Associations and pressure for democratic governance by Lambi, Julius
  
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
Titel der Dissertation 
 
Associations and Pressure for Democratic 
Governance: The Case of Cameroon 
 
 
 
Verfasser 
 
Mag. Julius N. Lambi 
 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
 
Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. Phil.) 
 
 
 
Wien,  2011 
 
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 092 300 
Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaft 
Betreuer 1: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Herbert Gottweis 
Betreuer 2: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Werner Zips 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
If power holders were poets they would write: 
 
Oh power,  
So sweet to my heart,  
Is thy nectar,  
That losing thee, 
Is the stab of a dagger. 
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ABSTRACT   
 
The progress of democracy in any society hinges on pressure from civil society. 
Given the widely accepted premise that democratic governance is crucial for 
development efforts to succeed, international donors have since the late 80s, allocated 
high amounts of funding to civil society organizations (CSOs) in developing 
countries. Robert Putnam’s (1993: 185) argument that associations promote social 
capital, which “is the key to making democracy work” has greatly contributed in 
promoting the expectation that international donor support to civil society 
organizations in the developing world will result in more democratic and better 
performing governments. Taking the association-rich North West Region of 
Cameroon as a case, this research examines the extent to which CSOs a sub-Saharan 
African context possess capacities to pressure for democratic governance. It also 
analyses how the institutional context – regulations, norms and cultural values – affect 
the democracy pressure capacities of Cameroon’s civil society organizations.  
 
The research shows that on average, CSO pressure for democracy (bottom-up 
pressure) is low in North West Cameroon, despite the high density of development 
association in the region. On the one hand, CSOs in the case study exhibit high social 
capital, in the form of inter-association networking, and collaboration with 
stakeholder communities. On the other hand, political capital, as well as resource 
capacity is low among these civil society organizations. The association boom in 
Cameroon has not produced anticipated improvements in governance, because unlike 
Putnam’s thesis suggests, a high level of social capital is not sufficient for 
associations to have a positive effect on state administration. The study demonstrates 
that Putnam’s assumption that high political capital invariably accompanies high 
social capital is incorrect.  
 
To effectively promote democratic governance, efforts aimed at strengthening civil 
society organizations in Africa must directly challenge the regulatory, normative and 
cultural institutions that constrain political capital and resources capacity in these 
associations. Civil society organizations in Africa are more likely to break 
institutional constraints to democracy when they actively replicate those interventions 
that have yielded results in their given contexts; and when they make their advocacy 
efforts consistent or continuous over a period of time, as opposed to intermittent or 
discontinuous.  
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KURZFASSUNG 
 
Der Prozess der Demokratisierung in einer Gesellschaft hängt vom Druck der 
Zivilgesellschaft ab. Ausgehend von der weitverbreiteten Vorraussetzung, dass 
demokratische Governance ausschlaggebend ist, um entwicklungspolitische 
Anstrengungen zu erreichen, haben internationale Spender seit den späten 80iger 
Jahren hohe Geldsummen in die Finanzierung von zivilgesellschaftlichen 
Organisationen (CSOs) in Entwicklungsländern investiert. Robert Putnam (1993: 185) 
argumentiert, dass die betreffenden Vereine soziales Kapital fördern, welches “der 
Schlüssel zu einer funktionierenden Demokratie ist”, und hat damit dazu beigetragen, 
die Erwartungen zu fördern, dass die Unterstützung internationaler Spender zur 
zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen in Entwicklungsländern zu demokratischer und 
besser funktionierender Governance beitragen wird. Wenn man die Gemeinschaft der 
Nord- Westlichen Region Kameruns als Fallbeispiel hernimmt, zeigt diese Forschung 
in welchem Ausmaß CSO's in einem Sub-Sahara Kontext Druck ausüben können, um 
demokratische Governance zu erreichen. Weiters wird der institutionelle Kontext – 
Regulierungen, Normen und kulturelle Werte – analysiert, der diese demokratischen 
Bewegungen, ausgehend von Kameruns Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, 
beeinflusst.  
 
Die Forschung zeigt, dass der Druck von CSO's (bottom-up Druck) in Nord-West 
Kamerun in Durchschnitt eher niedrig ist, trotz der hohen Dichte von 
entwicklungspolitische Vereinen in der Region. Auf der einen Seite verfügen 
zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in diesem Fall hohes soziales Kapital in Form 
von inter-Vereins networking und der Zusammenarbeit mit Stakeholder 
Gemeinschaften. Auf der anderen Seite sind in diesen zivilgesellschaftlichen 
Organisationen sowohl politisches Kapital als auch Ressourcen knapp. Der Vereins-
Boom hat die angestrebten Veränderungen im Governance Bereich nicht 
herbeigeführt, da, wie von Putnam behauptet, ein hoher Level an sozialen Kapital 
nicht ausreichend ist um die staatliche Administration positiv zu beeinflußen. Die 
Studie widerlegt Putnam's Annahme, welche besagt, dass starkes soziales Kapital 
unausweichlich von hohen starkem politischen Kapital begleitet wird.  
 
Um demokratische Governance effektiv zu stärken, müssen die Anstrengungen die 
darauf abzielen, zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in Afrika zu stärken regulative, 
normative und kulturelle Institutionen hinterfragen, die politisches Kapital sowie 
Ressourcen in diesen Vereinen innehalten. Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen 
werden institutionelle Auflagen eher durchbrechen, wenn sie Interventionen 
wiederholen, die bereits Ergebnisse eingebracht haben und sie ihre Bestrebungen 
konsequent und konstant über einen gewissen Zeitraum ausüben, anstatt sporadisch 
und unstetig.  
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1. ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY 
IN AFRICA 
 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Democracy has never been handed down to a people on a platter of gold . . . We have 
set as one of our goals, to rid the Cameroonian society of a system that deprives people  
from being free men…We call upon you to stand up and be counted  
amongst those who share our democratic ideal.”  
 
The above were the words of a commoner, John Fru Ndi, (quoted in Konings, 2004: 291) 
who, together with a group of associates, defied the oppressive Biya regime in Cameroon 
and launched the first opposition party at a massive rally on 26 May 1990. This event 
exemplified an unprecedented rise in civic advocacy for democratic rights in Cameroon; 
and it marked a turning point in the country’s political life. In the month of December of 
1990, the government reluctantly responded to the pressures from civil society groups by 
passing civil liberty decrees, namely, the freedom to form political parties, the freedom of 
association, and the press freedom laws. Through civic networking, which was mostly 
done clandestinely, citizens had identified their common interests, built group solidarity 
and courage, and developed a common strategy to force the government to carry out 
reform.  On the African continent, this rise of opposition to authoritarianism followed by 
a transition to multiparty politics was not peculiar to Cameroon.  
 
In fact, the early 90s was the era of democratic awakening for sub-Saharan Africa in 
general. In almost all countries in the sub-continent, there was unprecedented civic 
mobilization and advocacy for electoral reform, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. Following Huntington (1991: 12), scholars have referred to this 
prodemocracy turn in Africa as part of the “third wave of democratization” – a global 
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movement for democracy which was set in motion by the fall of authoritarian regimes in 
Europe.  Decalo (1992) for example writes:  
triggered by the spectacle of the fall of titans in Bucharest and elsewhere, in 1990 a 
powerful backwash of demonstrations for ‘re-democratization flooded all corners of Africa. 
By 1991 the backwash was a veritable tidal wave, methodically transforming the political 
map of the continent.  
 
To put it differently, an appetite for democracy had grown among citizens in Africa, as 
dictatorships lost credibility across the world. The national prodemocracy movements 
coupled with strong international pressure for democratic reform forced a majority of 
post-colonial regimes in Africa to introduce multiparty politics and civil liberties. By 
1997 all but 4 of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had introduced multiparty elections 
(Bratton, 1999).  
 
From a quantitative perspective, the scale of transitions, from one-party to multiparty 
politics, was impressive. However, from a qualitative point of view, a majority of the new 
African democracies left much to be desired. In most of the young democracies, 
incumbent governments practised massive election-rigging, intimidated or victimized the 
opposition, censored or harassed the press, and carried out human rights violations. Many 
of the African governments had in effect transformed to hybrid regimes; exhibiting some 
democratic features amidst dominant authoritarian traits. Researchers used different 
labels like “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2009: 382), “virtual democracies” 
(Joseph, 1998), pseudo-democracies, “incomplete” democracies (O'Donnell, 1996) and 
so on, to describe the new African democracies.  These different labels communicated the 
same thing, namely that liberal democracy had been planted in Africa, but it was yet to 
take root. Despite, the deficiencies of the new African democracies, there were hopes for 
rapid consolidation of democracy on the continent, both among scholars and international 
development practitioners. The reasons behind such high hopes for a speedy 
3 
 
consolidation of democracy on the continent are best captured by two words: civil 
society.   
 
1.2  CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY  
 
Following the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy in sub-Saharan 
African countries in the 1990s, scholars postulated that newly introduced civil liberties 
would constitute an enabling environment in which hitherto suppressed civil society 
organizations would blossom. Researchers argued that just as social groups such as the 
middle class had undermined patrimonial rule in Western European states (Woods, 
1992), the nascent civil society in African states will develop and readily consolidate or 
deepen democracy.  
 
Expectations regarding the civil society’s role in the consolidation or deepening of 
democracy in Africa were basically two-fold. First, the civil society was expected to 
pressure the government to put in place policies and structures such as respect of human 
rights, press freedom laws, and independent electoral commissions that would ensure free 
and fair elections (representative democracy). Second, and more important, scholars 
argued that the civil society would advocate for participatory governance reforms –
democracy beyond election of representatives.  
 
According to Haberson (1994: 1), “multiparty elections do not by themselves produce or 
sustain democracy. They do not ipso facto institutionalize broad participation in political 
life.” Similarly, Diamond et al (1999) point out that although elections are the spine of 
democracy, the Schumpeterian model of representative democracy is inadequate for 
guaranteeing true democratic accountability. They note:  
Elections – however competitive, free, and fair – are by themselves too weak to 
guarantee “decent” government. They are necessary but by no means a sufficient 
condition for keeping state power under control; protecting civil liberties; making 
public officials follow established rules and procedure; keeping them responsive to 
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citizen preferences; making them observe norms of fairness and efficiency in the 
appropriation and expense of public money; and deterring them from exploiting 
public office for private gain (ibid: 2).  
 
Participatory democracy which engages citizens in decision-making, policy 
implementation and monitoring was seen as crucial for development in Africa. Scholars 
and development practitioners argued that pro-poor reforms were unlikely to be 
conceived and effectively implemented in African states, if the poor are excluded from 
politics. In development discourse, civil society was accorded significant responsibility 
for promoting participatory governance in the new democracies of Africa. Haberson 
(1994: 1, italics added) for example, hypothesized that civil society was the “missing key 
to sustained political reform, legitimate...governments, [and] improved governance” in 
Africa. 
 
Larry Diamond (1994) provides one of the most comprehensive analyses of the potential 
contributions of civil society to the deepening of democracy. He highlights that the civil 
society could contribute to the enhancement of democracy in ten ways. First, the civil 
society plays a crucial role in setting limitation on state power, thereby checking the 
abuse of power by government. Second, associations within civil society promote citizen 
participation. By so doing, they build ‘skills for political engagement’ among citizens and 
act as supplements to political parties. Third, by promoting participation, the civil society 
plays an important function of ‘teaching’ people democratic values and norms such as 
tolerance, negotiation and compromise. Fourth, civil society organizations contribute in 
representing and championing the interests of minority groups that have inadequate 
channels of communicating their concerns to decision-makers. Fifth, a civil society that 
promotes or is characterized by religious, cultural and political pluralism bridges political 
extremities; and by encouraging dialogue and tolerance it reduces the possibilities for 
violent conflicts.  
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Sixth, civil society organizations also have a democratic function in that they can act as 
the training centres for activist who can subsequently play a leadership role in mobilizing 
people to challenge illegitimate governments. Seventh, civil society organizations can 
encourage voter-turnout, monitor elections, and discredit fraudulent elections. The eighth 
contribution of civil society to democracy is the dissemination of information regarding 
government activities and performance. Access to adequate information enables people to 
demand government accountability, and to advocate for their rights.  Ninth, with greater 
access to information, civil society organizations contribute to equality and fairness by 
supporting economic reforms that benefit marginalized groups or the wider population, 
rather than those that will benefit an elite minority. Tenth, the civil society can support 
democracy by working in partnership with an elected government, thereby giving it 
legitimacy. Greater legitimacy – citizen recognition and acceptance of the authority of the 
government – facilitates governance and increases government effectiveness. 
 
The above identified democratization potentials of civil society, drawn from the 
experiences of Western European countries was the reason for the high expectations and 
euphoria about the role of civil society in the new democracies in Africa. In scholarly 
descriptions, civil society soon began to sound like a panacea that will rid Africa 
democracies of their inadequacies. Owusu (1992) and Fatton (1995), for example, noted 
that civil society is crucial for democratization because powerful elites are often reluctant 
to carry out reforms that will diminish their powers. The emergence of participatory 
forms of governance was therefore seen to hinge on pressure from civil society – bottom-
up pressure. An extraordinarily high proportion of donor support to Africa was directed 
towards civil society organizations (CSOs). This increased funding prompted a 
tremendous increase in the number of CSOs on the continent (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996).  
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Diamond (1994: 5) defines civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is 
voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and 
bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.”  Per this definition, civil society includes a 
myriad of societal groups; such as, cultural and religious groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), community development organizations, churches, audio-visual 
and print media organs, trade unions, the academia and commercial/economic 
organizations. Bratton (1994: 51-52) notes that civil society – the collection of non-state 
actors that work towards state transformation – is a term that evolved “distinctively in 
European historical and cultural milieu.” Civil society, he observes, is a construct: “a 
theoretical concept rather than an empirical one” (ibid: 57).  
 
Although euphoria about the potential contribution of civil society to democratization in 
Africa remained dominant in development discourse in the 1990s, an increasing number 
of researchers began to question the applicability of the concept in the African context. 
Despite a tremendous increase in the number of CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa, hopes for 
the advancement of democracy and the emergence of participatory governance remained 
unrealized. In countries like Cameroon, the democratic process appeared not only to have 
stalled, but to be actually moving in reverse (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004). Takougang 
(2003: 433) observes that in Cameroon “democracy is yet to mean more than something 
cosmetic, an empty concept or slogan devoid of concrete meaning.” Scholars have noted 
that the civil society in many sub-Saharan African countries does not exercise the 
attributes to push for participatory governance that are mentioned above. In the case of 
Cameroon, for example, the civil society is seen as weak, passive, disorganized, and 
fragmented (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004; Dicklitch, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 1999). 
 
The concept of civil society, however, remains en vogue in development discourse 
despite the apparent slow emergence of ‘beyond-the-ballot-box’ democracy in many 
African countries. Whether or not the civil society in Africa can be counted upon to 
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advance democracy as was the case in Western European countries remains an issue of 
heated scholarly debate. On one side, there are optimists who see a rosy picture in which 
dense associational networks act as breeding grounds for democratic norms, and 
spearhead advocacy for participatory governance reforms. On the other side, pessimists 
argue that the conceptualization of civil society as a realm of organized protest in which 
actors respect norms of participation or inclusion is inconsistent with the African context, 
where patronage, and ethnicity, and social fragmentation is the norm. Equally, Kasfir 
(2004: 121) argues that the normative assumptions and positive expectations associated 
with the civil society concept in conventional literature make it “an artefact pointing to 
the future of African politics, not to its present.” 
 
Blind and uncritical optimism which ignores the African context is not useful for 
understanding the realistic role which civil society can play in enhancing participatory 
governance in Africa. Extreme pessimist arguments that highlight the shortcoming of 
civil society in African countries are also not very helpful, if they fail to identify how 
civil society can overcome these shortcomings. Civil society despite its problems can be 
given some credit for the ground that democracy has gained so far in sub-Saharan African 
countries like Cameroon. The overly pessimist view that the concept is not applicable or 
is unfounded in the African context is as such not justified.  
 
According to Woods (1992) and Lewis (2002), the right question to pose is not whether 
there is an emerging civil society in Africa, but rather, under what circumstances a strong 
civil society will develop in these ailing democracies. Reiterating Comaroff and 
Comaroff (1999), Lewis (2002) argues that there is need to shift focus away from 
rhetoric, to close-up observation or micro-level analysis of specific civil society actors in 
Africa, and the historical, socio-economic, cultural and political processes that shaped 
them. Close-up observation here means focusing research attention on a specific class of 
actors within civil society rather than on civil society as a single category.  
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Civil society has theoretical value for understanding how state-society interactions 
influence the evolution of democracy. However, the all-embracing concept is not very 
useful as an analytical tool for testing hypotheses in empirical research. Foley and 
Edwards (1998: 17) point out that as regards civil society,  
theorists willing to move beyond a mainly polemical or normative use to develop 
analytical tools for conceptualizing modern polities quickly become embroiled in 
unresolvable boundary disputes over just what constitutes civil society...at the 
expense of concrete investigation of the ways in which specific elements of society 
are shaped by, and shape in turn, the economic and political setting in which they 
move and breathe. 
 
The set of attributes that defines civil society has been a heavily contested issue since the 
inception of the concept. Leading scholars such as Hegel, Gramsci, and Tocqueville, 
conceptualize the notion differently. A historical review of the different interpretations of 
civil society is not the purpose of this study. It would suffice here to highlight that these 
variations in conceptualization make civil society a fluid concept. For example, while 
some scholars would classify government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) as civil society, 
others would regard such organizations as mere extensions of the government’s 
administrative structure. Business organizations for some scholars constitute part of civil 
society, meanwhile for others, these associations would fall under a separate category, 
namely the private sector (Foley and Edwards, 1996).  
 
Lewis’ recommendation that research should direct attention to how specific non-state 
actors influence democratic processes can help avoid the analysis challenges which 
ambiguity in the conceptualization of civil society poses.  This study will focus on the 
relationship between associations and the deepening of democracy for three reasons. 
First, in political science and international development discourse, the argument that 
there is a positive relationship between the existence of civic associations and the 
robustness of democratic institutions has gained remarkable prominence. Second, the 
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number of civil society organizations in sub-Saharan African countries like Cameroon 
has risen tremendously since the 1990s; how these associations contribute in pressing for 
greater participation, transparency, and accountability in the state is an issue of interest. 
Third, the persistence of politics of exclusion, centralized governments, and a poor 
human rights record in Africa despite the association boom – what Mohan (2002: 125) 
calls “the disappointments of civil society” – begs for research attention. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH FOCUS: THE ASSOCIATIONS-DEMOCRACY EQUATION 
 
Following Alexis de Tocqueville, who first highlighted a relationship between the 
vibrancy of associations and democracy in the United States, many scholars (Putnam, 
1993, 1995; Cohen and Rogers, 1992; Warren, 2000; Fung 2003) argue that a rich 
associational life promotes participation, trust, and cooperation that supports democracy. 
The associations-democracy theory has played a significant role in enhancing the 
expectations that the mushrooming of civil society organizations in Africa will have a 
positive effect on democratization processes. Paxton (2002: 254-255) observes that 
“current development efforts concentrate on the formation of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) in the belief that, once created, such institutions will foster and 
maintain stable democracies.” In particular, Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam’s 
(1993) pioneer study on associations and democracy in Italy has stimulated much support 
for the associations-democracy theory.  
 
Putnam (1993) observed great disparities in both the practice of politics and the 
performance of governments in twenty autonomous regions across Italy. In the regions of 
the North, there was a high density of cultural and recreational associations. Putnam 
(ibid: 101) refers to these regions as the “more civic regions.”  In these regions, 
corruption was low, and levels of civic engagement as well as government performance 
were high. In contrast to the North, the regions in the South were characterized by 
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scantiness in local associations, hence the term, “less civic regions” (ibid: 97). Here, 
corruption was high, government performance was poor and politics was “marked by 
vertical relations of authority and dependency...embodied in patron client network” (ibid: 
99).  
 
Drawing on Coleman (1988), Putnam advanced that the differences in modes of 
governance and government performance between the Northern and Southern regions 
were due to differences in social capital. The vibrant associational life in the Northern 
regions created a high stock of social capital – norms of reciprocity, trust and networks of 
solidarity – which predisposed citizens to cooperate in pursuit of common interests. He 
argued that when social capital is high as was the case in the Northern regions, citizens 
“demand more effective public service, and they are prepared to act collectively to 
achieve their shared goals” (Putnam, 1993: 182). In addition, he noted that the networks 
of horizontal ties established by associational activity implanted egalitarian values in 
society, and made state-society relations more democratic.  
 
According to Putnam (1993: 171), social capital consists of two components – “norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” – which co-determine each other. In other 
words, in regions with limited associational activity, people tend to trust and depend on 
each other. Meanwhile, communities in which people distrust each other are often 
characterized by a scantiness of civic associations. Considering this, he argues that the 
low level of associational activity in the Southern regions of Italy was the main reason for 
the undemocratic nature and poor performance of governments in these parts. In his 
conclusion, Putnam writes: “Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to 
making democracy work” (ibid: 185, my italics). In other words, Putnam argues that 
associations are the key to establishing and sustaining successful democratic governance. 
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The concept of social capital on which Putnam rests the associations-democracy theory is 
not new. Sociologists such as Bourdieu and Coleman had used the concept to explain 
why some individuals in different spheres of society have more advantages than others. 
According to Bourdieu (1986), social capital is a resource which an individual derives 
from institutionalized relationships with others and which the individual can draw upon 
to gain access to goods and services or other privileges. Like Bourdieu, Coleman defines 
social capital in functional terms. He regards it as a component of social structures which 
“like other forms of capital...is productive, making possible the achievement of certain 
ends that would not be attainable in its absence” (Coleman 1988: 98). 
 
Putnam’s perspective on social capital differs from that of Bourdieu and Coleman in one 
major way. While the two sociologists conceptualize social capital as a resource that 
individuals can possess and exercise, Putnam in his associations-democracy thesis 
regards it as a collective good that develops over time from the social interactions of a 
group of people (Schuurman, 2003). Putnam’s perspective is novel in the sense that it 
highlights how the sociological concept could have implications on the functioning of 
political systems and consequently on socio-economic development.  The influence of 
Putnam’s perspective on international development has been far reaching. Farouk (2004) 
observes that the following publication of Putnam’s work, multinational organizations, 
notably the World Bank began giving considerable attention to research on the 
implications of social capital for development and on ways of building social capital in 
developing countries.1 In fact, the World Bank (2001) defines social capital as a crucial 
factor for development: “the glue that holds societies together and without which there 
can be no economic growth or human well-being.” 
 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Dudwick et al (2006), Woolcock and Narayan (2005), and Grootaert, (1999). 
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1.4  THE RESEARCH PUZZLE 
 
Putnam’s associations-democracy theory brought social capital into the limelight of 
international development discourse – and behind popularity, followed scrutiny and 
critique. Levi (1996: 51) contests that Putnam’s associations-democracy thesis is a 
“romanticism of both associational life, and, more generally, social capital.” The thesis, 
she argues, overemphasises the positive democracy attributes of social capital and 
overlooks its potential negative or dysfunctional side.  
 
From the perspectives of Bourdieu and Coleman, social capital is a means that can be 
used for different ends: to advance equality and cooperation or to reproduce inequality 
and sectarianism. For example, Narayan (2002) notes that networks or solidarity among 
members of an association, can also act as the foundation for corruption, power 
monopoly, exclusion and segregation. Levi’s critique on Putnam’s neglect of the double 
face of social capital shows that the association-democracy relationship is not clear-cut. 
Other factors influence whether positive manifestation or negative forms of social capital 
develop. ‘How other factors come into play in the associations-democracy equation?’ is, 
therefore, a question that begs for research attention. 
 
In line with the above critique, Tarrow (1996) argues that Putnam focuses on an 
‘associations-to-democracy’ causal path and does not pay sufficient attention to how the 
institutional or socio-political context affects associations or social capital. In a similar 
vein, Paxton (2002: 260) writes: “the relationship between social capital and democracy... 
[is] reciprocal and mutually reinforcing.” This critique about the negligence of the effect 
of the institutional context on the democracy promotion potential of associations is even 
more salient when one looks at African countries like Cameroon. 
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Given the failures of the state to deliver development to the majority in Cameroon, many 
different kinds of community associations have emerged throughout the country in the 
past two decades. In these organizations local citizens cooperate to fill the development 
gap left by the government. The politically marginalized Northwest and West Regions 
(provinces) of Cameroon in particular are teeming with such associations. The 
democratization process in Cameroon appears to have come to a standstill (Mbaku, 2002) 
despite this so-called “efflorescence of...associational life” (Putnam, 1993: 91). The 
political system has remained quasi-presidentialist in nature; as the powers of the head of 
state extend into the judiciary, legislative and executive arms of the state. In addition, to 
high levels of bureaucratic corruption, “politics of the belly” (Bayart, 1993: 228) – the 
government practice of rewarding supporters with political power and financial resources 
while penalizing opponents – is prevalent. The observation that undemocratic 
governments persist in African countries like Cameroon despite the association boom 
brings one to ask how the institutional context of these countries shape the potential of 
associations to advance democratic governance.  
 
As Forje (2006) notes, an analysis of associational life in relation to the institutional 
context is of paramount importance because, “it will be erroneous to impose extra 
Cameroonian [or more broadly extra-African] perceptions, prescriptions and 
expectations” on this evolving civil society. To adequately understand what potentials 
associations have for the advancement of democratic governance, analysis of the 
influence of the institutional context must not be limited to societal and cultural factors, 
but must include the role of political structures (Berman, 1997). For Foley and Edwards 
(1996: 47), the contribution which civil society associations can bring to the advancement 
of democratic governance “depends crucially on the larger political setting.” Apart from 
the critique on neglect of the institutional context, reviewers have identified other major 
weaknesses in Putnam’s argument that call for research attention.  
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While Putnam posits a positive relationship between social capital and government 
performance, he does not explicitly explain the mechanisms through which social capital 
produces this desirable change (Boix and Posner, 1996; Booth and Richard, 1998). In his 
empirical research, Putnam focuses on non-contentious associations and on the 
cooperative and ‘civil norms-building’ function of civil society. According to Foley and 
Edwards (1996), apart from their civility-enhancing functions (dubbed Civil Society I), 
associations can also exercise an advocacy or anti-tyranny function (dubbed Civil Society 
II).  Civil society II represents contentious dispositions or political capital; as opposed to 
Civil Society I which is based on networking and collaboration – social capital. Putnam’s 
associations-democracy theory is silent on how social capital (Civil Society I) relates to 
political capital (Civil Society II).  
 
Booth and Richard (1998: 782) argue that “in order to have political significance”, 
associational life “must foster attitudes and behaviours that actually influence regimes in 
some way.” Likewise, Farouk (2004) asserts that for associations to actually enhance 
democratic governance, social capital must be transformed to political capital. With 
regards to African countries where there are high numbers of development associations, 
these commentaries raise a number of puzzles. First, does the existence of a high density 
of civic associations mean elevated social capital, in the form of high collaboration and 
networking among associations? Second, does the high association density mean the 
existence of high political capital, or a high disposition for activism? Third and most 
importantly, is the level of social capital among associations in a given region correlated 
with the level of political capital? If not, then how is the institutional context implicated 
in shaping whether or not political capital in associations develops alongside social 
capital? Finding answers to these puzzles is the business of this study.  
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1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
1.5.1 Research Questions 
 
Since its inception, the Putnam associations-democracy theory has come under fire. The 
persistence of autocratic forms of government in many African countries despite the rise 
of associations, compel scholars like Kasfir (1998: 1-2) to argue that the associations-
democracy link has been exaggerated. Despite such criticisms, current international 
development policy and practice continue to promote the creation of associations in 
developing countries in the belief that this will lead to democratization effects. There is 
need to leave faith aside and clarify with evidence the actual role which associations in a 
typical African context play in pressing for democratic governance.  
 
Warren (2004: 46) writes that “there is a very large amount of thinking and research to be 
done if we are really to take seriously the democracy-civil society [or association] 
connection.”  For instance, how the institutional context affects the capacity of 
associations to promote democracy has been largely neglected in most research (Fung, 
2003: 517). To determine the extent to which or the conditions under which the theory is 
applicable to sub-Saharan African countries, we must focus research attention on the 
influence of the institutional context.  
 
Taking as case study the North West Region of Cameroon, which is renowned in the 
country for its richness in development associations, this research addresses the following 
main question:  
1. How does the institutional context affect the capacity of associations to press for 
participatory democracy? 
2. With what measures have development associations challenged institutional 
constraints and contributed in pressure for democratic governance? 
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1.5.2  Research Objectives 
 
This study addresses the research questions and research puzzles highlighted above 
through six research objectives. The objectives fall into three categories, namely: 
conceptual tool, assessment and explanation objectives. 
 
Conceptual Tool Objective: 
1. Develop, through a broad review of literature, a framework that can be used for 
analyzing ‘the capacity of associations to pressure for democratic change’. 
Assessment Objectives: 
2.  Measure the bottom-up pressure potential of development associations in the 
North West Region of Cameroon and identify which attributes of pressure are in 
need of enhancement. 
3. Determine whether social capital among development associations correlates with 
political capital.   
4. Determine whether the influence of the institutional context is strong or weak in 
the North West Region of Cameroon. 
Explanation Objectives: 
5.  Elaborate the mechanism through which the institutional context (rules, norms, 
and cultural setting) constrains the capacity of associations to pressure for 
democracy. 
6. Identify and describe those measures that have helped development associations 
in the case study to challenge those institutions that constrain their potentials to 
act as democratization agents.   
 
1.6  RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Objective 1, the conceptual tool objective, is exploratory in nature and therefore requires 
no hypotheses.  
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To address Objectives 2, 3, and 4 (the assessment objectives), five sets of hypotheses are 
advanced; with H0 as the null hypothesis and Ha as the alternate hypothesis. In the 
context of this study, the null hypothesis represents the result that is predicted by theory, 
while the alternate hypotheses, as the name implies, represents the reverse of theoretical 
prediction. The hypotheses are as follows: 
 
The level of social capital among associations in the case study: 
H10: Social capital (cooperation and networking among associations) is high 
considering the high density of development associations in the NW region. 
H1a: Social capital (cooperation and networking among associations) is low despite 
the high density of development associations in the NW region. 
 
The level of political capital among associations: 
H20: The high density of associations in the NW region is associated with high 
levels of political capital. 
H2a: The high density of associations in the NW region is associated with low 
levels of political capital. 
 
On association’s capacity to pressure for democracy (bottom-up pressure): 
H30: On average, bottom-up pressure among associations in the NW Region is high 
given the high density of associations.  
H3a: On average, bottom-up pressure among associations in the NW Region is low 
despite the high density of associations. 
 
The relationship between social capital and political capital in associations: 
H40: Social capital and political capital in associations are correlated (coupled). 
H4a: Social capital and political capital in associations are not correlated.  
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The influence of the institutional context on bottom-up pressure: 
Institutionalism theorists, Dimaggio and Powell (1983), advance that organizations in a 
given environment become homogenous in character when they experience the same 
institutional pressures. Following this logic, the following hypotheses are advanced to 
investigate the extent to which the institutional environment – in an African case study 
like the NW Region of Cameroon – affects bottom-up pressure: 
H50: The influence of the institutional context is strong; associations display 
similarity (homogeneity) in bottom-up pressure capacities. 
H5a: The influence of the institutional context is weak; associations display a high 
degree of variance in bottom-up pressure capacities. 
 
Objectives 5 and 6 (explanation objectives) involve the description of causal mechanisms 
and effect processes. Given their descriptive orientation, addressing these research 
objectives does not involve the testing of hypotheses. Instead, in accordance with the 
grounded theory approach, causal mechanisms and effect processes are “abductively 
generated from robust data patterns...and justified in terms of their explanatory 
coherence” (Haig, 1995: 2). 
 
1.7  DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
 
Social capital and democratic governance, the key concepts in this research are probably 
the most popular and most contested notions in political science and development 
discourse. To avoid ambiguity, it is imperative that these key terms and others stated in 
the research questions and research hypothesis be clearly defined.  
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Institutional Context:  
Following Scott (2001), the institutional context in this study refers to the collection of 
rules (formal and informal), established societal values or norms and cultural belief 
systems that structure social action in a given setting.  
 
Participatory governance:  
Participatory democracy emerged as a critique of liberal democracy; it is as such best 
defined in relation to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is a system of government in 
which citizens enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
and freedom of association; and through free, fair, and transparent elections, they choose 
representatives who formulate laws and policies and carry out state administration on 
their behalf. According to critics, a liberal-type (purely representative) democracy cannot 
ensure that the interests of diverse segments of society, especially marginalized groups, 
are taken into consideration in decision-making. In this regard, liberal democracy can 
easily become what Tocqueville (2003: 240) calls “a tyranny of the majority.”  
 
Radical democracy theorists advance participatory governance as a remedy for the 
accountability, justice, and fairness deficit of liberal democracy. Participatory democracy 
is generally understood as a system of governance where people do not only freely elect 
their representatives, but where there is also “close and regular dialogue and interaction 
between leaders and followers”, enabling different groups in society to contribute their 
voice in decision-making (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992: 20).   
 
Associations:  
In accordance with conventional use of the term, an association in this study refers to a 
voluntary-membership group in which people organize themselves for social solidarity 
and/or for the pursuit of some shared interests. In Making Democracy Work, Putnam 
(1993) focuses on non-contentious secondary associations like leisure and cultural 
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groups. Foley and Edwards (1996) criticize Putnam for selection bias and for gross 
neglect of political associations that play a key role in advocacy against exclusion and 
authoritarianism. Such bias is avoided in this study. Since this research seeks to 
understand how associations can contribute to democratic governance for effective 
development, development associations will be the unit of analysis. Development 
associations will include all kinds of associations – contentious and non-contentious – 
that have a goal of improving access to public goods and services and of promoting the 
respect of human rights. The term associations will also be used interchangeably with 
civil society organizations (CSOs), which will include NGOs, community development 
organizations, and village development associations (VDAs).  
 
Social capital:  
Considering that the bone of contention of this study is the associations-democracy 
thesis, it makes sense to adopt the Putnam (1993) perspective on social capital. Social 
capital is thus defined in this study as comprising the networks and relationships of 
cooperation among development associations, as well as the relationships of 
collaboration which these associations have with their beneficiary communities.   
 
Political capital:  
Drawing on Booth and Richard (1998), political capital is defined as those attitudes, 
political party ties and activities of associations that can enable them influence state 
policies or practice. In accord, Farouk (2004: 2) notes that: 
Political capital consists, in the first instance, of resources which are part of the 
social structure that ... actors can utilize in their interaction with the state, which in 
turn may influence the state in formulating policies favourable to them. Additionally, 
political capital refers to organizational activities or activism that promotes civic 
norms that support democratic governance (support for democratic liberties) and 
conventional political participation. 
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1.8  OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
 
Chapter 1 – this introductory section – has presented a brief background of the 
democracy movement in sub-Saharan African countries which resulted in the 
introduction of civil liberties in the 90s. Following this liberalization, researchers 
postulated that a rise in association numbers will enhance democratic governance. This 
chapter has reviewed Robert Putnam’s associations-democracy theory, identified research 
gaps in the theory, and laid down research objectives and hypotheses to contribute in 
filling these research gaps. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 will address the first research objective of the study which is to build a 
conceptual framework that can be used for analysing and measuring the capacity of 
associations to promote democratic governance. The chapter argues that for associations 
to effectively pressure for democracy, they must have POWER. The acronym POWER 
stands for the argument that association must exercise five attributes, namely: ‘Politicize 
their development efforts’; ‘Organize and form networks’; ‘Work in collaboration with 
local communities to build grassroots ties’; ‘Establish link with opposition political 
parities’; and ‘Rally required resources’. 
 
Chapter 3, the methodology section, elaborates how the conceptual tool is operationalized 
in empirical data collection and analysis. This section also explains why the North West 
Region of Cameroon – a negative case study – is appropriate for addressing the research 
questions posed. The data collection methods, namely, a survey and semi-structured 
interviews, are described and justified; and so are the data analysis methods: 
correspondence analysis and process-tracing.  
 
Chapter 4 begins with a brief presentation of the political history of Cameroon and then 
focuses on addressing the second, third and fourth objectives of the research. As concerns 
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the second research objective, this section demonstrates that despite the high density of 
associations in the NW Region of Cameroon, average bottom-up pressure for democracy 
is low. Associations in the case study region score high in social capital attributes, 
namely, ‘Organization and networking’ (O) and ‘Working in collaboration with local 
communities’ (W). However, associations show low scores for ‘Resource capacity’ (R), 
as well as for political capital attributes, namely, ‘Politicization activities’ (P) and 
‘Established links with opposition political parties’ (E). The quantitative assessment of 
bottom-up pressure therefore reveals that development associations in Cameroon need to 
focus efforts on developing their political capital and resource capacities if they hope to 
play a greater role in democratization. 
 
Regarding the third research objective of the study, correspondence analysis of survey 
data leads to the conclusion that social capital and political are not correlated or coupled 
in the case study. In other words, although social capital is an important bottom-up 
pressure attribute, high levels of it among associations is not automatically accompanied 
by high levels of political capital. Given the observation that social capital and political 
are not coupled, Chapter 4 argues that social capital is not sufficient for democratization 
efforts as Putnam suggests. Without two other key elements, namely political capital and 
material/financial resources, social capital will not have the democratization effects that 
Putnam predicts. Simply put, as a contributor to democracy, social capital is weak in the 
absence of political capital and financial resources. 
 
In relation to the fourth research hypothesis, Chapter 4 demonstrates with the help of 
correspondence analysis that the influence of the institutional context on bottom-up 
pressure is strong in the case study. Associations exhibit considerable homogeneity in 
their bottom-up pressure capacities (POWER). Considering the strong influence of the 
institutional context, Chapter 4 concludes that to effectively support civil society in 
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Africa, it is first crucial to understand the mechanisms through which the institutional 
context produces an effect on bottom-up pressure, the fifth objective of the research. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses this fifth research objective. This section demonstrates that 
government and donor regulations, together with norms and cultural codes of conduct 
work to constrain political capital in development associations. The regulatory constraints 
include: government harassment of politically-active associations; state enforcement of a 
decree that forbids associations to have political objectives or political party ties; the 
retainment of a vague state law that permits the government to ban protests on account of 
preserving peace and security; and lastly, government and donor preferential funding of 
service-delivery associations as opposed to activist associations.  
 
Regarding the influence of normative institutions, the fifth chapter argues that corruption 
and clientelism are entrenched norms that inhibit political capital in associations in the 
Cameroonian context. These practices are so widespread that the non-players 
(associations that criticize the government) tend out to be the losers. To gain access to 
financial resources from the state, associations are therefore forced to succumb to the 
corruption norm, and their opposition spirit is compromised in the process. Furthermore, 
in Cameroon, opposition or political rivalry is construed as enmity. This norm, which is a 
relic of clashes between the opposition and the ruling party during the democracy 
movement of the 90s, makes most associations to avoid engagement in political activities. 
Furthermore, being apolitical and non-partisan is a norm encouraged by the majority of 
development associations in the NW Region, even though apolitical equates with 
acquiescence to bad governance.  
 
In addition to the above norms, politics in the Cameroonian context is construed as a 
profession that should be left to experts, namely political party officials. The prominence 
of this so-called ‘professionalization of politics’ norm limits the formation of 
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‘association-opposition party linkages’ that are important for democratization efforts. The 
above influence factors are exacerbated by a predilection for ethnicity politics. The 
existence of over 294 registered political parties – as many parties as ethnic groups – 
leaves the opposition highly fragmented. Due to this fragmentation, opposition parties do 
not appear to associations as credible partners with whom they can establish links and 
work to advance democracy.  
 
Two cultural factors that contribute in limiting political capital in associations are 
highlighted in Chapter 5. The first is an enduring culture of respect or reverence of elites 
and chiefs. This longstanding tradition limits the degree to which civil society 
organizations challenge established power. Secondly, resource scarcity has bred a culture 
of strife and competition, rather than one of cooperation among development 
associations. Quantitative data shows that associations in the NW Region exhibit high 
social capital in the form of cooperation and networking. However, this networking 
remains superficial in the atmosphere of backstabbing, blackmail, and scramble over 
donor resources, which has developed among associations. As a result of this culture of 
competition, joint advocacy campaigns are uncommon even though good governance is 
an objective with which a large number of development associations identify. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the sixth research objective: identifying those measures that have 
helped development associations in North West Cameroon to challenge institutions that 
constrain their pressure potentials. This section argues that associations are more likely to 
break institutional constraints to democracy when thier advocacy efforts are consistent or 
continuous over a period of time, as opposed to when they are intermittent or 
discontinuous. Some of the measures that have yielded results include, the creation of 
microcosms of participatory democracy by involving citizens in development projects at 
the local level. Such participation programmes erode those norms and values that support 
corruption, clientelism and exclusion. Other measures worthy of note include: carrying 
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out revenue-generating activities to reduce reliance on donors for resource; establishing 
partnerships with multiple donors to reduce the risk of cooptation by one principal donor; 
and using the legal system to fight injustice and abuse of power.  
 
Qualitative data also reveals that attacking the image of the government through 
embarrassment and shaming of corrupt government sectors forces state administrators to 
consider reform. In addition, using the media and other means of communication allows 
associations to share vital information, learn from each other, and replicate measure that 
have yielded positive improvements in governance. Through such information-sharing, a 
movement for change can grow out of disconnected association advocacy initiatives. 
 
Chapter 7, the concluding section recapitulates the main research puzzle of the study, 
highlights the conceptual and theoretical contributions of the research, and proposes some 
practical recommendations for international donors and development associations in 
Africa. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the degree to which the findings can be 
generalized, and also points out the limitation of the study as well as issues for further 
research. 
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2. CONSTRUCTING A TOOL FOR ASSESSING BOTTOM-
UP PRESSURE: THE POWER FRAMEWORK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Pressure from the bottom is crucial for driving democratic change. Without bottom-up 
pressure, the emergence of participatory governance will be entirely dependent on the 
benevolence of the powerful, who typically are unwilling to open up decision-making.  
Although literature abounds with case studies on how civic associations can mount 
pressure for democratic change, no suitable methodological tool for assessing bottom-up 
pressure has yet been developed. From an extensive review of literature, this chapter 
develops a tool – the POWER framework – for the assessment of bottom-up pressure. 
The POWER framework upholds that civic associations mount effective bottom-up 
pressure when they: (i) Politicize their development efforts; (ii) Organize, form networks 
and coalitions based on a participation ideology; (iii) Work in collaboration with the 
community, thereby building social ties that make mobilization possible; (iv) Establish 
strong links with pro-democracy opposition parties; and (v) Rally resources and 
capacities for advocacy and lobbying. 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In international development, participatory governance has gained widespread popularity 
as the therapy for the failings of hierarchical systems of governance in developing 
countries. In fact promoting participation in development programs has almost become a 
gospel among western donors. This popularity is based on the premise that including the 
marginalized in decision-making guarantees more equality, accountability and justice in 
development. Given this argument, many scholars, NGOs, western donors and 
international organizations across the globe have joined voices in what can be termed a 
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‘rhetoric jihad’ for participatory governance. Changes in practice on the ground, 
however, have not readily followed popular calls for participatory governance.   
 
In the last three decades, critics have increasingly noted that many participatory 
approaches in development have failed to achieve their empowerment goals. A number of 
critics concurrently point out that these failures occur because participation programs pay 
inadequate attention to power inequalities. Although supposed participatory schemes 
introduce new procedures that incorporate marginalized people, they do not necessarily 
grant these formerly excluded groups more power to influence policies. White (1996: 14) 
refers to this tendency of participatory approaches to downplay power inequalities as the 
“non-politics of participation.” Ferguson (1990: 21) calls it the “anti-politics machine” in 
development; Cleaver (1999: 599) talks of “empowerment depoliticized”; and Mosse 
(2001: 17) laments how “participation no longer has the radical connotation it once had.” 
 
Depoliticization is a characteristic feature of top-down participation schemes 
(participation programs engineered or sponsored by the powerful). While appearing to be 
inclusive, these programs obscure huge power inequalities that exist between different 
actors. In top-down participation schemes, how much influence marginalized people have 
often remains entirely dependent on the good will of those who hold greater power. As 
many have noted, participatory governance has been slow to materialize essentially 
because elites hang on to power and resist genuine introduction of reforms that shift 
control to ordinary people (Schönwälder, 1997: 754-755; Owusu, 1992: 393; Bell and 
Park, 2006: 64). Counting exclusively on top-down facilitation for the emergence of 
participatory governance in undemocratic settings is “either naive or potentially 
dangerous for the poor” (Sandbrook, 1977: 412). To do so, is to entrust the promotion of 
participation to those who have a propensity to hold on to power.  
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Recognizing power egocentricity as a frequent attribute of powerful actors especially in 
undemocratic contexts does not imply that governing elites can never open up and 
introduce meaningful participatory reforms. Political elites sometimes support power 
devolution. For example, in an analysis of the emergence of the famous participatory 
budgeting scheme in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Abers (1998: 512) underlines the important 
role which state actors played in promoting the scheme. In far too many cases, however, 
while chanting participation, administrators and development agents leave established 
power structures intact and genuine transformations that give control to local people fail 
to take place. Given this observation, Cooke and Kothari (2001:8-13) describe 
participation as “the new tyranny” in development. By this, they see participation as an 
instrument that powerful actors recurrently employ to tame opposition and make 
legitimate their oppression of others.  
 
This ‘neglect of power’ critique has not stopped the popularity of participatory 
approaches to development (Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 238). Nonetheless, it has raised 
consciousness on the fact that participation initiated from the top often acts like mascara 
that conceals entrenched power inequalities. The critique has called on advocates of 
participatory governance to take power seriously by recognizing the dangers of relying 
solely on powerful actors for the introduction of participation.  
 
Participatory governance no doubt takes root and thrives readily where those with power 
create conducive conditions for civil society to operate. However, exclusive reliance on 
top-down facilitation overlooks that political will for the promotion of participatory 
governance does not simply emerge on its own accord. Without motivation, those in 
control would hardly relinquish power to lower levels. Bottom-up pressure especially in 
unconsolidated democracies is important for participatory reforms to go beyond cosmetic 
involvement of people. In the absence of pressure from the bottom, participation often 
ends up as ‘involvement without influence’. 
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True participatory governance as Fung (2003: 528) notes, often materializes from civic 
association demands for equality, accountability and power devolution. In other words, 
whether or not governments introduce participatory governance reforms in 
unconsolidated democracies is seen to depend on pressure from civil society 
organizations (CSOs). Literature is lush with case studies that examine the role of CSOs 
in promoting participation in diverse policy areas in different regions of the world. These 
case studies range from positive descriptions of how CSOs have marshaled in 
participatory reforms, to accounts of how the empowerment agendas of CSOs have been 
co-opted and depoliticized. 
 
The wealth of literature on CSOs and participatory governance contribute bits of 
knowledge on what is required for civic bottom-up pressure to advance democracy. 
However, there is no study that combines these contributions and provides a 
comprehensive framework of the elements needed for effective civic association pressure 
for participatory governance. Since bottom-up pressure is essential for the promotion of 
meaningful participation, the need for a comprehensive framework that can serve for 
systematic analysis of civic association pressure in different contexts cannot therefore be 
overstressed.  
 
Drawing on civic associations, participation, and social movement literature, this chapter 
develops a conceptual tool – the POWER framework – for assessing bottom-up pressure. 
The POWER framework takes inspiration from Lowndes et al (2006a: 281-291) who 
develop a framework of the factors that influence citizen participation.  The POWER 
framework presents five factors as the essential attributes of effective bottom-up pressure. 
This categorization makes the framework suitable for systematic analysis and comparison 
of bottom-up pressure among different associations or across contexts. The POWER 
framework can also serve as a methodological tool for disciplined analysis of how the 
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institutional context may influence the growth or decline of civic association pressure for 
participatory governance. 
 
The first section of the chapter defines the concept of participation and highlights how 
participation loses meaning when power inequalities are downplayed. Section two 
discusses the different forms in which power manifests, and most importantly, it reflect 
on how power can affect the promotion of participation. The third section argues how 
CSOs could mount effective bottom-up pressure for genuine participation. The section 
presents and explains the POWER framework – a compilation of the elements for 
effective civic association pressure developed from existing literature. Section four 
explains the methodological advantages of the framework and how it can be used for 
disciplined analysis of civic association pressure in diverse contexts. 
 
2.2  PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND THE NEGLECT OF POWER 
 
The most attractive feature of the theory of participatory democracy is the argument that 
participation can remedy the failings of traditional top-down management. Proponents 
argue that participation promotes effective, responsive, accountable, efficient and 
sustainable development. Apart from this argument, participation has a strong moral 
appeal, as it connotes people-led and people-centered development. Both aspects 
contribute to why nowadays, in development work, ‘everyone’ from global to local level 
is talking about participation. In this popularity, the concept of participation has been 
stretched to incorporate many things, and its meaning has become blurred (Oakley, 1991: 
115; White, 1996: 7). The vagueness surrounding the use of participation makes 
Anderson (1999: 191) to liken participation to an empty signifying: a multi-purpose 
notion employed by different actors (even the nondemocratic) in pursuit of different 
interests.  
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But what in essence is participation? Like democracy, development, empowerment and 
similar buzzwords, the definition of participation is highly contested. Perhaps the most 
renowned definition is that of the World Bank, a major contributor to the participatory 
turn of the development discourse. The World Bank (1996: 2) defines participation in 
development as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them.” Participation, 
Stiglitz (2002: 165) corroborates, “entails open dialogue and broadly active civic 
engagement, and it requires that individuals have a voice in the decisions that affect them 
[my italics].”  
 
For greater clarity, Oackley (1991: 116) differentiates between two issues embodied in 
the concept of participation, namely, participation as a means and participation as an end. 
As a means, participation denotes involvement of stakeholders to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in already-set agendas over which they have no real control. Meanwhile as 
an end, participation means challenging the power inequalities that characterise 
hierarchical management, thus making formerly excluded and dependent groups free to 
input their priorities in development. As the World Bank definition above indicates, the 
devolution of decision-making authority to stakeholders should be the very essence of 
participation. Participation thus is fundamentally political. Without its democratization 
component (that is, participation as an end) which seeks to transform domination and 
shift greater control to less powerful actors, participation will be superficial and 
‘inauthentic’ (Anderson, 1998: 575-76).  
 
Much of the attack on participation centres on the failure of many schemes to fulfil the 
vital mission of making a resolute assault on power inequalities. In many schemes that 
claim to be participatory, powerful actors who are unwilling to give up control tend to 
focus on the effectiveness and efficiency objectives of participation rather than on the 
empowerment objectives. When power inequalities are downplayed, participation loses 
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its potential to transform the system of governance. For example, Quaghebeur et al 
(2004: 161) show that in donor-driven development, programs that focus on achieving 
tangible project outcomes leave hierarchic relations untouched. In this way, powerful 
actors only exploit participation as a ‘soft’ means to secure legitimacy (Mosse, 2001:27): 
“a means for top-down planning to be imposed from the bottom up” (Hildyard et al, 
2001: 59-60). 
 
As far back as the 18th century, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, the pioneer of participation theory 
recognised the importance of power balance for true participation.  He emphasised that 
ideal participation requires equality among stakeholders, to ensure that no actor forces its 
goals to prevail over common interests (Pateman, 1970). Rousseau pointed out that, 
equality among stakeholders holds  
the key to the working of the political machine [of participation]; this alone 
legitimises civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and 
liable to the most frightful abuses (Rousseau, 2008: 27).  
 
This prerequisite – the independence of actors – makes the emergence of participatory 
governance seem like an unrealistic utopian dream in political settings with hierarchic 
power relations. But while Rousseau in his time wrote on participation only 
hypothetically, today there is compelling empirical evidence that this other world which 
he imagined is indeed possible.  
 
Case studies of successful empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) 
show that power structures can be transformed to bring participation close to Rousseau’s 
utopian vision. But if power imbalances in a given context are not restructured, then 
participation as a democratic vision in which people jointly decide their policies and 
priorities becomes unrealisable. In many so-called participatory programmes in 
development, participation misses the whole point: initiators of participation programs 
fail to apply participation as a radical challenge to power inequalities and paternalistic 
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structures. Instead, they apply participation as a mere technical solution to societal 
problems (Botes and van Rensburg, 2000: 46-47).  
 
Participation engineered or promoted by powerful actors often stresses on cooperation 
and consensus, rather than revolution and system overhaul. Bachrach and Botwinick 
(1992: 152) note that consensual politics is a favoured approach to democracy in political 
science, because class struggles are often considered potentially destabilising. They argue 
that restraining struggles against inequalities via the promotion of consensus is unhealthy 
for democratization. Democracy, they argue, instead benefits when bottom-up class 
struggles are promoted as these are crucial for counteracting domination and promoting 
equality (ibid: 152-53). For Mouffe (2000: 149), the aim of democratic politics should 
not be to eradicate passions and dissent under the guise of consensus, or harmony. 
Encouraging democratic contestation (“agonism”), she argues, reduces the potential for 
differences to degenerate into violent conflicts (“antagonism”).  
 
True participatory governance will seldom be bestowed to a people; it is something 
marginalized groups themselves have to struggle for. In fact, Taylor (2001: 136) upholds 
that participation in development is in dire need of its neglected radical side: a “challenge 
from below” against relations of subordination. Similarly, Rahman (1995: 29) argues that 
this pressure from the bottom “is needed to influence...political or social forces towards 
eventual transformation.” Given the criticism levied on participation, proponents of 
participatory governance are now turning attention to how participation can be re-
politicized. The book ‘Participation: from Tyranny to Transformation’ (Hickey and 
Mohan, 2004) is an example of such works. Re-politicization means viewing 
participation as a project whose primordial aims is to reduce asymmetries of power. It 
means reconceptualising participation in terms of advocacy or struggle for political 
accountability and authentic inclusion of the interests of marginalized groups.  
 
35 
 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are generally regarded as having the mandate to 
mount pressure for power devolution reforms. Understanding what is needed for CSOs to 
effectively exercise this role is of great value to proponents of participatory democracy. 
But before proceeding to discuss the elements important for CSOs to mount effective 
pressure for participation, it is first important to understand how domination is exercised. 
Contemplating how insubordination can grow and thrive will benefit from a discussion of 
the mechanisms through which subordination is secured in the first place. The next 
section reviews the concept of power with emphasis on the different mechanisms which 
powerful actors employ to achieve dominance.    
 
2.3  DOMINATION AND THE DIMENSIONS OF POWER 
 
In political science, considerable intellectual scholarship has focused on discerning the 
forms in which power operates. Understanding the dimensions of power sheds light on 
how some groups or classes manage to maintain control over others. Knowledge on how 
power operates provides a basis for reflecting on what counter power mechanisms 
marginalized groups would require to escape these domineering influences.  
 
What is power? How is power exercised to secure domination for some over others? 
These questions have been heavily debated. Academic debate has yielded valuable 
insights on the different forms in which power works to secure domination. These 
different forms of power are commonly referred to as the four dimensions of power 
(Digeser, 1992: 978; Hardy, 1996; 4). It is beyond the scope of this work to exhaustively 
review, for its own sake, the debates on the dimensions of power that go far back in the 
history of political thought. Numerous works have already done justice to this aspect (see 
for example, Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996). The interest here is to reflect on what the 
different dimensions of power mean for CSOs and the participatory governance agenda. 
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The first dimension conceives power as the capacity of an individual, group or 
organization to make its interests prevail over those of another in a decision-making 
setting. According to this position, the exercise of power occurs only in situations of 
observable conflict, which implies that the party whose position is adopted at the end of 
the decision-making process is the party with more power (Dahl, 1961: 336; Polsby, 
1963: 113). This view of power presumes that actors (such as CSOs) are conscious of 
their preferences and they pursue them resolutely in decision-making. The one-
dimensional view on power thus sees disempowerment only as a subjugation of the 
interests of the weak in decision-making. In other words, it sees no power at work where 
there appears to be consensus. Therefore, by implication, it suggests that to promote 
participation, CSOs and marginalized groups only need to increase their representation 
and negotiation power in decision-making. 
 
The second dimension of power argues that analyzing power only in terms of contention 
in decision-making is insufficient. Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 949) point out that power 
is also at work when an actor “limits decision making to relatively non-controversial 
matters, by influencing community values and political procedures.” They refer to this 
second dimension as the “non-decision making” face of power (ibid: 949), since it works 
to keep certain disagreements out of the political process.  
 
This second dimension view which highlights a more covert face of power has significant 
implications for participatory governance. It reveals that dominant actors can forestall 
genuine participation just by influencing which issues come up on the agenda for 
stakeholder deliberation. Conscious or uncalculated agenda shaping can exclude the 
consideration of radical alternatives from decision making, hence it is a form of 
domination outside the decision-making process. By implication, CSOs seeking to 
promote participation must not restrict themselves to questioning who participates and 
who has leverage to influence decisions. They should also question on whose terms 
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participation is based and strive to change these terms to their benefit. Achieving 
participatory governance will entail that CSOs counteract those value systems and 
procedures which keep the issue of power devolution from getting on the agenda for 
deliberation.      
 
The third dimension of power adds yet another important perspective on how one actor 
could achieve dominion over another. Lukes (2005: 27) asserts that in addition to the two 
dimensions of power, an actor also wields power over another by “influencing, shaping 
and determining his [or her] very wants.” This view criticizes the first two dimensions of 
power for making two wrong assumptions. First, that people always know what their real 
interests are. Second, that such consciousness is beyond the influence of power. The third 
dimension of power rejects the underlying assumption that power is only at work in 
situations of observable grievances or disagreements. In fact, it upholds that power is 
more effective at accomplishing domination when it breeds consensus by placating actors 
to accept the status quo (Lukes, 2005: 27-28; Boulding, 1990: 10). Gramsci (2006:12) 
calls this hegemony by consent: power that operates through acquisition of legitimacy. 
He argues that the acquisition of legitimacy facilitates the success of more coercive 
power. Ideological indoctrination is a formidable restraint against revolution since it 
influences the proletariat to accept current standings and practices as normal (Gramsci, 
1990: 50). Domination in this case proceeds through the sustenance of those ritualistic 
practices, identity constructions, and relationship configurations that enlist the masses 
into the project of the powerful. Bourdieu (1980: 53) captures this third dimension of 
power in the term habitus. Habitus denotes the predisposition for people to act according 
to historically standardized and taken-for-granted routines without conscious reflection of 
underlying motives.  
 
While the first two dimensions see power only in terms of political, economic, or material 
capacity, the third dimension brings out the ideological and cognitive reach of power. 
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This rather radical perspective clearly widens the horizon of how power could work to 
obstruct genuine participation. The crucial contribution of this perspective is that the 
powerful can effectively sustain supremacy, if they make the marginalized accomplices 
in their own subordination. This could be through the reinforcement of certain identities 
that limit the imagination of alternatives such as participation. Alternatively it could be 
through the promotion of perceptions that recruit marginalized people into courses of 
action that do not serve their real interests. By implication, in order to foster participatory 
governance, CSOs would need to guard their emancipation and empowerment interests 
against ideological colonization. This will mean framing their interests as a political 
vision that questions and challenges hierarchic management. It will entail developing and 
advocating egalitarian and democratic identities that enable marginalized people to reflect 
on their rights/entitlements within a given political system. 
 
The three dimensions of power discussed above conceptualize power in ‘zero-sum’ terms 
(as a finite attribute) and also as a property which can be acquired or conferred. The 
fourth dimension of power credited to Michel Foucault’s work rejects these perspectives. 
Foucault (1993: 214) argues that power permeates societal relations: “it is never localized 
here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or a piece of 
wealth.” In his view, power is a relational phenomenon operating within societal 
processes and discourses. Power is incorporated in the very identities of actors, making 
them the products of power as well as the means of its operation (ibid: 214).  
 
In comparison to the other dimensions, the fourth dimension shifts from the 
conceptualization of power exclusively as sovereignty or domination. Power, according 
to this perspective, is “a mode of action upon the action of others” (Foucault, 2000: 21). 
According to this view, power is embodied in the mechanisms and discourses that define 
the subject; as a result, it establishes particular conceptions of reality and structures the 
conduct of subjects. Foucault also contests the perception of power as an exclusively 
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negative phenomenon – a view which is dominant in the first three dimensions of power. 
He emphasizes that power is acceptable to those whom it targets because it does not 
always forbid and repress but also produces positive effects (Foucault, 2002: 120).  
 
The Foucaultian view of power points out the limits of the prospect that actors like CSOs 
can break out of the influences of power. According to this fourth perspective, escape 
from power is difficult because power is not external but internal to all actors, and it is 
omnipresent in societal networks and discourses. As Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998: 
459) point out, this means power is not a capacity or resource which actors (like CSOs) 
can freely manipulate. Instead, “power is embedded in the very fabric of the system; it 
constrains how we see, what we see, and how we think, in ways that limit our capacity 
for resistance” (ibid: 460).  
 
Although the system, meaning the collection of institutions – internalized rules, norms, 
values, and cultural perceptions/practices – is relatively stable and resistant to change, it 
is not immune to change.  Actors cannot escape the influences of the fourth dimension of 
power but they can mobilize the first three dimensions of power (resources, procedures 
and meaning) to effect systemic change (Hardy, 1996: 9). To put it differently, actors can 
use the productive or positive attributes of power to reshape (though not eliminate) the 
discourses that structure their relationship with others in society. Clegg and Hardy 
(1999:427) note that the cooperative efforts among organizations that have resulted in 
breakthroughs and change are owed to the productive side of power. 
 
The different perspectives on power hold important implications for how participatory 
governance could be promoted from the bottom-up. To be effective, bottom-up pressure 
for participation should have elements that counter the different forms which subjugation 
could take. That is, actors like CSOs would need to mobilize the first three forms of 
power to transform the institutionalized societal relations and configurations that support 
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exclusion. These three forms of power – resource, political and social power – are 
intricately linked to each other (Boulding, 1990: 9). In order to bring about strategic 
change, all three forms need to be mobilized together and targeted so that they are 
mutually reinforcing (Hardy, 1996: 13).  
 
Civic association, social movements and participation literature abound with case studies 
of bottom-up struggles against diverse forms of oppression. Richness of literature 
notwithstanding, no comprehensive conceptual framework that describes how actors like 
CSOs can exercise pressure for strategic change has yet been developed. Drawing on 
extensive literature, this paper proposes the POWER framework as the set of attributes 
essential for effective bottom-up pressure for participation. The next section describes the 
five attributes of the POWER framework and the dimensions of power that each attribute 
articulates for system change.  
 
2.4  POWER: ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE BOTTOM-UP PRESSURE  
 
It has been argued earlier on that participatory approaches have often failed because they 
have been depoliticized. The development of the POWER framework draws on various 
arguments of how a radical spirit could be restored in ventures that aim to promote 
participatory governance. It also draws on literature on factors that determine success of 
social movements. The acronym POWER stands for the argument that development 
associations would mount effective pressure for participation if they:  
• Politicize their development efforts; 
• Organize, form networks and coalitions based on a participation ideology; 
• Work in collaboration with the community to build social ties;  
• Establish links with opposition political parties that support participation;  
• Rally resources and capacities for advocacy and lobbying;  
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Each of these elements requires elaboration and justification regarding how they would 
challenge existing power structures and open up spaces for participation. Table 2.1 
summarizes which of the three dimension of power each element of POWER articulates 
to advance pressure for participation. 
 
Table 2.1: POWER and its Relationship to the Dimensions of Power 
Bottom-up Pressure Elements 
Dimension of Power Articulated 
Power of resource 
(1st Dimension) 
Power of process 
(2nd Dimension) 
Power of ideology 
(3rd Dimension) 
Politicization activities    
Organize, form networks and coalitions    
Work in collaboration with  communities     
Establish strong links with parties    
Rally resources    
 
: articulated     : not directly articulated       
 
‘Politicization activities’ (P), the first attribute of bottom-up pressure, is based on the 
argument that CSOs are more likely to bring about change in governance when they 
pursue their objectives for participation as political rights-based claims. Fowler (1993: 
325) asserts that “to effectively promote democratization in Africa, NGOs will need 
to...consciously include the issue of citizenship in their interventions.” Similarly, Hickey 
and Mohan (2005: 238) argue that great potential for transformation lies in the “pursuit of 
participation as citizenship.” They point out that pursuing participation as citizenship 
means imbedding demands for participation within a wide political goal that is geared 
towards establishing the norms and practices that recognize participation as a right. As 
Barnes (1999: 82) further elaborates, framing participation as a right means demanding: 
(i) the right to access certain social privileges, (ii) the right to inclusion in certain 
activities and (iii) the right to hold authorities accountable.  
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Demands for the right to certain social privileges would allow CSOs to lay claim on 
resources and opportunities that increase their capacities to vie for their interests (first 
dimension of power). Demands for the right to inclusion in certain activities particularly, 
decision-making forums, would afford development associations the opportunity to 
influence the policies that affect the lives of local communities (second dimension of 
power). CSO demands for the right to inclusion in decision-making champions the 
standpoint that citizens should have a voice in the issues that affect them. Demands for 
the right to hold authorities accountable would contribute in promoting the ideology that 
true participatory democracy requires regular downward accountability to citizens (third 
dimension of power). 
 
Bachrach and Botwinick (1992: 163) also argue that struggles for participatory 
governance should be framed as a basic political right to equal voice in decision-making. 
When framed in this way,  
democracy could again become an ideology of the people – an ideology that would 
not only stir struggle for…[these] rights, but would also provide, in the course of this 
struggle, an ideal basis upon which to build a majority coalition (ibid: 163).  
 
Local problems of development and exclusion which NGOs typically concern themselves 
with are but symptoms of fundamental malaise of the political system. Mohan (2001: 
165-66) argues that to bring about systemic change, development associations must link 
local development problems to a wider project of democratization. Such a politicization 
of development will help CSOs build a broad democratization ideology that is crucial for 
mobilizing a variety of actors to bring about radical systemic change.  
 
‘Organize and form networks based on a participation ideology’ (O), the second attribute 
of bottom-up pressure, recognizes the importance of large scale mobilization for effective 
pressure. Actors at the lower levels of the power hierarchy are often too weak to 
challenge the established social order if they work individually. Freire (1996: 122) notes 
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that in many situations the ruling minority dominate the majority by promoting divisions 
and internal conflicts among the masses. Marginalized and impoverished communities 
are often teem with civil society organizations, but there is usually very little networking 
between these CSOs (Narayan et al, 2000: 219). For CSOs to increase their bargaining 
power with powerful actors in the government, networking is vital. Organization and 
networking enables excluded groups to turn away from internal strife, and to focus their 
energies on the common problem of political exclusion. Effective networking for change 
requires both tight bonds among civic associations as well as loose cross-cutting ties with 
other actors who share the same goal (Putnam, 2000: 22-23; Baldassarri and Diani, 2007: 
773). Networking for sustained collective action is the defining trait that enables bottom-
up struggles to gain the momentum of a social movement. 
 
Overturning the deep-seated structures which support exclusion is usually beyond the 
resource and knowledge capacities of any single actor. Through networking, civic 
associations draw on the power of numbers to bring more weight to their political 
demands (Perkin and Court, 2005: 16). Networking helps CSOs to mobilize different 
advocacy resources and skills, while promoting exchange of information (Diani, 2000: 
161; Lasker and Weiss, 2003: 24). Through networking, CSOs can increase their 
representation and influence in decision-making (first dimensional power); and in cases 
of complete exclusion, networking empowers them to negotiate their interests unto the 
agenda (second dimensional power). Networking makes it possible for civil society 
organizations to develop a joint strategy for advocacy and then divide responsibilities 
according to competences.  
 
An important merit of networking as an attribute of pressure is its potential to build and 
consolidate a common identity for advocacy. With this common identity,  
organizational and individual actors involved in collective action no longer merely 
pursue specific goals, but come to regard themselves as elements of much larger and 
encompassing processes of change (Diani and Bison, 2004: 284). 
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Just by organizing around a strong vision for an egalitarian and participatory society, 
marginalized groups counter the norms and discourses that give legitimacy to 
exclusionary practices. Networking for change can ideologically empower local groups 
(third dimension of power) to imagine themselves in ways formerly unimaginable; to see 
possibilities where there were only impossibilities; and to question representation which 
before was beyond questioning. Furthermore, networking can help CSOs build 
confidence to challenge cultural codes, and institutionalized political practices which no 
association is willing to challenge on its own. In other words, networking helps to build 
mutual encouragement that is essential for the sustenance of bottom-up pressure.  
 
‘Working in collaboration with communities’ (W), the third attribute of bottom-up 
pressure, is closely related to the second attribute. ‘Working in collaboration with 
communities’ (W) is important for bottom-up pressure because in order to mobilize and 
inspire people to struggle for participatory democracy, development associations must 
have strong social ties with local people. Collaborating with local communities in 
practice would help CSOs build trust that is important for popular mobilization. Although 
NGOs in the South play an important role in delivering services to marginalized groups at 
the local level, many of them do not practice participatory decision-making that involves 
the people (Vivian, 1994: 184; Narayan et al, 2000: 224). By operating as professional 
service providers in whose work people feel no sense of ownership, such organizations 
do not build norms and values for participation within local communities.  
 
‘Working in collaboration with communities’ (W) is important for the promotion of 
participatory governance because participation comes by doing. As Pateman (1970: 42-
43) asserts “participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more 
individuals participate, the better able they are to do so.” When CSOs involve the 
grassroots in their planning and decision-making, the people become socialized in 
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participation norms and values. Brown (1991: 822) argues that “collective action can be 
launched in the absence of formal power and resources when appropriate visions and 
values have been articulated [italics added].” Working in collaboration with local 
communities makes it possible for CSOs to inspire such visions and values in society; 
and by so doing, “develop and maintain a sense of enthusiasm and anticipation” within 
the population (Zucker and Snow, 1981: 478).  
 
‘Working in collaboration with communities’ permits CSOs to act as ‘schools of 
democracy’: forums where political consciousness and capacities for pressure are 
cultivated (Paxton, 2002: 289; Fung, 2003: 520). Moreover, through social integration 
with communities, CSOs can demonstrate the positive effects of participation, and 
thereby awaken people’s desire for broad societal change. For example, Abers (2003: 
204) explains that in Porto Alegre, the ‘demonstration effect’ of small participation 
schemes in which the grassroots were involved encouraged replication, which led to 
eventual extension of the scheme to the whole city.  
 
If civic associations, especially NGOs hope to mobilize communities for a bottom-up 
movement for democratic change, they themselves need to be democratic or inclusive in 
orientation (Hyden, 1997: 16-17). In many African countries, NGOs operate as insular 
professional organisations with no accountability to the grassroots or local communities. 
Low downward accountability on the part of associations such as NGOs affects 
community trust in NGOs. ‘Working in collaboration with communities’ is important for 
CSOs because it helps these associations build what Rothstein and Stolle (2003: 4) call 
“knowledge-based trust” with local residents. NGOs can effectively mobilize 
communities to join in advocacy for participatory democracy only when the grassroots 
trust them and identify with them. 
 
46 
 
‘Working in collaboration with communities’ fosters communication and builds an esprit 
de corps between CSOs and the grassroots. This puts CSOs in a position to counter one 
of the most pernicious effects of ideological (third dimensional) power, namely, political 
apathy. Collective behaviour explanations of social movements highlight that grievances 
and passions are vital for the masses to become mobilized and to advocate for their 
interests (Piven and Cloward; 1991: 439; Crossley, 2003: 289). According to Ost (2004: 
299-30), emotions especially anger is vital for the pursuit and exercise of power, in 
conventional politics as well as in activism. Emotions, he explains is something which 
actors need to tap and channel to effect political change. Emotion is the fuel that powers 
contention; without it, bottom-up pressure cannot exist (Jasper, 2003: 158). Working in 
collaboration with communities would enable CSOs to activate popular emotions for 
participatory governance. NGO and grassroots linkages in some developing countries 
have, in this sense, helped to compensate for the weaknesses of formal political parties, 
thus contributing to democratic change (Clarke, 1998: 41).  
 
‘Establish links with opposition political parties’ (E), the fourth attribute of bottom-up 
pressure, represents the argument that to influence government policies, CSOs need to 
forge alliance with actors that have political power. Through lobbying, marginalized 
groups can bring pressure to bear on policy-making processes from the outside. However, 
their chances of effecting policy change increases, if their interests are strongly 
represented inside the forums where critical decisions are made.  Schönwälder (1997: 
762) upholds that grassroots movements need to form alliances with political parties that 
support participation. He argues that although such alliances can expose the grassroots to 
cooptation, they are also an effective means of pressuring the political elite to actually 
implement participatory governance reforms. These links are also important because, 
political parties…usually have less difficulty in devising and implementing political 
strategies and can therefore project the concerns of…popular movements into the 
political arena and represent them there (Ibid; 762). 
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In social movement research, McAdam, (1996: 27) similarly argues that political allies 
and access to the political system act as key “political opportunity” factors that increase 
the chances for advocacy to succeed.    
 
Established links with the opposition enables CSOs to articulate the first, second and 
third dimensions of power to pressure for participatory governance. As these links 
increase representation of marginalized interests in decision-making circles, it profits 
bottom-up pressure through the first dimension of power. Such links also enhance the 
potential of CSOs to influence the agenda of the political elite so that it reflects their 
interests (second dimensional power). Moreover, alliances with parties that support 
participation could help CSOs introduce and strengthen an ideology of egalitarianism and 
participation in public consciousness (third dimensional power). Working together, these 
three mechanisms could enable CSOs to brake vicious cycles of corruption, clientelism 
and political apathy that sustain exclusion.  
 
Two popular empirical cases of participatory governance elucidate how civic association 
links to participation-friendly parties could transform dreams of participation into reality. 
In Porto Algre, Brazil, and in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, participatory 
governance schemes emerged thanks to radical reforms that grassroots-backed parties 
introduced (Fung and Wright, 2003: 6-7). In the Porto Alegre case, the influence of the 
Workers’ Party as a promoter of democracy grew beyond the local level when it gained 
the support of local social movements (Koonings, 2004: 82). This implies that links with 
parties that support participation, could elevate grassroots pressure for democracy from 
the relative obscurity of the local level to the political agenda at the national level. CSOs 
could also use their support of opposition political parties as a bargaining chip for state 
responsiveness. That is, throwing support behind the opposition could motivate the 
government to strive towards regaining credibility by increasing responsiveness to 
grassroots’ demands. Establishing links with the opposition is also important because 
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elites in the political system can provide powerless grassroots with vital resources to 
sustain pressure (Jenkins, 1983: 533; Fox, 1996: 1098).    
 
‘Rally resources and capacities for mounting pressure’ (R), the fifth attribute of 
bottom-up pressure, is drawn from the resource mobilization theory of social movements. 
The resource mobilization theory argues that resources are vital for the emergence of 
opposition against a polity, and resources are also crucial for sustained and effective 
activism (McCathy and Zald, 1973: 1; 1977: 1216). The resource mobilization theory 
maintains that even when marginalized groups hold grievances against the government, 
lack of resources could constrain their activism or pressure for change. As Cress and 
Snow (1996: 1095) note, these important resources could be moral (for example, 
solidarity); material (for example, finances); informational (for example, technical 
knowhow); and human (leadership and organizational capacity).  
 
Without crucial resources and capacities, marginalized groups cannot effectively press 
through their interests even if powerful actors open up spaces for them to contribute their 
voice. For example, Mulder (1971: 35) shows that expert knowledge and skills for 
argumentation are crucial for effective participation. He argues that when marginalized 
groups lack these capacities, powerful actors with these competences dominate decision-
making. Hailey (2001: 94) concurs that even in inclusive approaches like Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA), “power often lies in the hands of the most articulate and 
politically adept.” Mobilizing the different kinds of resources would, therefore, build the 
capacities of CSOs and marginalized groups to influence the political agenda (second 
dimension of power). Such resources would also permit grassroots to actually effect 
change on governmental policy (first dimensional power) when spaces open up for their 
participation. 
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Civic associations in developing countries receive substantial financial resources from 
foreign donors who perceive them as more capable of delivering development to the most 
excluded. While external funding can boost civic association advocacy activity, it can 
also dampen it. Edwards and Hulme (1996: 962) posit that high dependence on donor 
funding influences NGOs to concentrate on service delivery at the expense of advocacy. 
Social movement theorists also argue that resource dependence can lead to 
professionalization of social movement organizations and moderation of their goals (see 
Jenkins and Eckert, 1986: 814). A challenge for CSOs, therefore, is to gain access to the 
resources necessary to sustain pressure and at the same time maintain their autonomy. 
They are most likely to reduce the risk of being co-opted by resource providers if they 
diversify their resources sources (Kriesi, 1996: 155).  
 
The POWER framework is a good lens for analyzing bottom-up pressure in different 
contexts because it was developed from a broad review of literature on civic pressure. 
Although the POWER framework provides conceptual guidance on what analysis of 
pressure for democracy should focus on, it should be noted that what counts as pressure 
could be locally specific. This implies that in addition to the five attributes of bottom-up 
pressures discussed above, researchers must remain open-minded in their analysis, so that 
they can identify any peculiar pressure strategies which are culture or context specific. 
Page (2005: 68), for example, describes how old women in Tombel (Cameroon) marched 
naked and urinated in front of the state-owned water corporation in objection to 
government takeover of a community water project. Following this unconventional 
protest practice, the workers of the state corporation fled in fear of the ‘juju’ which the 
traditional rite had casted.    
 
Also, in ‘Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Form of Peasant Resistance’, Scott (1990: 
289-293) identifies some resistance strategies among the poor in Malaysia that do not 
conform to conventional understandings of resistance. His ethnographic study shows 
50 
 
peasant resistance as (i) not organized, (ii) not revolutionary, (iii) not ideologically 
directed, and (iv) accepting rather than rejecting domination. His study illustrates that 
context-bound realities can make marginalized people to adopt resistance measures that 
are different from the norm. Consequently, while using the POWER framework as a 
conceptual tool for analyzing pressure for participatory democracy, researchers should 
remain aware that contexts differ and context matters.  
 
2.5  THE POWER FRAMEWORK AS A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL 
 
Many studies on research design emphasize that clarifying research concepts is 
paramount in scientific research. Chalmers (2010: 11) points out that: 
before an observer can formulate and assent to an observation statement, he or she 
must be in possession of the appropriate conceptual framework and a knowledge of 
how to appropriately apply it. 
 
Similarly, Nørgaard (2008: 4) argues that “even the most inductive analysis must 
determine what will be observed, [and] how it will classify with respect to what purpose.” 
Without a clear framework that sets boundaries on a research concept, the concept can 
mean anything, which puts it at risk of meaning nothing. Ambiguity is a luxury that 
scientific research cannot afford. 
 
The POWER framework is useful as a methodological tool for analyzing countervailing 
pressure because it uses categories to clearly elaborate and delineate the phenomenon that 
is the focus of analysis. Appraising, not to mention, measuring power is a difficult issue. 
No methodological consensus has yet been reached on how to assess power, because of 
differences in the way researchers conceptualize power. Lukes (2005: 62-63) argues that 
the methodology for power analysis or appraisal cannot be divorced from the specific 
question or issue that is being studied. The POWER framework proposes categories for 
appraising power in the context of bottom-up pressure for participatory governance. 
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Since these categories are developed from a broad survey of social movement, civic 
association and participation literature, the conceptual tool is theoretically well-grounded.  
 
Scarce time and resources would be wasted in empirical research if researchers go to the 
field only with (i) a research question, and (ii) the ‘hope of seeing what is happening in 
the field’. The POWER framework saves time and resources because it gives focus to 
research on bottom-up pressure. Without acting as a mind-closer, the conceptual tool 
directs the researcher towards what to look for in the field, and on what issues interview 
questions should focus on. The POWER framework can be applied quantitatively, for 
example, by assessing how civic associations score in the different attributes of pressure. 
It can also be used qualitatively: for discussing how the context in which civic 
associations are imbedded promotes or constrains the development of the five POWER 
attributes. Moreover, the tool can be used in connection with process tracing, to discern 
how the different pressure attributes affect each other in a given context.  
 
None of the five attributes of POWER can be accorded functional superiority in the 
promotion of participatory governance because they interact to support each other. Using 
the framework, researchers can carry out a more structured qualitative analysis of 
bottom-up pressure in a single case study and also compare bottom-up pressure across 
associations or geographic regions. The framework is a diagnostic tool that facilitates 
identification of which pressure attributes are high in a particular context, and which 
attributes development associations need to improve upon, in order to effectively promote 
participatory democracy.  
 
2.6  SUMMING UP 
 
This chapter has discussed how the notion of bottom-up pressure relates to the concept of 
power in political science. This discussion culminated in the development of the POWER 
framework that can be used (i) for quantitative measurement of bottom-up pressure and 
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(ii) for qualitative assessment of how institutional factors affect the pressure capacities of 
associations. The next chapter will describe in detail how the conceptual framework is 
applied in quantitative data collection, and how qualitative data is obtained. The next 
chapter will also describe the methodological logic that guides the interpretation of 
collected data.  
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3 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter explains why a single negative case study is the appropriate methodological 
approach for addressing the research questions and objectives of this study. First, the 
chapter identifies the unit of analysis in the study, defines the research parameters and 
elaborates the criteria used for selecting research subjects – associations. Second, it 
describes how questionnaires were used in assessing bottom-up pressure quantitatively 
among associations in the NW Region of Cameroon, and how interviews and other 
methods provided rich qualitative data. Finally, the chapter describes two analytical 
techniques, namely correspondence analysis and causal process tracing that are used for 
interpreting quantitative and qualitative data respectively.  
 
3.1  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In research, “the question being asked determines the appropriate research architecture, 
strategy, and tactics to be used – not traditions, authority…or schools of thought” 
(Sackett and Wennberg, 1997). Simply put, the research question must dictate the 
research design. To recall, the main research questions of this study are:  
3. How does the institutional context affect the capacity of associations to press for 
participatory democracy? 
4. With what measures have development associations challenged institutional 
constraints and contributed in pressure for democracy? 
The institutional context is the main focus of the research.  
 
The research questions focus on contextual factors, because as explained in the first 
chapter, the ‘civil society–to–democracy’ causal pathway does not hold true in many 
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African countries. To understand the extent to which the associations-democracy 
argument is applicable to the ‘young’ democracies of Africa, inquiry into how the 
institutional context affects the pressure capacities of associations is imperative. The 
main objective of the research questions of this study is, therefore, not theory testing but 
theory refinement. The appropriate methodological design for achieving this objective is 
a negative case study research design.  
 
3.1.1  The Case Study 
 
The selected case study is the Republic of Cameroon located in Central West Africa. 
There are a number of practical reasons for choosing Cameroon. These include: (i) 
familiarity with the country’s history and geography; (ii) high probability of gaining easy 
access to data; (iii) and fluency in the country’s most widely spoken languages. These 
practical advantages, however, are secondary reasons. The principal reason for selecting 
Cameroon as a case study is that the country is a good example of a situation in which the 
‘associations–to–democracy prediction’ does not hold. Despite a dramatic increase in the 
number of civil society organizations in Cameroon since the 90s, democracy has not 
advanced as readily as anticipated.   
 
In literature, single – especially deviant – case study designs like the one which this 
research applies are usually discouraged. Firstly, critics allege that in the single case 
study (N = 1), there is no variation in the independent and dependent variables. Critics 
argue that for this reason, single case study designs are useless in providing causal 
explanations. King et al (1994: 129) state: “nothing whatsoever can be learned about the 
causes of the dependent variable without taking into consideration other instances when 
the dependent variable takes on other values.” Secondly, according to Geddes (1990), the 
negative case study design commits one methodological error: it selects on the outcome 
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or dependent variable. For her, such a selection bias greatly undermines the validity of 
findings.  
 
Thirdly, some research fellows argue that the single negative case study design is 
altogether uninteresting as it sets out to investigate a “non-event.” They equate 
‘interesting’ with finding out why something happened and not with asking why it did not 
happen. For them, asking why something did not happen is a “non-question.” Fourthly, 
the social pressure that urges researchers to shun the single case study is strongest in the 
claim that generalization is not possible with such a research design. “How are you going 
to draw inference from just one case” is an accusation – framed as question – which one 
has heard all too often. These critiques are part of what Flyvbjerg (2006: 216) calls the 
“misunderstandings about case study research.” These misunderstandings arise for two 
reasons. First, the single case study method is often judged without taking into account 
the purpose of the research question that is addressed. Second, the single case study 
design is often evaluated according to the covariational logic of causal inference that 
guides quantitative (large-N) research designs. 
 
Unlike large-N designs, the single case study is a ‘zoom-in’ kind of research design. Its 
use in this study enables in-depth analysis of the causal mechanisms through which 
contextual factors contribute in the failures of associations to drive democracy forward in 
Cameroon.  As Ragin (2004: 128) notes, causal explanation is not restricted to explaining 
covariation. To be complete, explanation must also include a comprehensive account of 
causal mechanisms – how intervening factors interact to produce the observed effect. As 
the single case study pays attention to details, it is appropriate for answering the “how” 
question (Yin, 2003: 1) posed in this study. With this design, “the identification of causal 
mechanisms through process tracing is a stronger methodological basis for causal 
inference than the estimation of covariation” (Bennett and George, 1997). 
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Selecting research units based on the dependent variable in deed poses a validity problem 
for quantitative analysis. However, it does not pose a problem – rather it is an asset – for 
qualitative (case study) research whose aim is theory refinement through identification of 
causal paths. These causal mechanisms that are of interest can be more readily 
appreciated in cases with extreme observations of the independent or the dependent 
variables (George and Bennett, 2005: 31-32). Since the promulgation of the Freedom of 
Association Law, 20 years ago in Cameroon, there has been a tremendous increase in the 
number of development associations. Despite this association boom, progress in 
democratic practice at national and local levels has been slow. These extreme and 
controversial observations make Cameroon a suitable case for tracing the causal 
processes responsible for this enigma. 
 
When theoretical expectations fail to materialize, asking the ‘why not’ question is more 
interesting, and also makes more sense. For example, in Power and Powerlessness, 
Gaventa (1982) asked why rebellion did not arise among oppressed people. Similarly, in 
this study, the negative (‘non-event’) case study research design is more suitable for 
understanding why the associations-democracy prediction does not hold in sub-Saharan 
African countries. Emigh (1997: 665) points out that negative methodology “emphasizes 
the integrity of the entire case, the historical details, and the connections between 
different aspects of the case.” Given this sensitivity to context, the negative case study 
chosen in this study is appropriate for correcting “Western bias” (ibid, 658) in the 
associations-democracy theory. The negative case study methodology is, therefore, ideal 
for the study’s purpose, which is to contribute in developing the content of theory.  
 
According to conventional opinion, the single case study can achieve deep contextual 
analysis but it does not allow for generalization. This impression, however, is quite 
misguided (Emigh, 1997: 659; Flyvbjerg, 2006: 225). In large-N studies, covariation over 
a sample of cases is widely believed to be the only basis from which causal conjectures, 
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hence generalization can be made. In qualitative research, causal inference follows a 
different logic. In case study research, causal inference can be made by identifying 
“commonalities” or uniform traits between a few cases or between units within a case 
(Ragin, 2004: 129). In other words, congruence (or similarity) analysis of within-case 
units, together with process tracing is a good basis for causal inference and theory 
development in single case studies (George and Bennett, 2005: 181). Using existing 
theoretical predictions as a point of reference, these methods show how explanatory 
factors are causally related to observations. These causal inferences are micro level 
theories that can be extrapolated to other cases that have a similar context. The single 
case study, therefore, relies on “causal process observations” for drawing causal 
inference and generalizations, and not on covariation data sets (Blatter and Blume, 2008: 
350).  
 
Another reason for choosing a single case research design is that this research looks into 
the interaction between many – and not just two – factors. As argued earlier, ‘bottom-up 
pressure’, the effect-parameter in the study consists of five factors, summarized in the 
acronym, POWER. The cause-parameter, ‘institutional context’ also consists of a number 
of factors which would be elaborated later on. The classical large-N study does not often 
describe complex causal interactions between many factors. Thanks to its orientation 
toward thick description, the case study methodology is better suited for analyzing 
complex and conjunctive causal influences (Ragin, 2004: 136). Before elaborating further 
on the logic of causal inference used in the study, it is worthwhile to first of all define the 
unit of analysis in the case, as well as the research parameters of the study.   
 
3.1.2  The Unit of Analysis in the Case Study 
 
The units of analysis or the cases in the case study (Cameroon) are: ‘development 
associations’ in the North West Region. Cameroon’s richness in civil society associations 
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makes it especially suitable for analyzing how contextual factors influence bottom-up 
pressure in associations. As highlighted earlier, the rapid increase in association numbers 
began in Cameroon in 1990 following the promulgation of Law No 90/053 that 
decriminalized association, and laid down requirements for formation of associations and 
unions. By 1998, Cameroon – with 98 NGOs – ranked second after Kenya in the UN 
database on NGOs in African countries (Sakabe et al, 2006:52). This UN data which was 
actually an underestimate of the actual number of NGOs in Africa at the time (ibid, 47), 
shows Cameroon at the leading position of the association boom. Over the years, 
association numbers in Cameroon have exploded. The total number of civil society 
organizations in the North West and South West Regions alone is estimated at 17,000 
(SNV and DED, 2007). 
 
Of the ten regions (or provinces) in Cameroon, “the North West Region is by far the 
pacesetter as far as vibrancy of associations is concerned” (Interview with a former 
member of parliament, 2008). It is for this reason that the case study focuses on 
associations in the NW Region. The development-oriented associations that flourish in 
the NW Region act as gap-fillers wherever the state is unable, or unwilling, to ensure 
basic services delivery to local communities. The NW Region was also selected as a case 
because it is the cradle of the first opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), 
whose advocacy forced the Biya regime to introduce multiparty politics in 1990. The 
region’s enduring legacy as ‘an opposition hotspot’ makes it suitable for studying the 
relationship between the institutional context and CSO pressure for participatory 
democracy. 
 
The civil society is made up of a variety of actors that “seek concessions, benefits, policy 
changes, relief, redress, or accountability” from the state (Diamond, 1994:6). Analyzing 
the civil society as a single unit will defeat the close-up observation objectives of this 
research. Moreover, trying to include all the different kinds of actors that make up the 
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civil society in analysis will definitely yield more fuzziness than clarity. Given that the 
theoretical interest of the study is the associations-democracy thesis, I narrow down 
analysis to associations, which are a subset of civil society. 
 
As an analytical unit, ‘associations’ is also characterized by great diversity. For instance, 
the objectives of associations in the NW Region range from religious, economic, choral, 
cultural, solidarity, to promoting development. Including all these types of associations in 
the research design cannot be beneficial, since the research question is concerned with 
bottom-up pressure for democracy and equitable development. Considering the aim of the 
research question, the study focuses on ‘development associations’ as the unit of analysis. 
Figure 3.1 below situates the unit of analysis in the case study, Cameroon.  
 
Fig. 3.1: The Unit of Analysis in the Case Study 
 
 
 
‘Development associations’ refers to groups whose goals include broad-based societal 
development, rather than just private interests. This implies that associations that exist 
strictly for solidarity, religious or cultural reasons, and which pursue no societal 
development goals, were not included in the scope of the research. Associations like 
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common initiative groups (CIGs) that are only concerned with economic development for 
their registered members (and not for local communities at large) were also excluded. In 
total, 135 development associations in the NW Region served as within-case studies, 
from whom quantitative and qualitative data on the research parameters of the study was 
solicited.  
 
3.2  RESEARCH PARAMETERS 
 
A precise definition of research parameters or variables is vital for good scientific 
research (Nørgaard, 2008: 7). The two types of indicators on which data is collected in 
scientific research are generally termed the independent and dependent variables. These 
appellations are strongly associated with the covariation logic of causal interpretation that 
is dominant in political science. In other words, the term variable (dependent and 
independent) invariably connotes a research design that aims at assessing causation 
through an appraisal of covariation.  
 
As this study seeks causal explanation through process-tracing and congruence analysis 
in a single case study, I avoid the use of the term variable. Instead of talking of an 
independent and a dependent variable, I use cause-parameter and effect-parameter. The 
latter terms are appropriate because they carry no implicit methodological bias. From the 
research question above, ‘institutional context’ is the cause parameter while ‘bottom-up 
pressure’ in associations is the effect-parameter. Each of them is defined in greater detail 
below.  
 
3.2.1  The Cause-Parameter: ‘Institutional Context’ 
 
Institutional theory provides a basis for defining and setting boundaries on the cause-
parameter, the ‘institutional context’. The theory of institutional isomorphism advanced 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is especially useful in this regard. The theory posits that 
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organizations within a certain institutional context will be influenced by that environment 
to become homogeneous or isomorphic over time. Isomorphism, they point out is “a 
constraining process that forces units in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environmental condition (ibid: 149).”  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150) point out that isomorphism can come about through 
coercive, mimetic and normative processes. They argue that: 
 Coercive isomorphism arises because of: (a) formal as well as informal 
regulations in the given context. 
 Mimetic isomorphism depends on (b) cultural codes of conduct (taken-for-
granted practices) in the given context.  
 Normative isomorphism is a feature of: (c) the established values or norms in 
the given context. 
 
The factors that give rise to these processes help in defining what counts as the 
institutional environment or context. To operationalize the institutional context in the 
case study, I, therefore, analyze the effects of the three factors above, namely, (a) 
regulations, (b) culture, and (c) norms on bottom-up pressure in associations. This 
characterization of the institutional context is consistent with Scott’s (2001:51) definition 
of institutions as comprising regulatory, cultural-cognitive and normative elements. 
Clearly identifying the factors of the institutional context as such gives the case study 
analytical focus.  
  
According to the theory of institutional isomorphism, the degree of homogeneity among 
organizational units reflects the degree to which contextual factors exert influence on 
them. A high degree of homogeneity implies strong isomorphic forces at work 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 155). The theory of institutional isomorphism is, therefore, 
not only useful in defining the cause-parameter (institutional context) of the study. The 
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theory is also aligned with the research design’s approach of drawing causal inference 
through similarity analysis of the units of analysis (associations) within the case study.  
 
3.2.2  The Effect-Parameter: ‘Bottom-Up Pressure’ 
 
Through a broad survey of relevant literature, chapter 2 identified five attributes that are 
vital for effective bottom-up pressure for participatory democracy. These attributes are 
summarized in the acronym, POWER. To recall, the POWER model stands for the 
argument that associations mount effective pressure for democracy when they:  
(i)  Politicize their development efforts; 
(ii)  Organize and form networks; 
(iii) Work in collaboration with local communities; 
(iv) Establish links with democracy-oriented opposition parties; 
(v)  Rally resources necessary for advocacy. 
Bottom-up pressure is operationalized in the study by collecting quantitative and 
qualitative data on each of the five attributes of the POWER framework. Apart from 
being useful in delimiting the effect-parameter (bottom-up pressure), the framework 
makes possible the quantitative assessment of bottom-up pressure, and also facilitates 
analysis of how the institutional context affects the pressure capacities of development 
associations.  
 
3.3  DESIGN OF THE DATA SAMPLE 
 
The data collection phase for this study was preceded by one-month of preliminary or 
pilot fieldwork. The purpose of the pilot field work carried out in September 2008 was to 
identify key research contacts. At this stage, a partnership for research cooperation was 
established with the North West Association of Development Organizations (NWADO) – 
the most prominent CSO network organization in the NW Region. Given its status as a 
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CSO network, NWADO was a suitable point from which contacts with other associations 
could be made.  
 
The research partnership with NWADO was based on mutual benefit. In the course of the 
field work – 1 April to the 31 July 2009 – the researcher worked as an unpaid volunteer 
for NWADO. As a member of the NWADO team, the researcher benefited from the 
organization’s outreach to get in touch with associations and other informants.  
 
Four strategies were used to identify and select associations that provided the necessary 
data. These strategies include (a) consultation of databases, (b) internet search, (c) 
random explorations and referrals and (d) attending CSO workshops. Each strategy 
merits elaboration. 
 
a) Consultation of Databases 
 
NWADO’s database on active associations in the North West Region was the starting 
point for identifying research contacts. The NWADO database provided the telephone 
numbers of listed associations and this made it easy for these groups to be located.  The 
lists of registered associations in each of the seven divisions of the NW Region were also 
obtained from local government administrators. Law required that all registrations 
(legalizations) of associations be done at the Senior Divisional Office, in the 
administrative headquarters of each division. The ‘Association Files’ available at each of 
the seven Divisional Offices in the region provided information on registered 
associations. Regrettably though, telephone numbers were available only for a handful of 
the many associations obtained from these government files. Consequently, only those 
associations with listed telephone numbers were approached for data collection. Of the 
135 associations to which questionnaires were distributed, 25 were identified through 
consultation of databases.  
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b) Internet Search 
The Google search engine proved useful for identifying some NW region associations. 
Nine of the 135 CSOs to which questionnaires were distributed were identified through 
internet search. Associations with online (web) visibility are often more resourced than 
those without. Selecting associations for data collection using internet search, therefore, 
had a danger of introducing bias in the research sample. The use of more random 
strategies for selecting associations for the data sample buffered this risk of bias.   
 
c) Random explorations and Referrals 
Eighty-three (83) associations in the data sample were identified through referrals and 
simply by travelling around and watching out for signboards of associations. Most of the 
associations identified through signposts were NGOs that have permanent offices. 
Arbitrarily asking people whether they knew or belonged to a development association 
proved effective in getting in touch with research contacts. Some informants referred to 
one or two associations that could be contacted and these associations in turn referred to 
other associations. This snowball method was especially useful in identifying village 
development associations (VDAs) and other CSOs that have no permanent offices or 
secretariats.  
 
d) Attending CSO Workshops 
 
Organizing training and capacity building workshops is a common practice among NGOs 
in the North West Region. Through these workshops which bring together representatives 
of associations from different divisions in the region, NGOs try to share experiences and 
best practices. Attending these workshops was an effective means of getting in touch with 
research contacts. Contact with 18 associations was made by participating in three 
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workshops sponsored by the European Union Support Program for the Structuring of the 
Civil Society in Cameroon (PASOC).  
 
3.4  METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
Quantitative data for this study was obtained by administering questionnaires to 
associations, and by going through archival records. The questionnaire was aimed at 
assessing how CSOs in the NW Region score in the bottom-up pressure attributes 
(POWER) described in the previous chapter. Archival records were examined to estimate 
the number of registered associations in the region.  
 
Qualitative data was obtained through interviews, observations, focus group discussions 
and document reviews. The qualitative data served two goals. First, it was used to 
corroborate the quantitative data. Second, it provided rich descriptions/explanations of 
how institutions – regulations, norms and culture – influence the pressure capacities of 
associations. Respectively, the quantitative and qualitative data methods complemented 
each other, and increased validity through data triangulation. The different data collection 
methods are elaborated below. 
 
3.4.1 Quantitative Data Collection Methods 
 
a) Questionnaire 
 
As aforementioned, the POWER framework was operationalized quantitatively in the 
case study using a questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that the 
five bottom-up pressure attributes could be assessed on a scale from 0 to 10. The 
formulation of the questionnaire was based on literature on the five POWER attributes, as 
well as, on the local experiences of associations in the NW Region. This ensured that the 
questionnaire was, on the one hand, aligned with theory and on the other hand, 
appropriate for empirical data collection in the given context.  
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Prior to the start of the field work, a draft of the questionnaire was designed, taking into 
account theoretical and case studies literature on each of the bottom-up pressure 
attributes. To adapt the questionnaire to the local context, the draft questionnaire was 
then discussed with members of development associations during the first two weeks of 
the field work. The feedback from these key informants was used to revise the 
questionnaire, to ensure that it captured the range of pressure activities that associations 
in the region were involved in. Revisions proposed by the CSO network organization, 
NWADO, which has in-depth knowledge on association activities in the region, was 
especially helpful in this regard. Thanks to the inputs from development associations in 
the case study, some questions in the questionnaire were reworded to avoid 
misinterpretation by respondents.   
 
The questionnaire was organized into five sections, with each section corresponding to 
one of the elements in the POWER framework: 
i) Politicization activities 
ii) Organization and networking  
iii) Working in collaboration with communities 
iv) Established links with opposition parties 
v) Resource capacity 
 
To measure ‘Politicization of activities’ (P), the questionnaire assessed the extent to 
which associations engaged in ten specific political/advocacy activities (see Table 3.1 
below). These ten markers of ‘politicization activities’ (P) are adapted from the indicators 
of political action used in the Roper Surveys in the United States (see Putnam, 2000: 45). 
These indicators of political action are clearly not specific to the United States, but rather 
are universal; and this justifies their adoption as markers of ‘politicization activities’ (P) 
in this study. 
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As table 3.1 illustrates, assessing ‘politicization activities’ (P) on a scale from 0-10 was 
achieved by assigning each of the ten political/advocacy activities a score of 1. A 
development association that engaged in all ten activities obtained a total score of 10, 
while an association that engaged in none of these activities scored 0.  
 
Table 3.1: Measuring ‘Politicization activities’ (P) on a 0-10 Scale 
Pressure 
Attribute Questions 
Score for 
a positive 
answer 
Maximum 
Score 
possible 
P
oliticizatio
n
 a
ctivities
 
1. Has your association done any of the following within the last 
24 months? (Yes/No) 
 
10 
A.) Written or signed a petition directed at local or central 
government with the aim of achieving your 
organization’s development goals. 
1 
B.) Organized or participated in a public march or rally to 
advance its development goals. 1 
C.) Approached or written a letter to the local or central 
government demanding accountability, citizen 
participation or citizen rights to certain facilities. 
1 
D.) Attended local council meetings or public investment 
budget committee meeting. 1 
E.) Written an article or letter to a newspaper; given a press 
conference; or featured on television or radio to advocate 
for certain benefits or for democratic practice within the 
government. 
1 
F.) Filed a law suit to force the government to grant certain 
rights and benefits to some groups or communities. 1 
G.) Participated in an initiative geared at changing a law or 
policy to benefit a group of citizens or a community 1 
H.) Organized or participated in a campaign to pressure for 
transparency in elections and/or to encourage citizens to 
exercise their right to vote. 
1 
I.) Organized or participated in a boycott or work stoppage 
campaign to get the government to grant some of your 
demands.  
1 
J.) Supported a community member/leader or one of your 
members to run for public office. 1 
 
Measuring ‘Organization and networking’ (O) on a 0-10 scale was achieved by asking 
questions that focused on three issues. The questions were concerned with determining (i) 
whether associations were part of formal CSO networks, (ii) the frequency of cooperation 
and interaction with other associations and (iii) the quality (closeness) of the relationship 
with other associations. The questions used to assess ‘Organization, networking and 
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collaboration’ (O) were inspired by the Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of 
Social Capital developed by Grootaert et al (2004). Table 3.2 illustrates the scoring 
scheme used for assessing ‘organization and networking’ (O) quantitatively.   
 
Table 3.2: Measuring ‘Organization and networking’ (O) on a 0-10 Scale 
Pressure 
Attribute Questions 
Score of 
answer 
Maximum 
Score 
possible 
O
rg
a
nizatio
n
 a
nd
 n
etw
o
rking
 
 
1. Is your association a member of a formal platform or a 
network of development associations?  
 
10 
 
 
A.) No 0 
B.) Yes 1 
2. Does your association cooperate, share information or 
work with other national associations within the NW 
Region 
 
A.) No, we cooperate with no organization 0 
B.) Yes, occasionally 1 
C.) Yes, frequently 2 
3. Does your association cooperate, share information or 
work with other national associations outside the NW 
Region 
 
A.) No, we cooperate with no organization 0 
B.) Yes, occasionally 1 
C.) Yes, frequently 2 
4. How close is the relationship between your organisation 
and other development-oriented associations on average? 
 
A.) Very distant 0 
B.) Somewhat distant 1 
C.) Neither distant nor close 2 
D.) Somewhat close 3 
E.) Close 4 
F.) Very close 5 
 
Measuring social integration, that is the extent to which associations ‘Work in 
collaboration with communities’ (W) can be done in different ways. Brissette et al (2000: 
56) list four techniques. These include (i) identifying the types of social relationships; (ii) 
assessing feelings of belonging in the community; (iii) assessing the extent of 
participation or engagement in activities. A fourth way (iv) combines all the three 
techniques above. Brissette et al (2000: 65) point out that the technique most appropriate 
for a particular study will depend on the study’s “own theories about why social 
integration is salubrious.” In the literature review of previous chapter, I argued that when 
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associations are participatory, (involve target populations) they build social ties that are 
crucial for mobilizing the population to pressure for change. Considering this 
argumentation, assessing the extent to which CSOs engage target populations in their 
projects is most appropriate for measuring the degree of social integration of associations 
in this study.  
 
The questionnaire, therefore, operationalized the extent to which associations ‘Work in 
collaboration with communities’ (W) by assessing the degree to which associations were 
open. Openness was assessed by asking whether associations involved project 
stakeholders in decision-making. The questionnaire also assessed how frequently 
associations invested time in building social bonds with local communities and the extent 
to which they were accountable to their target populations. Table 3.3 illustrates how the 
questionnaire was used to measure, on a 0 to10 scale, the extent to which associations 
‘Work in collaboration with communities’ (W).  
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Table 3.3: Measuring ‘Work in collaboration with  
Communities’ (W) on a 0-10 Scale 
 
 
To measure the extent to which associations have ‘Established links with opposition 
parties’ (E), the questionnaire assessed how associations perceived their relationship with 
opposition political parties. It also assessed how frequently associations actually 
interacted with opposition parties in the pursuit of their goals. Perception is a useful 
indicator of the quality of links or relationships, but it is subjective. Actual interaction is a 
more objective indicator of linkages, but it does not provide information on the quality of 
Pressure 
Attribute Questions 
Score of 
answer 
Maximum 
score 
possible 
W
o
rk
 in
 collab
o
ratio
n
 w
ith
 co
m
m
u
nities
 
1. Do you involve the people in the communities where you carry 
out development work in the meetings of your organisation? 
 
10 
 
 
A.) No 0 
B.) Yes 1 
2. Are some beneficiaries or target populations part of the 
executive of your organisation? 
 
A.) No 0 
B.) Yes 1 
3. To what extent are the target populations involved in the 
decision-making processes of projects that your association 
carries out? 
 
A.) Only the executive members of the organisation are 
involved in decision-making. 0 
B.) The beneficiaries or target populations are consulted but 
are not part of decision-making. 1 
C.) The beneficiaries or target populations play a central role 
in decision-making. 2 
4. To what extent does your association give an account to the 
target populations on projects carried? 
 
A.) Our accountability is only to donors. 0 
B.) Accounts are given occasionally. 1 
C.) Accounts are given regularly. 2 
5.  How frequently does your organization interact with the target 
populations in social, cultural and recreational 
activities/meetings or visit people in their homes? 
 
A.)  Never 0 
B.)  Occasionally 1 
C.)  Regularly 2 
6.) How frequently does your organisation request for and 
respond to feedback from beneficiaries or target populations? 
 
A.)  Never 0 
B.)  Occasionally 1 
C.)  Regularly 2 
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these links. Both indicators – perception of closeness and actual interactions – were 
therefore used in the questionnaire, in order to obtain a more balanced (realistic) 
assessment of the links between associations and opposition parties. Table 3.4 depicts 
how the questionnaire was used for measuring ‘Established links with opposition parties’ 
(E). 
 
Table 3.4: Measuring ‘Established links with  
opposition parties’ (E) on a 0-10 Scale 
 
Pressure 
Attribute Questions 
Score of 
answer 
Maximum 
Score 
possible 
E
stablish
ed
 link
s
 w
ith
 opp
o
sitio
n
 p
a
rties
 
 
1. How often has your association approached an opposition 
party official (parliamentarian, mayor, etc) to push through 
your goals in government policy making? 
 
10 
 
 
A.) Never 0 
B.) Occasionally 1 
C.) Regularly 2 
2. How will you describe the relationship (links) that your 
association has with opposition parties that advocate 
democracy? 
 
A.) None. We have no links with such political parties 0 
B.) Weak links 1 
C.) Fairly Strong links 2 
D.) Strong links 3 
3. How often has your organization written a motion of support 
to or voiced support for an opposition political party that it 
sees as having more democratic promise? 
 
A.) Never 0 
B.) On a few occasions 1 
C.) On many occasions 2 
4. How often has your organization (formally or informally) 
mobilized the local population to support an opposition 
party that it sees as having more promise to deliver 
development? 
 
A.) Never 0 
B.) On a few occasions 1 
C.) On many occasions 2 
5. Within the past 2 years, has your organization joined an 
advocacy rally or march organized by an opposition party? 
 
 
A.) No 0 
 
B.) Yes 1 
 
The questionnaire measured `Resource capacity´ (R) by checking how many kinds of 
resources that associations had regular access to. A checklist of ten types of resources 
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was developed from a taxonomy of resources that Cress and Snow (1996:1094-1096) 
argue are important for social movement organizations. Each of the ten resources was 
assigned a score of 1 (see table 3.5). An association that reported regular access to all ten 
types of resources obtained a total score of ten (10) for ‘Resource capacity’ (R). An 
association that did not report regular access to any of the resources was ascribed a score 
of zero (0) for ‘Resource capacity’ (R). The phrase ‘regular access to’ used in the 
questionnaire was quite subjective and ambiguous in nature. However, for lack of a better 
term, the phrase was used to communicate to respondents that only those resources 
available in satisfactory amounts should be reported.  
 
Table 3.5: Measuring `Resource capacity´(R) on a 0-10 Scale 
 
Pressure 
Attribute Questions 
Score for 
a positive 
answer 
Maximum 
Score 
possible 
R
eso
u
rce
 C
ap
a
city
 
1. Does your association have regular access to the following 
resources? 
 
10 
A.) Working space 1 
B.) Strong leadership 1 
C.) Man power 1 
D.) Financial resources 1 
E.) Knowledge and capacity building opportunities 1 
F.) Transportation  1 
G.) Basic supplies (paper, computer, phone etc) 1 
H.) Moral support (motivation) from other civil society 
organizations or beneficiaries 1 
I.) Employment or financial compensation for workers 1 
J.) Access to information 1 
 
In the questionnaire, equal weighting was assigned to all the indictors used to assess the 
respective bottom-up pressure elements. For example, all the political/advocacy activities 
used to assess ‘Politicization of development’ (P) were given the same level of 
importance (value of 1). Also, the various types of resources used to measure ‘Resource 
capacity’ (R) were given equal weight.  One can assume that in reality, some 
political/advocacy activities or resources are of more importance to associations than 
others. However, given the difficulty of determining which indicators are more important 
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and to what degree, all indicators are ranked equally in this study. One limitation of the 
questionnaire, therefore, is that it does not rank the indicators (for example, resource 
types) according to degree of importance.  
 
The questionnaire was administered fairly randomly to 135 ‘development associations’ in 
the North West Region. The survey was done under anonymity, to avoid a situation 
where concerns over information disclosure will lead to incorrect reporting of 
information by associations. One hundred and six (106) associations responded to the 
questionnaire, giving a response rate of 78.5%. Six of the 106 questionnaires received 
were not fully completed by the respondents, and to avoid bias, these six questionnaires 
were considered invalid. The remaining 100 completely-answered questionnaires were 
retained for analysis. Analysis of the questionnaire produced a two-way contingency 
table that depicted how associations in the data sample scored in each of the bottom-up 
pressure (POWER) attributes. How this quantitative data was analyzed is discussed later 
on in this chapter. 
 
b) Archival Records Consultation 
 
The purpose of the quantitative data gathered through consultation of archival records 
differed from that of the questionnaire. The goal of consulting archival records was to 
obtain an estimate of the number of associations registered yearly in each division of the 
NW Region of Cameroon. This estimate was intended to elucidate the vibrancy of 
associational life in the region. The archival records consulted were those from 1990 to 
2008. Data on the number of registered association obtained from archival records had 
one shortcoming: it was incomplete. Due to poor management of archives at the 
Divisional Offices in the NW Region, some records on the list of registered associations 
were entirely missing. This shortcoming notwithstanding, the available archival data 
provided a good basis from which inference on the richness of associational life in the 
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region could be drawn. The quantitative data was complemented with observations and 
interviews on the vibrancy of associational life in the case study region. 
 
3.4.2  Qualitative Data Collection Methods 
 
a) Interviews 
 
In total, twenty-six interviews were conducted with resource persons in the NW Region. 
The informants were selected on purpose, and not randomly. Interviewees were selected 
based on their experience and knowledge on the research subject, and their willingness to 
share information. Interviewees were drawn from different groups in society: executive 
members of associations, ordinary members of associations, government officials, 
politicians who were no longer in government, opposition party officials, journalists and 
scholars. This diversity of resource persons made it possible for different perspectives on 
the same issues to be obtained and compared, thereby enhancing data reliability (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1995: 65). Furthermore, to avoid geographic bias, at least two resource 
persons were selected from each of the seven divisions of the NW Region.  
 
The interviews were of a semi-structured nature. Interviewees were asked open-ended 
questions that gave them space to tell their story in the way they saw it. Such open-ended 
questions were suitable for obtaining rich descriptions, analyses, and explanations (Blee 
and Taylor, 2002: 94). At the beginning of each interview, the respondent was given a 
brief description of the general purpose of the study. However, the exact hypotheses of 
the study were left out, so as to preserve the objectivity of the interviewee. All interviews 
were conducted face-to-face. With the permission of the respondents, the interviews were 
recorded, for subsequent transcription. The duration of each interview ranged from 1 to 
2.5 hours. All the interviews were one-to-one interviews, with the exception of two 
interviews that were each conducted with a group of four respondents. The group 
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interviews gave the opportunity of raising discussions around some salient and 
controversial issues that came up in the one-to-one interviews.  
 
A researcher’s ability to establish a cooperative relationship with respondents is crucial 
for interview respondents to volunteer credible and sensitive information (Aita and 
McIlvain, 1999: 264). Working as a volunteer for NWADO, a well known CSO network 
organization in the NW Region helped to build researcher-interviewee trust, as members 
of different associations saw the researcher as one of their own. This ‘semi-insider’ 
position gave the researcher “access to answers that would have been denied a complete 
outsider” (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 11).  
 
Spending a long time (4 months) in the field, and interacting frequently with informants, 
helped significantly to erode the scepticism and distrust that some potential informants 
initially had. A short ‘get in-get out’ research stay might have left no time for the 
researcher to build quality trust with informants. Some issues which the researcher 
explored in the late phases of the fieldwork were actually suggested by resources persons 
during informal lunch chats.   
 
b) Observations 
 
The researcher took advantage of his position as a volunteer for the CSO network 
organization, NWADO to gain access to training workshops and mobilization meetings 
of civil society organizations. Attending these CSO meetings provided direct access to 
insider discussions that would have been difficult to get otherwise. For ethical reasons, 
the researcher in these workshops or meetings always disclosed his dual position of 
researcher and CSO volunteer.  
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In the course of the field research, I attended five association workshops, four peaceful 
demonstration planning meetings and one of the meetings of the North West Investment 
Budget Committee. As a passive observer, I took notes as CSO members discussed issues 
amongst themselves; and avoided contributing my own views, in order not to influence 
the direction of discussions. This passive observer position ensured integrity in the data 
gathered.    
 
Close observation of two peaceful demonstrations that took place in the NW Region in 
April and July 2009 also provided valuable information. These demonstrations were 
captured in pictures and videos. Data was also gathered through observations of the 
activities of associations. For example, interacting frequently with members of NGOs 
during the 4-month research period enabled the researcher to keenly observe what really 
goes on in these associations on a day-to-day basis. Observations therefore were 
important for verifying data obtained through questionnaires and interviews.   
 
c)  Focus Group Discussions 
 
Towards the end of the fieldwork, the researcher in collaboration with the North West 
Association of Development Organizations (NWADO) organized a focus group 
discussion to reflect on the preliminary research findings. Fourteen people took part in 
the focus group discussion. Half of the participants were members of the host association, 
NWADO, while the others were representatives of seven other associations. In other 
words, a total of eight CSOs were represented in the focus group discussion.  
 
The focus group discussion which was organized in a workshop style achieved two 
things. Firstly, the researcher presented the preliminary quantitative findings of the 
research and received feedback from local CSOs who were the focus of the study. 
Secondly, the workshop stirred up debates around controversial and sensitive issues that 
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interviewees had avoided.  In the focus group discussion, participants themselves 
volunteered recommendations on how bottom-up pressure (POWER) could be enhanced 
among CSOs in the NW Region. The focus group discussion was, therefore, an action-
oriented research approach: research subjects were actively involved in finding solutions 
to the problems they faced (Small, 1995: 942). With the permission of the participants, 
the focus group discussions were recorded for subsequent transcription. 
 
d)  Document Review 
 
Different kinds of documentary material on associations were consulted to complement 
the qualitative data obtained through other means. The diverse sources of documentary 
evidence served different purposes. For example, letters from associations to the 
government and vice-versa helped in revealing the kind of relationship between the two 
parties. The Constitutions of associations provided information on how CSOs were 
structured, and on the kind of values they espoused.  
 
Other types of documentary evidence examined included occasional reports on the 
activities of associations, and NGO evaluation reports. Some of these reports provided a 
good history and overview of relevant issues like networking, resource capacity and 
conflicts between associations in the case study region. Also, consultant reports – for 
example the institutional diagnosis report on NWADO – gave the researcher an appraisal 
of some associations through the eyes of non-members.  
 
3.5  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This study uses two within-case methods of data analysis, namely, correspondence 
analysis and causal process tracing, to explain how the institutional context affects 
bottom-up pressure. To explain natural or social phenomena, we “depend upon causation 
all the time (Brady, 2008: 217).” There are different logics of causal interpretation. The 
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appropriate methods for data analysis – hence for explanation – in a study depend on the 
causal interpretation perspective of the research design. Therefore, before going on to 
describe the two data analysis methods chosen, it is worthwhile to first of all discuss the 
logic or philosophy of causal interpretation adopted in this study. 
 
3.5.1 The Logic for Drawing Causal Interpretation 
 
What is causation and how can we establish it? This question has been a subject of 
tremendous scholarly debate following David Hume’s eighteenth century exposé on the 
topic. The simple reason for this high scholarly attention is that in causal interpretation 
lies the power of explanation – which is a major goal of science. Despite numerous 
debates on causality [which will not be reviewed here] there is still no unified philosophy 
for making causal inference in the social sciences (Salmon, 1998: 5).  
 
Advocating for a unified framework for causal interpretation is similar to saying there is 
one methodological design that can fit all kinds of inquiry. For example, John Gerring 
(2005) proposes a unified framework for causal analysis in the social science. In his 
framework, Gerring (ibid: 187-8) insists that “empirical evidence of causal relationships 
is covariational in nature.” He subjugates all data analysis methods, including within-case 
process tracing to the covariation way of thinking about causation (ibid: 188-9). In most 
accounts of causation, covariation is the dominant philosophy; and it is often mistakenly 
advanced as the only. The principle of causal homogeneity that is suitable for drawing 
causal inference in ‘no-variance’ (single case study) research designs is often relegated.  
 
Cartwright (2004: 805) points out that it is wrong to think of causation as “a single, 
monolithic concept.” She notes:  
there are untold numbers of causal laws, each most directly represented using 
thick causal concepts, each with its own peculiar truth makers, and there is no 
single truth maker that they all share (ibid: 817).  
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In other words, contrary to popular claims, covariation is not a sine qua non for causal 
interpretation. While covariation is desirable for comparative and large-N (multiple-case) 
research designs, it is not universal to all research designs. In single case studies (“no-
variance” designs) with within-case units, causal homogeneity provides a strong basis for 
analysis and explanation (Munck, 2004: 110). The data analysis methods used in this 
study apply causal homogeneity as the logic for interpretation and explanation. 
 
In causal homogeneity, the logic for causal inference is similarity or correspondence 
among units. That is, causation is confirmed when research subjects under the same 
general cause-parameter, exhibit ‘similar’ values of the effect-parameter (Collier et al, 
2004: 29). This perspective on causal interpretation is especially useful in single case 
studies, because in such studies, the cause-parameter does not vary; hence its influence 
on within-case units can be analyzed quantitatively and/or qualitatively by watching out 
for sameness. Two types of homogeneity are identified in literature, namely strong and 
weak homogeneity (ibid: 29). In strong, often termed ‘unit homogeneity’, the research 
units are expected to have exactly the same values of the effect-parameter when the 
cause-parameter is not varied. In weak homogeneity, causal claims can still be made 
when a majority but not all units show similarity in the effect-parameter.  
 
Collier et al (2004: 29) recommend weak homogeneity for social sciences, since it is 
highly improbable that strong homogeneity can hold there. Strong homogeneity as 
employed in natural science experiments involves the control or elimination of all 
unwanted influences on research subjects. Strong homogeneity also assumes that 
observations can be measured with high precision. In social science research, it is clearly 
not possible to control for all factors in a case study. Moreover in social science research, 
assessment tools (for example, the POWER framework in this case) only allow for rough 
estimation and not precise measurement of societal phenomena. It therefore makes more 
sense to use weak homogeneity as the basis for causal interpretation in this research.   
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Using weak homogeneity to investigate how the institutional context influences bottom-
up pressure in associations therefore rests on two premises: 
1. The institutional context (the cause parameter) is assumed to be more or less the 
same across associations in the NW region.  
2. The institutional context has a high causal influence if a majority of associations 
are similar in bottom-up pressure capacity (the effect-parameter).  
Weak homogeneity therefore does not think of causality as being deterministic – a 
necessary and sufficient condition. As Sekhon (2008: 272) notes, “the hunt for necessary 
and sufficient causes is generally misplaced in the social sciences given the lack of unit 
homogeneity.” Weak homogeneity is based on the probabilistic notion that a cause 
increases the likelihood of the outcome, but does not necessarily determine it. This study 
measures the influence of the institutional context on associations by assessing 
homogeneity among CSOs through correspondence analysis. Meanwhile, explanations 
are drawn from qualitative data through process tracing. 
 
3.5.2 Correspondence Analysis  
Correspondence analysis is a statistical technique that displays categorical data (such as 
the questionnaire data in this study) on a single graph, thus revealing the 
interrelationships between the different data entities. There are a number of software 
programs that can be used for correspondence analysis. In this study, the XLSTAT 
program was used because it is uncomplicated and user-friendly. The XLSTAT program 
produced: 
- A correspondence analysis graph showing the degree of homogeneity among 
CSOs in the NW Region of Cameroon; and  
- A biplot showing the correlations between the bottom-up pressure attributes 
(POWER). 
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A biplot is a representation of two or more parameters – in this case the five bottom-up 
pressure elements – in the same graphical space. The analytical strength of the biplot is 
that it shows the correlations between the different parameters. Unlike other statistical 
methods such as regression analysis, correspondence analysis is not a technique for 
investigating one-way linear correlations. The correspondence analysis biplot is unique in 
that it maps parameters within a given category relative to one-another through two-way 
association (Greenacre, 1994: 8; Malhotra et al, 2005: 287). Given this, Bourdieu 
strongly recommends correspondence analysis for analysing interactions in social 
sciences. He notes that correspondence analysis “is a technique which ‘thinks’ in terms of 
relation” and this “philosophy corresponds exactly to … the reality of the social world” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96). For him,  
the structural causality of a network of factors is quite irreducible to the 
cumulated effects of the set of linear relations, of…the different factors, taken 
one by one (Bourdieu, 1984: 107).  
 
Correspondence analysis makes a “break with linear thinking” (ibid: 107), which 
dominates the covariation logic of data analysis.  
 
3.5.3 Process Tracing 
 
Process tracing involves tracking explanatory narratives in interview data to reveal the 
underlying mechanisms that link cause and effect parameters. Process tracing is a strong 
technique for causal inference and explanation because it reveals the pathways through 
which different observations interact to produce an effect. The strength of the method, 
Hall (2006: 27) notes, “rests on the multiplicity of observations” within a single case. 
Salmon (1998: 15) concurs that to draw causal inference, “it would suffice to observe one 
case in which the cause, the effect, and the causal relations were present.” Process tracing 
is concerned with the series or chain of events that link causes to effects. 
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Variable-oriented research designs tend to oversimplify the interactions between many 
factors into X-Y relationships. Such oversimplification sometimes “distort reality beyond 
reasonable limits” (Hall, 2006: 26). Process tracing is more appropriate for analyzing the 
influence of institutions – regulations, norms, and culture – in this study because the 
method is sensitive to complexity and pays attention to context. As Maxwell (2004: 9) 
highlights, process tracing has “distinct advantages of identifying the influence of 
contextual factors that can’t be statistically or experimentally controlled.”  
 
I use process tracing to check whether there are causal mechanisms linking any two 
entities that the correspondence analysis biplot shows as being related. In this way, 
process tracing helps one to “avoid mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal 
association” (Mahoney, 2000: 412). Two techniques are used for process tracing, namely, 
process verification and process induction (Bennett and George, 1997). The process 
verification approach is theory inclined: it checks whether institutional context factors in 
the case study lead to effects through the (coercive, mimetic or normative) mechanisms 
advanced in the theory of institutional isomorphism. Process induction is a more 
grounded-approach. It traces causal mechanisms by systematically identifying, grouping 
and comparing interviewee comments on particular issues, to reach cumulative 
explanations.   
 
3.6  SUMMING UP 
 
This chapter has discussed why a single negative case study research design is 
appropriate for addressing the research questions of this study. How quantitative and 
qualitative data was collected in the case study has also been elaborated. Furthermore, the 
chapter has underlined that similarity rather than covariation is the logic for drawing 
causal inference on how the institutional context influences bottom-up pressure for 
democracy. Two data analysis techniques – correspondence analysis and process tracing 
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– consistent with this logic of causal interpretation have been described. The next chapter 
will examine what quantitative (questionnaire) data tell us about bottom-up pressure 
among associations in the North West Region of Cameroon.  
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4. CASE STUDY: ASSOCIATIONS AND BOTTOM-UP 
PRESSURE IN NORTH WEST CAMEROON 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the political system in Cameroon from 
independence to present day. The historical analysis underlines that following the 
introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990, significant democratic change has not 
taken place despite a tremendous increase in number of development associations in the 
country. Quantitative analysis shows that, overall, association pressure for democracy is 
low. Associations in the case study, the NW region show relatively high levels of social 
capital in the form of inter-association networking and social integration with 
communities.  Despite this high social capital, these associations do not exhibit high 
political capital that can advance democracy. This section posits that this disassociation 
or disjoint between levels of social and political capital is due to the strong influence of 
institutional context factors, which moderate the development of political capacities in 
associations. The existence of high levels of social capital does not, therefore, guarantee 
that associations would engage in political actions and alliances that support 
democratization. 
 
4.1 CAMEROON: A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Cameroon, located in Central West Africa, has a population of about 18.8 million (CIA 
World Factbook, 2009), with English and French as the official languages. This 
bilingualism is a heritage of British colonial rule in one part of the country and French 
colonial rule in the other.  Following independence, this double linguistic and cultural 
identity heritage greatly influenced politics in the country and it continues to do so today. 
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To contextualize bottom-up pressure in the current political landscape of the case study, 
presenting the political history of Cameroon is imperative. First, an account of how the 
Anglophone and Francophone identities emerged is essential. Second, a description of 
how this dual heritage has influenced struggles for democratization in the country is 
indispensable.   
 
Initially, Cameroon was colonized by Germany in 1884. When Germany lost the First 
World War in 1918, its colonies were appropriated by the victors as part of the 
punishments for the war.  The League of Nations, in 1922, divided Cameroon between 
France and Britain, to be governed as trust territories. France took control of four-fifth of 
the territory in the east, while Britain took the remaining fifth of the territory in the west, 
adjacent to its other colony, Nigeria. After the Second World War, a movement for 
independence or the end of colonialism began in Africa. Officially, French-speaking East 
Cameroon, gained independence from France in 1960 and became known as the Republic 
of Cameroon under the leadership of President Ahmadou Ahidjo. Like all other post-
independence sub-Saharan African countries, the Republic of Cameroon was a 
dictatorship with the Cameroon National Union (CNU) as the only legally recognized 
party.  
 
In 1961, the United Nations in consultation with Britain presented English-speaking West 
Cameroon with the choice of either joining neighbouring Nigeria or reuniting with 
French-speaking Cameroon. A plebiscite was organized and the northern part of English-
speaking Cameroon opted to become part of neighbouring Nigeria. The southern half of 
English-speaking Cameroon – then referred to as Southern Cameroon – voted to reunite 
with French-speaking Cameroon to form a federal state. Before the plebiscite Southern 
Cameroonians had been struggling for autonomy from Nigeria. In the plebiscite, “they 
overwhelmingly voted to join Cameroon Republic…in the belief that they were reuniting 
with ‘their brothers’ from whom they had been separated by colonialism” (Awasom, 
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2008: 52). The union state of the two Cameroons was known as the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon. Southern Cameroon was small relative to French-speaking Republic of 
Cameroon; and this minority status, as well as, concerns over autonomy motivated 
Southern Cameroon to opt for federalism. Anglophone Cameroon believed that 
federalism would ensure equality in administrative powers between the two Cameroons 
and by so doing, guarantee the preservation of its Anglophone identity.  Contrary to such 
aspirations, federalism turned out to be a debut in the annexation and subsequently, 
marginalization of Anglophone Cameroon by the majority Francophone Cameroon (Jua 
and Konings, 2004) 
 
In a congress held in July 1961 to negotiate the Constitution of the new federal state, 
Francophone Cameroon succeeded in pressing for adoption of a highly centralized 
federal system. The federal state was to have two Prime Ministers – one from each state - 
under the leadership of President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Francophone Cameroon. Following 
the formation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo 
embarked on an agenda to transform the federation into a single unitary state. In complete 
disregard of the federal agreement, he carved out the entire Federal Republic into six 
administrative regions, identifying Anglophone Cameroon as the West Region. The 
Federal Inspector put in charge of Anglophone Cameroon (now West Region) was given 
administrative powers that surpassed those of the Anglophone Prime Minister. In name, 
Anglophone Cameroon was one of the parties of a two-state federation, but 
administratively, it was merely one of the regions within Francophone Cameroon – the 
Republic of Cameroon (Awasom, 2008).  
 
The nominal federalism came to an end in May 1972 when President Ahidjo’s proposal 
for formation of a unitary state was endorsed in a nation-wide referendum. Konings and 
Nyamnjoh (1997) argue that the dictatorial nature of Ahidjo’s regime explains why 
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Cameroonians voted overwhelmingly for the transformation of the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon to the United Republic of Cameroon.   
 
Fig. 4.1: Political Map of Cameroon  
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Shortly, after the transition to a unitary state, President Ahidjo divided the country into 
ten provinces, principally along ethnic lines. With knowledge that there were tensions 
between the southerly coastal and the northerly grass field people of Anglophone 
Cameroon, he divided the erstwhile West province (Southern Cameroon) into two: the 
South West and North West provinces (see Fig. 4.1).  
 
In the unitary state, marginalization of the Anglophone minority in political decision-
making and economic development intensified (Awasom, 2008; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 
1997). The Anglophones were reserved subordinate positions in state institutions and 
were treated as imperfect citizens who needed to adapt to the French language. Although 
dissent simmered among Anglophone Cameroonians, internal divisions and the 
dictatorial nature of the Ahidjo regime prevented the emergence of an opposition 
movement. In Ahidjo’s one-party regime, the Law of June 1967 on Associations banned 
all grouping that in any way “threatened the form of government” (Jua, 2002: 5).  
 
The United Republic of Cameroon had a regime change in 1982, when President 
Ahmadou Ahidjo for yet unclear reasons resigned from power. As the Constitution 
required, his Prime Minister, Paul Biya took over as head of state. One year after the 
power transfer, a conflict developed between Paul Biya and Ahidjo, forcing the former 
president into self-exile. In absentia, the Biya government judged and sentenced 
Ahmadou Ahidjo to death.  In 1984, soldiers loyal to Ahidjo tried unsuccessfully to 
overthrow the Biya regime through a coup. Paul Biya responded to the failed coup with a 
bloody repression of Ahidjo supporters. Upon his rise to power, Paul Biya had pledged to 
introduce democratic reforms based on an ideology of decentralization and grassroots 
participation which he subsequently published in his book ‘Communal Liberalism’. 
However, after the failed coup, Biya’s so-called ‘New Deal Government’ reinforced 
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authoritarianism (Dicklitch, 2002). In practice, the Biya regime was essentially a copycat 
of the preceding dictatorial regime, albeit with enhanced tribalism and corruption. 
 
To the disappointment of English-speaking Cameroonians, President Biya also changed 
the country’s name from United Republic to simply the Republic of Cameroon – which is 
what Francophone Cameroon was called when it gained independence from France. The 
last relic which indicated that Cameroon was a union state was thus dropped. President 
Biya appointed officials from his ethnic group and from other parts of Francophone 
Cameroon to leadership positions in almost all sectors of state administration. 
Marginalization of the Anglophones, however, was not only political. Programs on the 
state television were almost exclusively run in French. Also, even though Cameroon was 
a bilingual country, English was in day-to-day practice, not accepted as a means of 
communication in government ministries, which considering the centralized form of 
administration were headquartered in the capital city, Yaounde, situated in the French 
part of the country. Anglophone Cameroonians, therefore, felt like second-class citizens 
who had to adapt in a Francophone state.  All the above, coupled with government 
marginalization of the North West and South West provinces with regards to 
development, fuelled bitterness among the Anglophones; thus intensifying the 
Anglophone-Francophone identity divide.  
 
The antagonism between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon manifested in the 
form of insults in everyday life. The French-speakers referred to the Anglophones as 
‘Anglo-fous’ (‘fous’ being the French equivalent for fools); while the English-speakers 
addressed their French counterparts simply as ‘frogs’. The regime also deepened the 
North Westerners versus South Westerners cleavage that existed among Anglophone 
Cameroonians. The people of the two regions were encouraged to see themselves as 
rivals, who competed for those positions that the French-dominated government 
discretionarily reserved for English-speakers. The Biya regime plunged Cameroon into 
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economic decline and widespread corruption; but through repression and a masterly use 
of the art of divide-and rule, Biya subdued opposition to his regime (Konings and 
Nyamnjoh, 2004; Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004). 
 
Upon his rise to power, Biya changed the name of the country’s only political party from 
the Cameroon National Union (CNU) to the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM). By this name change Biya intended to show how different his regime was from 
his predecessor’s dictatorial regime. He subsequently demonstrated his philosophy of 
democracy by organizing presidential elections in 1984 and 1988, in which the CPDM 
was the only party and he, the only candidate. Naturally, he won both times, with 99.98 
and 98.75 percent respectively (Hudgens and Trillo, 2003). The first significant 
opposition against the Biya regime gained momentum in 1990.  
 
Faced with continuous socio-economic, cultural and political marginalization, and 
inspired by the democracy movement that was sweeping across Africa, Anglophone 
Cameroonians increasingly defied repression to express their discontent. Despite 
government prohibition, on 26 May 1990, the first opposition party, the Social 
Democratic Front (SDF) was launched at a mammoth rally in Bamenda, the capital of the 
North West Province. In his rally speech, the charismatic SDF leader, Ni John Fru Ndi 
declared his party’s vision:  
Democracy has never been handed down to a people on a platter of gold . . . We 
have set as one of our goals, to rid the Cameroonian society of a system that deprives 
people from being free men…We call upon you to stand up and be counted amongst 
those who share our democratic ideal. (quoted in Konings, 2004: 291) 
 
The government repression that followed this launching left six people dead; these were 
the May 26th martyrs. With the launching of the SDF, the North West Region made its 
first mark in history as the hotbed of rebellion in Cameroon.  
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Following the launch of the SDF, the party’s popularity spread throughout the country. 
Apart from the capital cities of the North West and South West provinces (Anglophone 
provinces), the party’s strongholds included the capitals of three Francophone provinces, 
namely, the Centre, Littoral and West provinces. Given increasing domestic unrests and 
international pressures, President Paul Biya reluctantly promulgated a number of laws in 
December 1990, granting greater political liberties. The 1990 Liberty Laws included the 
right to form associations, freedom of the media, and the right to form political parties. 
Despite the promulgation of these laws the Biya regime was, in practice, nowhere close 
to making a commitment to democracy.  
 
The long suppressed civil society in Cameroon seized the opportunity of the liberty laws 
to spring into activity. Student groups, teacher unions, churches, media and cultural 
associations mobilized with unprecedented vitality to clamour for democratic change 
(Nkwi, 2006). By the end of 1991, over seventy political parties had already been formed 
(Gros, 1995), and among these, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) remained the most 
popular. Given his charisma, his people-oriented leadership and his appealing ‘Power to 
the People’ slogan, Ni John Fru Ndi, the SDF party chairman successfully brought the 
masses to identify with his vision for democratic change (Konings, 2004). The SDF, 
popularly nicknamed “Suffer Don Finish” (meaning, suffering is at an end, in local 
Pidgin English) was at the pinnacle of the democracy movement in Cameroon.  
 
The opposition parties in 1991 formed a coalition called the National Coordination 
Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP), in which over 20 parties were registered 
(Hudgens and Trillo, 2003). Apart from the dominant SDF party, there were two other 
relatively popular parties in the coalition, namely, the National Union for Democracy and 
Progress (UNDP) and the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC). The UNDP was 
popular among the Islamic people who dominated the Northern provinces. The UPC had 
support among the Bamileke and Bassa people of the West and South provinces 
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respectively. The coalition of opposition parties (NCCOP) asked President Biya to 
organize a sovereign national conference; a forum in which the opposition and the ruling 
party would define and delimit the powers of each of the arms of state administration. 
President Biya refused categorically to hold a national conference. Following this refusal, 
the opposition parties launched a widespread civil disobedience campaign dubbed 
‘Operation ghost town’ to force the regime into compliance. As the name suggests, the 
ghost town campaign was intended to cripple economic and administrative activities in 
the cities. Citizens boycotted work, kept businesses closed, refused to pay taxes, 
obstructed transportation and organized frequent rallies and street protests.  
 
Apart from Bamenda in the North West Province which was the epicenter of the protests, 
Douala, and Bafoussam, the capital cities of the Littoral and West provinces respectively, 
were also hot beds of revolt. The government responded to the civic unrest with 
repression; opposition party members or supporters were arrested and over 200 people 
were killed (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1997) in the campaign that lasted for close to five months. 
At the time, the days of the Biya regime appeared numbered, considering the popularity 
of the pro-democracy movement and the alliance between opposition parties. In October 
1991, the debilitating economic impacts of the ghost town campaign forced the 
government to call the opposition parties for talks.  
 
Instead of yielding to the coalition’s request for a sovereign national conference, 
President Biya organized a summit on constitutional reform and elections. A majority of 
the opposition parties compromised their position and signed a declaration to call off the 
ghost town protests if elections were organized the following year. In November 1991, 40 
of the 47 registered opposition parties signed the declaration to call off the ghost town 
protests (Krieger, 1994). Among these parties were the UNDP and the UPC. The Social 
Democratic Front (SDF) insisted on the sovereign national conference, refused to sign 
the declaration and boycotted the legislative elections organized in March of the 
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following year. This marked the beginning of a fragmentation of the opposition; most 
opposition parties preferred to grab a piece of the national cake instead of pursuing 
regime change (Gros, 1995). In the legislative elections, the ruling CPDM party won 88 
of 180 seats in parliament; and the rest were distributed among the UPC, the UNDP and a 
third party, the Movement for the Defence of the Republic (MDR). The ruling party 
exploited the division of the opposition and secured a parliamentary majority by forging 
an alliance with the MDR which had obtained 6 seats. With this parliamentary majority, 
the Biya regime narrowly escaped a downfall. 
 
In presidential elections organized in October 1992, fragmentation of the opposition 
dashed the promising chance for regime change in Cameroon. The leaders of all the 
major opposition parties aspired for power, and “they were unable to agree on a single 
candidate to run against Biya” (Takougang, 2003: 430). The Biya regime ignored the 
pledge of electoral reform that it had made to the opposition parties in order to end the 
ghost town protests. The Ministry of Territorial Administration which was essentially an 
institution of pro-CPDM state officials was put in charge of election organization. The 
Biya regime, given its control over the electoral process, rigged the votes and robbed the 
SDF of victory (Gros, 1995; Konings, 1996).  
 
According to official results, Paul Biya won the elections with 39 percent of the votes, 
while Fru Ndi of the SDF obtained 35 percent and Bello Bouba of the UNDP followed 
with 19 percent (Eyoh, 1998). The proclamation of the results sparked protests notably in 
the SDF stronghold, Bamenda, capital of the North West Province. True to its autocratic 
nature, the Biya regime clamped down on the demonstrations. The SDF Chairman was 
placed under house arrest, and a three months state of emergency was imposed on 
Bamenda. The North West region had proven itself again as the ‘capital’ of rebellion in 
the country.  
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The United States and Germany declared the election results fraudulent and suspended 
their aid to the Biya regime (Dicklitch, 2002). France on the other hand continued to give 
support to the regime. To France, President Biya “appeared to be more likely to safeguard 
French interests in Cameroon than the Anglophone” SDF Chairman, Ni John Fru Ndi  
(Konings, 1996: 261).  In the elections, Fru Ndi had won approximately 68 percent of the 
votes in two Francophone regions, namely, the West and Littoral provinces. In other 
words, with its campaign for democracy, the SDF had managed to bridge the historical 
Anglophone-Francophone divide (Krieger, 1994) which the Biya regime had fomented. 
This achievement on the part of the SDF, as well as the Law on the Freedom of 
Association that had been recently passed, seemed to hold much promise for a growth of 
the civil society democracy movement in the country. This promise, however, did not 
materialize: the year 1992 was the farthest the opposition and the Cameroonian civil 
society will get to ousting the autocratic Biya regime. 
 
Using cooptation, intimidation of the opposition, and fraud, the Biya regime in 
subsequent elections reclaimed the control that it had lost in the 1992 elections. By 
offering ministerial positions to opposition party officials, Paul Biya co-opted the UNDP 
and a faction of the UPC into a so-called government of national unity (Konings, 1996). 
In 1996, Cameroon revised its single-party state Constitution of 1972 to accommodate 
the multiparty system. The new Constitution set the length of a presidential term at seven 
years, and stipulated that after serving two terms in office, a president would not be 
eligible to stand election for another term.  
 
In 1997, the first presidential election under the new Constitution was organized. 
Remarkably, Biya obtained 92.57 percent of the votes. This percentage was more than 
double what he obtained five years earlier. According to Konings and Nyamnjoh (2000: 
9) this election result was reminiscent of the single party era, when Biya typically 
obtained 99 percent of the votes. For them, Biya’s so-called crushing victory in the 1997 
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Presidential elections was the work of a “post-elections rigging machinery” that his 
regime had perfected (ibid: 9). In the subsequent presidential election held in 2004, voter 
participation was low. Given the Biya regime’s reputation for election rigging, citizens no 
longer believed that voting could lead to democratic change in Cameroon. According to 
official records, Biya prevailed in the 2004 presidential elections with approximately 71 
percent of the votes, while the SDF Chairman obtained approximately 17.4 percent.  
 
Despite the election rigging tradition of the Biya regime, the opposition continued to 
nurse hopes of regime change because, according to the Constitution, Biya was not 
eligible for re-election in 2011 as he would have served two terms in office. The 
Constitution, however, stipulated that a revision of the law could be carried out through a 
simple majority vote in the parliament. Since it’s near demise in 1992, the ruling CPDM 
party had progressed considerably in its control of the parliament. The party had gone 
from controlling 88 out of 180 parliamentary seats in 1992, to wining 153 in the 2007 
legislative elections. It was therefore not surprising that in his end of year speech of 31 
December 2007, Paul Biya expressed his intentions to scrap presidential term limits from 
the Constitution. In his end of year speech to the nation, President Biya claimed that he 
was responding to calls for a revision of the Constitution from a majority of the 
Cameroonian citizenry.  
 
Following Biya’s proclamation, the SDF and civil society activist began organizing press 
conferences and demonstrations, notably in Douala – in the Littoral Region – to discredit 
the President’s claim. In contradiction to the liberty laws, the Governor of the Littoral 
province signed a decree forbidding all meetings, marches and demonstrations in the 
public domain. In addition, the government shut down two private media that aired 
programs in which the planned amendment of the constitution was criticized.  
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On February 25, 2008 civilians, notably in the southern part of the country, took 
advantage of a nation-wide passive strike organized by the Union of Transporters to 
express their grievances against the government. The main grievances expressed included 
the impending constitutional amendment and high costs of living. The anti-government 
protests which started in Douala (the Littoral Region) spread to 32 cities in five of the 
nation’s ten Regions; the town of Bamenda in the North West Region was one of these 
protest hotspots. As in the ghost town protests of the early 90s, all normal activities in the 
affected cities were disrupted. Demonstrators grounded transportation services, destroyed 
government buildings, private businesses and petrol stations, and barricaded streets. And 
like in the early 90s, the Biya regime responded to the civic unrest with ruthless 
repression. The regime’s repression brought the protests to an end on February 29, 2008. 
According to the government’s official statement, 40 people died in the protest and 1,671 
civilians were arrested (CRTV, 2008). However, according to The National Observatory 
of Human Rights in Cameroon (2008) at least 139 people were killed in the five days of 
protests.  
 
With 157 votes in favor and 5 votes against, the parliament on 10 April 2008 endorsed 
the removal of presidential term limits from the Constitution. Parliamentarians of the 
Social Democratic Front (SDF) boycotted the vote. The Biya regime had once more 
outmanoeuvred the opposition and established the opportunity for President Paul Biya to 
fossilize himself in power. Considering this revision of the Constitution in Cameroon, the 
prospects of regime change and advancement of democratic practice turned bleak.  
 
The Biya regime has remained in place, even though twenty years have passed since 
multiparty politics and the liberty laws were introduced. Legislative and presidential 
elections are organized routinely, but there are little chances for fairness, because the 
members of commissions charged with overseeing elections are typically ruling party 
officials handpicked by the president. In addition, devolution of powers to local 
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administrators has been slow and superficial (Cheka, 2007); citizens at the local level 
remain without a voice in the design and implementation of projects that affect them. 
Worst of all, human rights abuses are commonplace; those who protest against the regime 
are harassed, imprisoned or tortured. In effect, Cameroon under Paul Biya remains a 
“virtual democracy” (Joseph, 1999) – authoritarian rule cloaked as liberal democracy.  
 
The democratization process in Cameroon as many scholars have noted has stalled (see 
for example, Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004; Fonchingong, 2004; Forje, 2006). 
Paradoxically, this doldrum has occurred despite a rise in civic associations, which were 
expected to promote democracy by acting as the watchdog against state corrupt, 
irresponsiveness and abuse of power. The North West (NW) Region is one of the areas in 
Cameroon where the association boom is greatest. An interviewee describes the NW 
Region as “the pace-setter of civil society activity in Cameroon.” 
 
4.2  ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE IN THE NORTH WEST REGION 
 
The North West Region with its estimated 2.1 million inhabitants is the third most 
populated of Cameroon’s ten regions. The region is sub-divided into seven administrative 
units, namely,  Mezam Division, Boyo Division, Bui Division, Ngoketunjia Division, 
Menchum Division, Momo Division, and Donga-Mantung Division (Fig. 4.2).  The 
people of the NW region, as an interviewee remarks, have a strong disposition of 
“coming together and doing things together.” A lively spirit of community and solidarity 
is a defining feature of the North Westerners. The region teems with social, cultural, 
development-oriented, religious, and others associations to the extent that the total 
number of these associations is indeterminable. In short, the NW region is a ‘paradise’ of 
associational activity, not only in terms of number of associations, but also in terms of 
variety of associations and vitality of associations. On Saturdays and Sundays in 
particular, the majority of people in the NW region routinely attend social, cultural, 
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and/or religious association gatherings: socializing in associations is a typical feature on 
the weekend agenda.   
 
Fig. 4.2: The North West Region of Cameroon 
 
 
Source: Adapted from http://nwcanada.org/ 
 
Table 4.1 below shows that between 2000 and 2008, at least 1,128 new associations were 
officially registered at the offices of divisional administrators in the NW region. This 
implies that on average, more than 125 new associations are registered annually in the 
region. This figure, however, is an underestimate of the actual number of associations 
that are created yearly in the region, because the data in Table 4.1, obtained from the 
records of divisional administrators, is incomplete. Also, the data depicts only registered 
associations and does not take into account the multitude of associations that operate 
without formal registration. Despite these shortcomings, the data does show that 
following the introduction of the 1990 liberty laws, an association boom has been taking 
place in the North West region.  
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Table 4.1: Number of New Associations Registered in the 
NW Region from 2000 to 2008 
 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS PER DIVISION YEARLY 
TOTAL Mezam Bui Donga-Mantung Momo Menchum Boyo Ngoketunjia 
2000 25 3 16 6 5 n.a n.a 55 
2001 42 4 4 7 10 6 n.a 73 
2002 23 16 3 7 7 12 n.a 68 
2003 55 27 29 19 13 30 n.a 173 
2004 89 20 27 9 3 42 2 192 
2005 81 14 12 1 4 7 2 121 
2006 51 35 15 1 10 11 3 126 
2007 34* 20 9 n.a 8 7 2 80 
2008 101 57 17 23 4 22 7 231 
Unspecified - - - 9  -  9 
GRAND TOTAL : 1128 
 
[* partial data;  n.a - not available] 
 
There are a number of reasons for the high prevalence of associations in the NW Region 
of Cameroon. First, the tendency to form associations can be seen as the manifestation of 
a custom and tradition of social solidarity that characterizes North Westerners. The 
people of the NW region place a high value on family, community, tribal and other social 
bonds. Second, marginalization and neglect of the Anglophone regions by the French 
dominated state has compelled the people of the NW region to take development into 
their own hands. Economic crisis and the failures of the state to provide needed services 
has led to an unprecedented rise of village development associations (VDAs) and self-
reliance development initiatives (Fonchingong and Fonjong, 2003). Third, as Fowler 
(1991) notes about African countries in general, a contributing factor to the escalation in 
number of associations was the increased availability of donor funding for the nonprofit 
sector. An interviewee in the North West region of Cameroon elucidates:    
People are using the opportunity of globalization to get funds to help themselves. 
When they learned that they can form an association and get some money, every 
family began forming an association. This is one of the reasons for the existence of 
so many associations. 
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A local government administrator further explains: “people of the North West Region are 
very educated, informed and conscious of certain rights. Poverty and underdevelopment 
of the region makes them politically volatile.” Forming associations to demand for good 
governance and better service delivery is thus a manifestation of this political 
consciousness.   
 
According to the Putnam (1993) associations-democracy thesis, a high stock of social 
capital – networking, integrative and reciprocal relationships – will exist where there is a 
vibrant associational life. Social capital, Putnam argues, predisposes people to cooperate 
in the pursuit of common goals, and this tendency to work together for the achievement 
of shared interests results in more efficient and more democratic governments.  The 
North West region of Cameroon, as explained above is rich in number of development 
associations. Taking into account Putnam’s argument, this high number of associations in 
the case study region raises two important questions. First, what is the level of social 
capital among development associations in the NW region? Second, to what extent do 
these associations take relevant actions or measures that influence the system of 
governance positively? Quantitative measurement of the five attributes of bottom-up 
pressure (POWER) in the case study provides answers to these questions. 
  
4.3: BOTTOM-UP PRESSURE IN THE NORTH WEST REGION 
 
Quantitative measurement of bottom-up pressure (POWER) in the case study was 
achieved through the use of a questionnaire. Using the scoring scheme described in the 
methodology section (Chapter 3) each of the five bottom-up pressure attributes was 
assessed on a 0-10 scale, based on the questionnaire responses provided by 100 
development associations.  
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Table 4.2 below shows how the sample of 100 associations in the NW region score in the 
five bottom-up pressure attributes: ‘Politicization activities’ (P), ‘Organization and 
networking’ (O), ‘Working in collaboration with the community’ (W), ‘Established links 
with opposition parties’ (E), and ‘Resource capacity’ (R). The data table of bottom-up 
pressure attributes depicts the cumulative pressure score for each of one hundred 
associations, A1 to A100. Given that it is difficult to determine with certainty how each 
of the bottom-up pressure attribute ranks in importance relative to the others, the total 
score in Table 4.2 is calculated based on the assumption that the five attributes of 
pressure (POWER) carry equal weight. In Table 4.2,  
 
Total Power = P + O + W + E + R 
 
The questionnaire data (in Table 4.2) make it possible for us to analyze: 
- whether on average, bottom-up is high or low in the association-rich North West 
region of Cameroon (Research Objective 2); 
- whether the level of social capital among associations is high (as the associations-
democracy thesis predicts);  
- whether social capital and political capital among associations are conjoined.  
(Research Objective 3); and 
- whether bottom-up pressure among associations is homogeneous; indicating a 
strong influence from the institutional context (Research Objective 4). 
Developing a conceptual tool for assessing bottom-up pressure (Research Objective 1) 
and operationalizing it for data collection has therefore made the fulfilment of Research 
Objectives 2, 3, and 4 possible. 
 
The scatter diagram (scattergram) is a good way of visualizing the questionnaire data in 
Table 4.2. Scattergrams depict skewness in statistical distributions, hence they can clearly 
show whether the bottom-up pressure attributes within the sample of associations are 
high or low.    
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Table 4.2: Bottom-up Pressure Scores for a Sample of 100 Associations  
in the North West Region of Cameroon 
 
Associations 
(Anonymous) 
Pressure Score 
Total 
POWER 
P O W E R 
Politicization 
activities 
Organization 
and 
networking 
Working in 
collaboration with 
the community 
Established links 
with opposition 
parties 
Resource 
Capacity 
A1 6 10 10 2 5 33 
A2 5 7 8 0 3 23 
A3 1 6 5 0 6 18 
A4 1 7 8 0 3 19 
A5 2 9 8 0 7 26 
A6 3 8 7 0 2 20 
A7 7 8 5 1 9 30 
A8 7 7 4 2 7 27 
A9 7 7 5 3 3 25 
A10 3 5 7 1 4 20 
A11 3 8 7 0 5 23 
A12 8 10 10 6 10 44 
A13 3 10 9 2 10 34 
A14 4 8 4 2 3 21 
A15 3 7 10 1 6 27 
A16 5 6 5 1 6 23 
A17 3 9 7 1 6 26 
A18 0 8 9 0 10 27 
A19 4 9 8 1 10 32 
A20 6 3 8 6 3 26 
A21 3 4 6 0 5 18 
A22 1 5 5 0 1 12 
A23 5 1 7 2 1 16 
A24 0 9 5 0 4 18 
A25 2 4 8 2 3 19 
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Associations 
(Anonymous) 
Pressure Score 
Total 
POWER 
P O W E R 
Politicization 
activities 
Organization 
and 
networking 
Working in 
collaboration with 
the community 
Established links 
with opposition 
parties 
Resource 
Capacity 
A26 7 9 10 3 10 39 
A27 3 10 9 1 10 33 
A28 1 7 4 3 4 19 
A29 2 8 6 0 9 25 
A30 1 4 6 0 8 19 
A31 5 3 7 3 6 24 
A32 4 4 8 0 6 22 
A33 1 5 10 2 1 19 
A34 1 5 7 6 6 25 
A35 0 8 6 0 5 19 
A36 1 5 6 0 2 14 
A37 4 5 9 4 4 26 
A38 1 3 6 6 1 17 
A39 2 2 10 4 1 19 
A40 0 1 7 3 2 13 
A41 2 4 1 0 2 9 
A42 2 5 8 3 1 19 
A43 0 5 3 2 1 11 
A44 2 6 6 7 3 24 
A45 1 8 4 0 4 17 
A46 0 7 4 1 3 15 
A47 4 9 5 5 5 28 
A48 2 8 7 2 2 21 
A49 2 6 9 1 5 23 
A50 6 8 6 0 6 26 
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Associations 
(Anonymous) 
Pressure Score 
Total 
POWER 
P O W E R 
Politicization 
activities 
Organization 
and 
networking 
Working in 
collaboration with 
the community 
Established links 
with opposition 
parties 
Resource 
Capacity 
A51 4 10 8 2 5 29 
A52 0 6 7 0 9 22 
A53 3 8 5 2 4 22 
A54 6 5 10 1 9 31 
A55 2 5 8 0 5 20 
A56 3 5 10 2 7 27 
A57 1 5 10 0 9 25 
A58 5 10 8 1 4 28 
A59 1 10 4 2 2 19 
A60 1 4 5 3 3 16 
A61 1 4 5 3 3 16 
A62 2 5 9 3 6 25 
A63 1 4 10 1 3 19 
A64 1 5 8 8 1 23 
A65 1 1 9 0 3 14 
A66 1 9 3 0 5 18 
A67 8 8 9 3 7 35 
A68 0 1 7 0 4 12 
A69 1 4 8 0 1 14 
A70 0 1 9 0 3 13 
A71 2 4 5 2 3 16 
A72 4 6 6 1 6 23 
A73 2 9 5 0 10 26 
A74 1 6 9 3 4 23 
A75 7 9 7 3 6 32 
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Associations 
(Anonymous) 
Pressure Score 
Total 
POWER 
P O W E R 
Politicization 
activities 
Organization 
and 
networking 
Working in 
collaboration with 
the community 
Established links 
with opposition 
parties 
Resource 
Capacity 
A76 7 8 5 1 5 26 
A77 5 6 6 1 4 22 
A78 1 3 10 0 3 17 
A79 2 4 6 1 4 17 
A80 1 7 10 8 4 30 
A81 6 6 6 8 8 34 
A82 3 2 6 5 5 21 
A83 3 7 7 5 4 26 
A84 4 8 3 2 5 22 
A85 1 7 8 8 3 27 
A86 2 4 10 0 4 20 
A87 2 3 10 0 4 19 
A88 2 6 8 2 3 21 
A89 5 4 7 4 3 23 
A90 3 5 10 6 3 27 
A91 1 7 4 2 3 17 
A92 2 4 7 4 3 20 
A93 2 6 3 6 1 18 
A94 5 10 10 0 4 29 
A95 2 5 10 6 4 27 
A96 2 5 10 4 3 24 
A97 1 7 10 4 4 26 
A98 2 4 10 8 3 27 
A99 2 4 10 8 4 28 
A100 1 6 10 3 1 21 
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4.3.1  Total Bottom-Up Pressure among NW Region Associations 
 
A scattergram of the ‘Total POWER’ scores from Table 4.2 reveals that on average, 
bottom-up pressure among associations in the North West Region is negatively skewed. 
As Figure 4.3 depicts, the median of the ‘Total POWER’ scores for the sample of 
associations lies below the mean. This negative skewness implies that on average, bottom-
up associations in the North West region is low. To be specific, 61 percent of associations 
in the sample have below-average values for ‘total bottom-up pressure’, while only 39 
percent have above average scores. Separate scatter plots for each of the five bottom-up 
pressure attributes shows that not all five attributes account for this low cumulative 
pressure in the case study. 
 
Fig. 4.3: Scattergram – ‘Total POWER’ Scores  
for Associations in the NW Region 
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4.3.2  Social Capital among NW Region Associations 
 
To recall, the social capital attributes of the POWER framework are: ‘Organization and 
networking’ (O) among associations and the extent to which development associations 
‘Work in collaboration with the community’ (W).  Figure 4.4, and 4.5 respectively show 
Mean 
34 % 
61 % 
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that the degree of ‘organization and networking’ (O) and the extent to which associations 
‘work in collaboration with the community’ (W) are high in the NW Region. These two 
pressure attributes (which reflect the social capital of associations) are positively skewed, 
since their median scores are significantly higher than the mean score of 5. As the 
scattergram for ‘organization and networking’ (O) illustrates, 55 percent of the sample of 
associations lie above the mean value while only 28 percent lie below. Regarding the 
extent to which associations ‘work in collaboration with the community’ (W), 75 percent 
of associations in the sample score above-average, while only 12 percent score below-
average. Unlike for these two attributes (O and W), associations in the NW Region show 
low scores for the other bottom-up pressure attributes. 
 
Fig. 4.4: Scattergram – “Organization and Networking” (O) Scores  
for Associations in the NW Region 
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Fig. 4.5: Scattergram – “Working in collaboration with the community” (W)  
Scores for Associations in the NW Region 
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4.3.3  Political Capital among NW Region Associations 
 
Associations in the NW Region show very low scores for the political capital attributes of 
bottom-up pressure, that is, ‘politicization activities’ (P) and ‘established links with the 
opposition’ (E). The scattergrams, for these two parameters (Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7) reflect 
high negative skewness, given that the median scores for both attributes are significantly 
lower than the mean value of 5. The scatter plot for ‘politicization activities’ (P) 
demonstrates that 78 percent of associations in the sample have below average scores, 
while only 14 percent of them have above-average scores (Fig. 4.6). Similarly, the 
scattergram for ‘established links with the opposition’ (E) shows that 83 percent of 
associations in the sample have below-average scores (Fig. 4.7). Only 14 percent of the 
one hundred associations report above-average scores for affiliations with political parties 
in the opposition. 
 
 
 
  Mean 
75 % 
12 % 
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Fig. 4.6: Scattergram – “Politicization activities” (P) Scores  
for Associations in the NW Region 
 
  
 
Fig. 4.7: Scattergram – “Established links with the Opposition” (E) Scores  
for Associations in the NW Region 
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4.3.4  Resource Capacity among NW Region Associations 
 
The scatter diagram for ‘resource capacity’ (R) scores shows that a majority of 
associations in the sample have low access to resources (Fig. 4.8). The negative skewness 
for ‘resource capacity’ (R), however, is not as pronounced as for the two political capital 
attributes of bottom-up pressure (P and E). While 59 percent of associations in the sample 
rank below-average in ‘resource capacity’ (R), 29 percent rank above-average.   
 
Fig. 4.8: Scattergram – “Resource capacity” (R) Scores  
for Associations in the NW Region 
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To summarize, the questionnaire data shows that associations in the NW Region, on the 
one hand, exhibit high social capital, and on the other hand, they have very low political 
capital and resource capacities. As the bar chart (Fig. 4.9) illustrates, the average scores for  
‘organization and networking’ (O) and the extent to which associations ‘work in 
collaboration with the community’ (W) – which are measures of social capital – are both 
high.  On the other hand, the mean scores for ‘politicization activities’ (P) and ‘established 
links with the opposition’ (E) – which are indicators or measures of political capital – are 
both low. The data therefore suggests that social capital and political capital are not 
Average score 
29 % 
59 % 
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coupled. In other words, although the existence of a high density of associations may 
generate high social capital, this is not necessarily accompanied by political capital, which 
is an important element for the promotion of democracy.   
 
Fig. 4.9:  Average Bottom-up Pressure (POWER) Capacities  
for Associations in the NW Region 
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4.3.5  The Relationship between Bottom-up Pressure Attributes 
 
A correspondence analysis (CA) graph of the five bottom-up pressure attributes affirms 
that social capital and political capital among associations in the case study are decoupled. 
In correspondence analysis biplots, the length of vector line for a particular variable 
reflects the degree of variances of that variable: “the longer the line, the higher is the 
variance” within the sample (Kohler and Luniak, 2005: 209). Meanwhile, the cosine of the 
angle (α) between two vector lines reflects the coefficient of correlation between variables 
that the vector lines correspond to (ibid).  The correlation coefficient measures degree of 
correspondence in a range from –1 to +1. A correlation coefficient of –1 represents a 
perfect negative correlation; a coefficient of zero (0) signifies no correlation; and a 
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coefficient of +1 depicts a perfectly positive correlation. Fig. 4.10 below is the biplot 
(correspondence analysis chart) obtained when the questionnaire data in Table 4.2 is 
analyzed in XLSAT.  
 
Fig. 4.10: Correspondence Analysis Plot showing the Correlations  
between Bottom-up Pressure Attributes 
 
 
 
The lengths of the vector lines in the biplot (Fig. 4.10) show that two bottom-up pressure 
attributes, namely, ‘Politicization activities’ (P) and ‘Established links with the opposition’ 
(E) have a high variance. Simply put, the biplot demonstrates that for the majority of 
associations in NW Cameroon, the level of political capital digresses significantly from the 
mean score of 5. As the scattergrams, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 above illustrate, this digression 
is negative rather than positive. The differential lengths of the vector lines in the biplot, 
therefore, raise one important question viz.: ‘why does political capital (P and E) show a 
high variance when social capital (O and W) shows a low variance?’ The next chapter will 
address this question. 
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To facilitate explanation, the correlations between social capital variables and political 
capital variables in the biplot are presented in Table 4.3 below. As the table illustrates, 
‘Organization and network’ (O) and ‘Politicization activities’ (P) are positively correlated. 
This implies that in the NW Region those associations that engage the most in networking 
also tend to be more involved in advocacy activities. This observation supports Putnam’s 
(1993) argument that social capital predisposes people to make demands on the 
government. Though positive, the observed correlation between ‘Organization and 
network’ (O) and ‘Politicization activities’ (P) in the NW Region is weak (Correlation 
coefficient of +0.51). 
 
Table 4.3: Biplot Interpretation 1 – The Relationship between  
Social Capital and Political Capital  
 
Social Capital 
Attribute 
Political Capital 
Attribute 
Angle between 
vectors (α) 
Correlation 
Coefficient (Cos α) 
Description of 
Correlation 
Organization and 
networking (O) 
Politicization activities 
(P) 59
o
 + 0.51 Weak positive 
correlation 
Established links with 
the opposition (E) 150
o
 – 0.87 Strong negative 
correlation 
Working in 
collaboration with 
the community (W) 
Politicization activities 
(P) 181
o
 – 0.99 Very strong negative 
correlation 
Established links with 
the opposition (E) 94
 o
 – 0.07 No correlation 
 
Table 4.3 also shows that there is a strong negative correlation (coefficient of –0.87) 
between ‘Organization and network’ (O) and ‘Established links with the opposition’ (E). 
In other words, associations that engage in CSO networks seldom establish ties with 
opposition political parties. High social capital among associations in the North West 
Region strongly discourages political capital that takes the form of opposition political 
party affiliations. Furthermore, there is a very strong negative correlation (coefficient of –
0.99) between ‘Working in collaboration with the population’ (W) and ‘Politicization 
activities’ (P). This implies that associations with strong community relations (ties) seldom 
engage in advocacy activities. The biplot shows no correlation between the extent to which 
associations ‘Work in collaboration with the community’ (W) and the extent to which they 
‘Establish links with the opposition’ (E). Overall, the correspondence analysis confirms 
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that social capital and political capital among associations in the NW Region are not 
coupled. 
 
Correspondence analysis also shows that while there is no correlation between the 
‘Resource capacity’ (R) of associations and ‘Politicization activities’ (Table 4.4 below), 
resource capacity is strongly correlated with ‘Organization and networking’ (O). This 
means that associations with better access to resources are more engaged in CSO 
networking. The biplot shows that a very strong negative correlation exists between 
‘Resource capacity’ (R) and ‘Established links with the opposition’ (E): well resourced 
associations in the NW Region hardly ever try to advance their goals by forging ties with 
opposition political parties. 
 
Table 4.4: Biplot interpretation 2 – The Relationship between ‘Resource capacity’ (R) 
and other Bottom-up Pressure Attributes 
 
 
Political Capital 
Attribute 
Angle between 
vectors (α) 
Correlation 
Coefficient (Cos α) 
Description of 
Correlation 
Resource 
Capacity (R) 
Politicization activities 
(P) 87
o
 + 0.05 No correlation 
Organization and 
networking (O) 28
o
 + 0.88 Strong positive 
correlation 
Working in 
collaboration with the 
community (W) 
93o – 0.05 No correlation 
Established links with 
the opposition (E) 176
 o
 – 0.99 Very strong 
negative correlation 
 
4.4 INFLUENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: STRONG OR WEAK? 
 
According to the theory of institutional isomorphism – reviewed in the previous chapter – 
organizations which face the same kinds of institutional constraints within a given 
environment tend to resemble each other (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The degree of 
similarity (or homogeneity) among organizations in the given institutional environment 
would, therefore, be a reflection of the constraining power of institutions (regulations, 
norms and cultural codes) within the given context. In other words, the greater the 
influence of the institutional context, the more similar the affected organizations would be.  
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Figure 4.11 below is a correspondence analysis graph which maps the sample of one 
hundred North West Region associations (A1 to A100) in relation to one another.  The 
correspondence analysis graph demonstrates that regarding bottom-up pressure, there is a 
high degree of homogeneity among associations in NW Cameroon. This high degree of 
homogeneity is reflected by the level of clustering of association markers on Figure 4.11. 
The correspondence analysis graph, therefore, indicates that the influence of the 
institutional context on associations in the North West Region is strong.  
 
Fig. 4.11: Correspondence Analysis Graph showing the Degree of Homogeneity 
among CSOs in the NW Region of Cameroon 
 
 
 
Based on the above findings, I advance the following conjectures to be examined through 
qualitative data in the next chapter:  
a) the institutional context moderates the abilities of associations to develop political 
capital (P and E). 
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b) Whether or not political capital develops alongside social capital depends on the 
institutional environment in which associations emerge.  
 
4.5  SUMMING UP 
 
This chapter has shown that, overall, bottom-up pressure among development associations 
in the North West Region of Cameroon is low. Most importantly, it has revealed that social 
capital and political capital among associations in the case study are not coupled. This non-
correlation between social and political capital thus challenges the argument that 
associations by virtue of generating high social capital would act as political forces for 
democratization.  
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that the influence of the institutional context on 
development associations in the case study is strong. This finding leads one to speculate 
that the institutional context moderates political capital among associations in the case 
study; hence the nature of the institutional context determines whether or not political 
capital will accompany high social capital. Investigating this speculation requires a 
qualitative approach. How institutions – regulations, norms and cultural codes – influence 
bottom-up pressure in associations of the NW Region is the subject of the next chapter.  
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5. THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE PRESSSURE 
CAPACITIES OF ASSOCIATIONS: CAMEROON IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter analyses how the institutional environment, which consists of regulations, 
norms and cultural codes of conduct, acts as an intervening factor in the associations-
democracy equation. Interviews show that because development associations in the NW 
Region of Cameroon are heavily reliant on donors and the government for resources, they 
succumb to government and donor regulations that have constraining effects on their 
political activities. Also, unethical norms, such as the misappropriation of donor fund, are 
so widespread among NGOs that, in the eyes of many local communities, these 
associations have lost credibility as promoters of positive change. Furthermore, CSOs in 
the NW Region uphold a norm of ‘non-intervention in politics’ and this limits the pressure 
they have on the government. Qualitative data also shows that stiff competition over donor 
resources weakens CSO networking, while an entrenched culture of respect for elites and 
leaders limits the disposition of associations to challenge authority. This chapter concludes 
that despite the high social capital in the NW Region, the institutional context moderates 
the abilities of associations to develop political capital. This implies that whether or not 
political capital develops alongside social capital depends on the institutional environment 
in which associations exist. 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Expectations that the civil society will grow rapidly and advance democracy were high for 
sub-Saharan Africa, when most countries in the region introduced multiparty politics in the 
90s.  As researchers took stock of the progress – or lack of progress – of democracy in 
countries of the sub-continent, these aspirations waned. An increasing number of scholars 
working on democracy in Africa began to describe the concept of civil society and its 
hypothesized effects on democracy as Western-centric and overly optimistic. Tangri 
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(1998), for example, noted that the conceptualization of civil society as a sphere of 
organized protest was not suitable for analysing the African context which is characterized 
by ethnic divisions, patronage politics, and sectarianism. Consequently, he argued that 
“civil society is an artefact pointing to the future of African politics, not to its present (ibid: 
127).”  Critical views of this nature emphasized that to adequately understand the 
democratization potential of civil society in Africa, the institutional context in which civic 
groups existed needed to be taken into consideration. 
 
Institutional analysis is useful, when general realist claims fail to hold, as is the case with 
the associations-to-democracy prediction in Africa. Institutional analysis takes power 
realities into consideration, hence it can clarify the conditions under which realist 
propositions can or cannot apply (Keohane and Martin, 1995). Analysing civil society 
associations in relation to the institutional context means taking into account how the 
socio-cultural, economic and political system affect association pressure for democracy. 
Robert Scott’s characterization of institutions as comprising, (i) regulatory, (ii) normative 
and (iii) cultural elements has analytical value. This section discusses the effects of 
institution on the pressure capacities of associations in Cameroon by focusing on these 
three elements.  
 
One challenge for institutional analysis within a single case study is the extrapolation or 
generalization of results to a wider population. To determine whether the influence of 
institutions on development associations in NW Cameroon can be generalized to other 
sub-Saharan African countries, two questions need to be answered. First, is the socio-
political context in sub-Saharan African countries similar? Second, are development 
associations in other sub-Saharan African countries structured by the same neoliberal 
paradigm that governs the activities of development associations in Cameroon? 
 
Kandiwa (2006) points out that since gaining independence in the 60s, countries in sub-
Saharan Africa have undergone appreciable socioeconomic and political diversification. 
Consequently, he cautions that conclusions drawn from one country may not be applicable 
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across the whole sub-continent.  Rather, they would apply to particular sub-regions or sub-
clusters of countries which have remained fairly similar. The Central and West African 
regions, he notes, remain quite similar; but differ from the South and Eastern regions. 
Following Kandiwa (ibid), one can argue that analysis of the effects of institution on the 
pressure capacities of associations in Cameroon can also apply to Central and West 
African countries that have a similar socio-political and economic situation.   
 
In addition, since the beginning of the association boom in Africa about 3 decades ago, 
donor support to development associations on the continent has established a paternalistic 
relationship between the western funders and the local NGOs (Michael, 2004). Simply put, 
in development practice, the donors are the pied pipers who play the tune, and 
development associations in Africa simply dance to whatever tune is played. The 
development paradigm, the donor-recipient relations, in which CSOs in Cameroon operate, 
is very much the same across Africa. Consequently, one can argue that conclusions drawn 
from the experience of CSOs in Cameroon would have relevance for development 
associations in other sub-Saharan African countries. This said, let us now examine how 
government, donor and other societal relationships – acting through regulations, norms and 
cultural codes – influence the pressure capacities of associations in Cameroon.  In the 
analysis, I will draw parallels to case studies in other African countries where relevant. 
 
5.2  THE EFFECTS OF REGULATIONS BOTTOM-UP PRESSURE 
 
5.2.1: Government Regulatory Constraints 
 
Some of the strongest constraints to the pressure capacities of associations in Cameroon 
come from the state regulatory systems in which CSOs operate. The law on freedom of 
association in Cameroon gave citizens the right to form associations, but the same law 
banned political activities that are important for associations to mount pressure on the 
government. A local government official points out that “the state passed the [freedom of 
association] law with some strings attached; it was like throwing a spear and holding the 
tail end.”  
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The Association Law (Law No.90/053 of 1990, modified in 1999) states that associations 
must be apolitical in nature. Generally-speaking, by ‘apolitical’, the law implies that 
association must not align themselves with political parties, and they must not pursue 
political activities.  What constitutes a political activity, however, is vague and elastic. The 
law, therefore, gives the government the leeway to classify as political – and hence illegal 
– any association activity which challenges the integrity of the regime in power.  
 
Furthermore, the Association Law requires associations to apply to government 
administrators (Senior Divisional Officers) for legal recognition. The mandatory 
documents for making such an application include: the constitution of the association, its 
aims and objectives, the names of its founders and its sources of funding. This requirement 
allows the government to monitor the activities of associations, and also makes it possible 
for the government to deny legal rights to those associations that are activist and political 
in orientation. For example, in reply to an application for legal recognition from the Upper 
Ashong Cultural and Development Association in 2001, the Senior Divisional Officer of 
the Donga-Mantung Division of the North West Region wrote: 
After examination at my level, it is deduced that...[your association] has some 
political inclination despite claims...that it is a cultural and development association. 
To this effect, the draft constitution should be returned to the founders.... (Official 
Letter: Ref No. E30/201/Vol.4/730) 
 
The use of mandatory registration to censor the activities of associations is not peculiar to 
Cameroon. Dicklitch and Lwanga (2003) note that in Uganda, the state uses delays or 
refusal of legal recognition to discourage or suppress human rights advocacy activities in 
associations. Proof of legal registration is one of the first eligibility criteria which 
associations must meet to gain access to funding. In their calls for project proposals from 
associations, donors often emphasise that they will only fund legally recognized 
associations. This legal recognition prerequisite forces associations in Africa to avoid 
political activities (Berhanu, 2002) or affiliations with political parties. An NGO worker in 
NW Cameroon explains how the Association Law limits their political capacities:  
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If CSOs start practicing partisan politics, the state will close them down because it 
will think of them as the opposition. 
 
To a large extent, CSOs in Cameroon have failed to contest the contradictory Association 
Law which claims to grant freedom but also greatly limits their abilities to influence state 
policies. The state in 1999 tightened the law even further by adding a clause which 
prohibits associations from accepting foreign aid. Contrary to the government claims, the 
goal of the new clause was not to reduce CSO misappropriation of donor funds. Rather, its 
main goal was to block the external donor support that was fuelling the growth of 
associations. In silent revolution, development associations in NW Cameroon ignore the 
new clause and continue to receive financial support from foreign donors.  
 
Associations that oppose or criticize state policies or practices, especially through protest 
marches, often become victims of government harassment and victimisation. In Cameroon, 
the government has the right to ban demonstrations, and to punish defaulters with a fine of 
between €150 (100,000 FCFA) and €1500 (1 million FCFA) and/or three months to twelve 
months of imprisonment (Law Law No.90/053 of 1990, modified in 1999), even though 
this contradicts the principle of freedom of expression. A development association worker 
describes the challenging circumstances in which activist associations in the town of 
Kumbo in the NW region operate:  
As CSOs, we are not much different from a mosquito if we stand against the state.... If 
you mobilize people to act against the wrongs of the state, the government will accuse 
you of [or arrest you for] inciting people to revolution. 
 
Orvis (2003) observes a similar situation in Kenya, where NGO activists report high 
incidence of government harassment. Fear of government victimisation, therefore, keeps 
most development associations from politicizing their development claims.  
 
One of the greatest constraints to activism or political capital in associations is a tendency 
for donors to channel funds for local CSOs through the government. As an example, the 
European Union Support Program for the Strengthening of Civil Society (PASOC)2 in 
Cameroon operates in partnership with the Ministry of Economy and Regional 
                                                 
2
 Programme d’Appui à la Structuration de la société Civile au Cameroun (PASOC) 
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Development. The government’s position as a partner in the PASOC program, gives it the 
power to direct funding away from association activities which it finds ‘uncomfortable’. 
As a CSO activist highlights, “when the PASOC selection committee decides on projects 
for funding, the government scrutinises them and selects which CSO projects should be 
funded.”  The donor philosophy that a government which is fundamentally undemocratic 
and corrupt can genuinely contribute in strengthening activism in civil society is absurd 
and naive, if not pretentious. Strong government involvement in the European Union (EU) 
funded project opened an opportunity for the corruption that is prevalent in the 
administration to compromise the good governance objectives of the PASOC program. An 
interviewee points out that “the state officials who control the program authorized projects 
depending on the kickbacks they can get from associations.” Associations, therefore, end 
up executing approved projects with only a fraction of the funds allocated for these 
projects. 
 
Controversy around coordination of the PASOC program in the NW Region shows how 
systemic corruption in the Cameroonian context derails donor initiatives from their good 
governance goals. The main objectives of the EU Support Program for the Strengthening 
of Civil Society (PASOC) were to promote transparency, accountability, networking and 
advocacy within the civil society through coordination organizations, such as CSO 
networks. According to many CSO interviewees, The North West Association of 
Development Organizations (NWADO), one of the most dynamic CSO networks in the 
NW Region, was in the best position to coordinate the PASOC program in the NW region. 
First, as a network organization, NWADO’s main aim was to build cooperation among 
development associations and thereby increase their influence of the government. Second, 
NWADO had considerable experience in coordinating association activities. Third, the 
NWADO Secretariat was located in the centre of region’s capital, Bamenda; and other 
associations would have easy access to any CSO support facilities (capacity building 
workshops, computers and internet) placed there. Despite these advantages, the PASOC 
selection committee did not select NWADO to coordinate the civil society strengthening 
program in the North West Region. Paradoxically, coordination of the civil society 
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strengthening program was entrusted to INADES-Formation, a NWADO member 
organisation, whose secretariat was located in the outskirts of the town and not readily 
accessible to many associations. An interviewee explains that government corruption 
compromised the PASOC program: 
it was clear to everyone that NWADO was favourite since its objectives were in line 
with what PASOC was out to promote. However, INADES-Formation and a certain 
individual [name withheld] used personal relationships to lobby at the level of the 
government in Yaounde. The EU expert was pushed to the wall and in the end he 
yielded. 
 
The support program came in to restructure the civil society, but ironically, as a CSO 
worker notes, “the Cameroonian system instead restructured it; the program danced to the 
tune of corruption played everywhere.”  
 
As corruption is entrenched within the government, the empowerment objectives of donor-
funded programs have often been thwarted when such programs go through the 
government. An interviewee notes: 
the spirit of corruption that has eaten into the PASOC program, is the same spirit that 
reigned in the multi-stakeholder program (PCPA)3 and in the Care-Cameroon 
program. Projects were funded according to personal relationships, and not 
according to the content of proposals. If another program comes through the 
government, the same disease will infect it. 
 
In addition to clientelism, state officials in charge of donor-funded programs tend to create 
their own associations to which they authorize funding. As a result of these practices, 
donor funds and resources get directed to the wrong associations and no real advocacy 
actions take place on the ground. Corruption is so deep-rooted at all levels of the 
Cameroonian society that non-players of the game tend to be the losers. Development 
associations have been co-opted into the very corrupt practices which they are expected to 
advocate against. The struggle among associations to grab their own piece of the pie, by 
hook or crook, undermines the ability of associations to develop a shared vision of 
pressuring for transparency and accountability. 
 
                                                 
3
 Programme Concerté Pluri-Acteurs 
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In essence, the government’s control over funds for civil society organizations, has forced 
many associations to either tone down or totally give up their critical voice. The Cameroon 
Teacher’s Trade Union (CATTU) was once the most vocal advocate for teacher’s rights 
and better education facilities for Anglophone citizens.  Today, however, the trade union is 
the prime promoter of the ‘begging civil society’ syndrome among associations in the NW 
region. For example, following government creation of a Higher Teacher’s Training 
School in the NW region, the CATTU leader on 28 April 2009, mobilized other 
associations for an unusual civil society march: a ‘March of Thanks’ to government. In this 
march, the trade union leader proclaimed: 
we are here to call on our President: father, we need a university....We know that when 
we say thank you, more will come [Translated].  
 
Even though the march was portrayed as apolitical, slogans like “More Power to you Mr. 
President” featured prominently. 
 
In hope of winning favour from the government, the CATTU leader, succeeded in 
influencing associations to give up the pressure philosophy which perceives development 
as a right which government owes to citizens. By participating in the march and expressing 
thanks to the government for what they termed the “gift” of a Higher Teacher’s Training 
School, CSOs inadvertently, endorsed the patronage culture of the Biya regime, where 
supporters of government get rewarded while critics remain marginalized.  
  
Another immense constraint to CSO activism in NW Cameroon is the tendency for the 
government to infiltrate the civil society and to disguise its political missions as civil 
society campaigns. For example, on 8 July 2009, the CATTU leader organized another so-
called civil society ‘March of Thanks to the Head of State’, following the appointment of 
an indigene of the NW Region as Prime Minister. Many NGOs in the NW Region 
boycotted the march and criticised it as an initiative that encouraged tribalism. Prominent 
ruling party officials were at the forefront of the purported apolitical civil society rally 
which proclaimed support to government: 
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We the sons and daughters of the NW region…unanimously thank the head of state, 
President Paul Biya for…appointing our son as Prime Minister....We hereby pledge 
and guarantee our unflinching support to the head of state…(Official Motion of 
Support Letter to President Paul Biya, 8 July 2009)  
Cultural associations which were mobilized to participate in the march were financially 
rewarded. The so-called civil society ‘March of Thanks’, which featured the president’s 
campaign posters, was in reality a government strategy to mobilize regional support for the 
head of state. The leader of CATTU who was once a fervent activist against 
marginalization of the Anglophone region, had embraced the practice of politics of the 
belly.  Although prominent CSOs in the NW Region like NWADO criticized the march, 
they failed to put out a statement exposing the CATTU leader as a defector who was 
misusing the NW Region civil society to advance his own political ambition. Toure (2002: 
2) notes that in Liberia, the government used the strategy of infiltration to limit effective 
organization within the civil society, and hence their potential for radical opposition.  
 
The government also infiltrates and weakens civil society organizations through 
government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs).  By handpicking 
GONGOs to represent the civil society in decision-making forums, the government gives 
top-down administration a semblance of participation and legitimacy. Given this practice, 
genuine CSOs in NW Cameroon have developed apathy towards trying to contribute to 
policy-making because they believe their ideas would not be taken into consideration. An 
NGO worker puts it thus: “when you cry out load against an issue and nothing changes, 
you tend to lose steam.” CSOs have become disenchanted with advocacy activities, 
because the government has proven irresponsive. A CSO worker explains:  “We have lost 
many brothers and sisters because they expressed their rights to protest, and so far, nothing has 
changed. That is why as CSOs, we only use our own gentle ways to seek change.” 
 
5.2.2: Donor Regulatory Constraints 
 
Western donors’ support to associations in developing countries is based on the belief that 
the civil society can contribute in reforming corrupt or ineffective governments. In 
practice, however, the kind of projects which donor funding targets makes it difficult for 
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development associations to play this reformist role. Donor predilection for projects that 
seek to meet the practical needs of people is a contributing factor to the low political 
capital among associations. As a CSO worker explains, “funders often evaluate CSOs in 
term of the direct impact they make on beneficiaries,” rather than in terms of advocacy. 
Given their dependence on donor funds, local associations forgo activism and streamline 
their activities according to donor preferences. Zaidi (1999) argues that the increased flow 
of donor aid to NGOs determines the agenda of these organisations. In other words, the 
problems which NGOs see as most pertinent in their localities are often predetermined by 
donors. The activities of CSOs change according to the buzzwords that are in fashion 
among donors: HIV/AIDS, community sanitation, environment protection, the girl-child, 
primary healthcare, access to water, basic education, and so on. Seldom are political 
activities, such as election monitoring, government accountability, government auditing, 
corruption reporting, and policy advocacy on the agenda of donors. It has become 
increasingly apparent to funders that improving the livelihoods of people, through service 
delivery activities cannot bring about sustainable change in governance. With this 
realisation, “funders are gradually directing resources towards lobbying, advocacy and 
policy change activities” (Interview with CSO worker, 2009). Nonetheless, because of 
their continuous pre-occupation with donor preferences, associations still tend to adopt 
advocacy activities which are ill-suited for effecting governance change in their contexts 
(De Waal, 2003: 485).  
 
To qualify for funding, donors typically demand that associations be non-partisan and non-
political. This donor requirement partly explains why “Established links with the 
opposition” (E) – with a score of 2.25 on 10 – is the lowest of the five bottom-up pressure 
attributes among associations in NW Cameroon. For donors, partisanship can strengthen 
social cleavages while jeopardizing fairness in the development interventions of CSOs.  
The pressure to be non-partisan forces associations into the irony of trying to achieve 
participatory governance and equality in development without challenging the regime 
politics that are responsible for exclusion and inequality. For CSOs to reform the system of 
governance, they need to be “embroiled in partisan politics and the distortions that 
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accompany the struggle for state power” (Edwards and Hulme: 1996:5-6). While 
associations mostly represent the interests of small groups, political parties can integrate 
these interests into a common policy position (Sabatini, 2002). Therefore, by discouraging 
partisanship among development associations, donors contribute in severing the political 
linkages between different groups which is vital for a social movement for participatory 
democracy to grow.  
 
In addition, although participation is en vogue among donors, the projects for which they 
earmark funding often fail to include activities that truly encourage participation values. 
For example, NGOs workers in NW Cameroon note that most donors prohibit the use of 
funds for baseline surveys, which is a necessary element for true involvement of 
beneficiaries in development projects. A CSO worker explains: 
For a project to be truly participatory, it has to begin with a baseline survey. The 
baseline survey is where the voice of the beneficiaries must start coming in; otherwise, 
it will not be truly taken into consideration in subsequent stages. Without baseline 
surveys, how can donors expect true participation? We merely conceive projects and 
impose them on the communities. 
Quantitative data shows that the degree to which associations in NW Cameroon “work in 
collaboration with communities” (W), is high – 7.2 on 10. However, qualitatively, 
involvement of communities in projects is at best superficial in the case of NGOs, given 
that most donors do not permit the use of funds for consultative processes. NGOs have 
become too professional and socially disconnected from communities. In other words, they 
are organizations at the service of the grassroots, and not per se grassroots organizations. 
They lack community embeddedness: the involvement, solidarity, and trust-building traits 
that are the hallmark of grassroots organizations like village development associations 
(VDAs). This low community embeddedness significantly limits the capacity of NGOs to 
mobilize citizens for advocacy action. Grassroots associations in NW Cameroon surpass 
NGOs in terms of numbers, but donors consider them too informal and unworthy as 
channels for development aid.    
 
In addition, funders typically provide financial resources for the execution of specific CSO 
project activities and often refuse to fund the running costs of CSOs. These running costs 
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include rents, basic office material, and salaries for staff. A CSO worker points out that 
“an organization cannot implement a project if it is not in operation.” Since the execution 
of donor-funded projects requires considerable time and effort, NGOs have devised 
strategies of squeezing out staff salaries from project implementation funds. For example, 
in their accountability reports, CSOs can inflate the funds spent on some of the project 
activities or materials. Despite these strategies, the financial compensations which NGOs 
in NW Cameroon can offer to staff tend to be irregular and low. Many interviewed NGO 
coordinators pointed out that they could not employ staff on a permanent basis because 
their organization could not offer the minimum monthly salary of €38 (25,000 FCFA) 
required by law. Due to low salaries, ‘staff drain’ – the loss of trained personnel to other 
sectors – is high among NGOs in NW Cameroon. An NGO worker points out that 
“advocacy and lobby requires capacity and there is a very serious shortage of human 
resource capacity within the civil society in the NW region.”  
 
On the one hand, donors support regular capacity-building and empowerment programs in 
NGOs. On the other hand, the donor regulations that prohibit the use of funds for staff 
salaries make it difficult for built capacity to stay in these civil society organizations. An 
interviewee describes NGOs as “a training ground” for young graduates, who eventually 
move off to greener pastures. Another NGO employee elaborates: “workers leave CSOs 
because the work is hard and the pay is very low.” Fyvie and Ager (1999) observe a 
similar situation in Gambia, where the lack of funds for staff salaries forces local NGOs to 
operate with insufficient manpower. An interviewee notes that given their rather small 
work force, NGOs in NW Cameroon tend to avoid advocacy and lobbying activities, 
which require particular skills. Additionally, when these associations do engage in 
campaigns that aim to change state policy, the small work force limits both the strength 
and the geographic scope of their advocacy actions.   
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5.3  NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS TO BOTTOM-UP PRESSURE 
 
Government and donor regulatory structures produce constraining effects on bottom-up 
pressure through coercive means, such as, threats of withholding funding from 
associations. On their part, normative structures – established societal values, practices and 
perceptions – predominantly exert influence on associations through socialization and 
mimetic processes.  The gravest normative constraint to bottom-up pressure in Cameroon 
is the widespread practice of using CSOs as a means to quick self-enrichment. Many so-
called development associations emerge not because of the host of development problems 
that need to be addressed, but because of the prospect of gaining access to donor funds. An 
NGO worker in the Menchum Division of NW Cameroon gives an example: 
the Ministry of Social Affairs once launched a program to support development 
associations with funds. Many common initiative groups changed their status to 
development associations in order to get the funds.  
 
The motivating factor behind the formation of associations is a very important determinant 
of whether or not these associations would contribute in the struggle for good governance. 
As Edwards and Hulme (1996) have noted, increased availability of donor funding is a 
principal contributing factor to the explosion of association numbers in developing 
countries. NGO misappropriation of donor funds which went unchecked in the 1990s in 
Cameroon played a strong role in undermining ethical practices among CSOs in 
Cameroon.  
 
The expected watchdog role which associations in Cameroon could exercise has 
diminished with the decay of ethical values among associations:  
the founders of CSOs are very rich; they own big houses. Nowadays, they avoid 
buying Prados4 because these big cars call public attention. CSOs have become even 
more corrupt than the government. Everyone wants to own an association; everyone 
wants donor funds (Interview with NGO Fieldworker, 2009). 
 
In 1998 and 1999, the corruption perception index of the German NGO Transparency 
International identified Cameroon as the world’s most corrupt country. A Divisional 
Officer in the NW Region explains that associations have failed to decry government 
                                                 
4
 Model name for the Toyota Land Cruiser 
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corruption, and through misappropriation of donor funds, they have “contributed in giving 
Cameroon the corrupt country image.” As several interviewees highlight, many 
associations in the NW Region receive donor funds, but do not execute the projects for 
which the resources were intended. In addition, NGOs in Cameroon have been used for 
carrying out international, as well as well as in-country scamming.  
 
The NGO, FAMM-Cameroon,5 for example, swindled over €381,000 (250 million FCFA) 
from over 3000 Cameroonians by promising employment opportunities and subsidised 
healthcare (Cameroon Tribune, 2008). Since the law exempts non-profit organisations 
from paying taxes, CSOs are also used as covers for operating profitable private 
businesses. Dubious and fictitious civil society organizations, the so-called suit-case 
NGOs, have dealt a serious blow to the reputation of development associations among 
local communities in Cameroon. The Coordinator of an NGO explains:  
there is a stigma on CSOs. When we go to the field to work, the first thing the 
communities say is: ‘we hope you don’t want to fool us like the other NGOs.’  
 
The distrust which genuine NGOs face especially in rural communities limits their 
effectiveness in mobilizing and organizing local groups around specific advocacy issues. 
Loss of credibility among the local population, however, is not exclusively an NGO 
problem.  
 
The custom of politics of the belly which is deeply established among politicians in 
Cameroon has eroded the credibility of opposition parties. This in turn has discouraged 
CSOs from collaborating with the opposition to pressure for democracy, as the low score 
for ‘Established links with opposition parties’ (E) among associations in the NW region 
shows. For political party officials, appointment to positions of power is not looked upon 
as an opportunity to change policies and ensure increased service delivery to citizens.  
Rather, political party leaders conceive ascension to political office as an opportunity to 
‘eat their share of the national cake’ and as the end of poverty for themselves, their 
families and kinsmen. This mentality explains why the corruption idiom, ‘a goat must 
                                                 
5
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graze in the field in which it finds itself [translated]’ has widespread appeal in the 
Cameroonian context. The coordinator of a NW Region association for the disabled gives 
an example: 
When the politician [name withheld] launched his campaign...we supported him, and 
during elections we also went to the poll to vote for him despite all our difficulties of 
movement. It is over two years since he became Minister...and he has not honoured 
his promises to us. This is the way politicians exploit us. 
Another interviewee notes that “the main objective of politicians is not the interest of the 
common man; it is to get power and enrich themselves.” Development associations in 
Cameroon as such view opposition political parties as mere shadows of the regime. In 
addition, development associations do not see opposition parties as worthy partners in the 
struggle for deeper democracy because the opposition is highly fragmented. In Cameroon, 
there are almost as many political parties as ethnic groups. According to the Cameroon 
Statistical Yearbook (2004; 2006), the number of registered political parties was 186 in 
June 2004, and by the end of 2005, the number had risen to 197. Fatton (1995) asserts that 
high fragmentation of political parties weakens bottom-up pressure and encourages 
clientelism, such that elections (even when free and fair) seldom pose a threat to the 
dominant elites.   
 
The widely accepted norm that ‘politics is best left to politicians’ also contributes to the 
low collaboration between associations and the opposition in NW Cameroon. A CSO 
worker explains how this ‘professionalization of politics norm’ hinders associations-
opposition party alliances: 
in Cameroon, politics is professionalized – it is seen as a profession: when CSOs bring 
up a good political idea, parliamentarians cannot welcome it, because they see CSOs 
as intruding into their field. 
A member of the CSO, Cameroon Alliance of Voluntary Organisations for Development 
(CAVOD) elucidates further: 
CAVOD organized a program to talk on the Constitution amendment, elections and 
stolen public funds. We invited parliamentarians of all political parties, to dialogue 
with them and find a way forward. But only one parliamentarian and the leader of the 
Social Democratic Front came.  
Rarely do associations in NW Cameroon make proactive attempts, as CAVOD did, to 
engage with political parties. Remaining apolitical is a creed among associations. The vast 
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majority of development association avoid involvement in partisan politics, because of an 
enduring enemy relationship that exists between the ruling party (CPDM) and the most 
prominent opposition party (SDF). As explained in the previous chapter, multiparty 
politics was introduced in Cameroon under great duress in 1990. Since this time, partisan 
politics has remained an issue of rancour and discord between leaders, ethnic groups and 
even people within the same community. Politics in the Cameroonian context still revolves 
around personalities and regional or ethnic competition for resource, rather than around 
ideologies. Although multiparty politics was introduced in Cameroon since 1990 (twenty 
years ago), President Paul Biya and the leader of the main opposition party, the SDF, 
formally met and shook hands only recently: on December 10, 2010. Latent intolerance 
remains a defining feature of partisan politics in Cameroon. Pro-democracy development 
associations avoid aligning with opposition parties for fear that this would stir up conflicts 
between different people or groups within their beneficiary communities.  
 
The impact that development associations in NW Cameroon can have in terms of 
promoting radical reform is low, because non-intervention in national politics gives 
consent to the status quo. As the Cameroonian political scientist, Hervé Emmanuel Kongo 
puts it, “politics plays those who refuse to play politics” (CRTV, 2009: Translated). The 
failure of associations to relate their service delivery works to national politics (regime 
policies and practices) leaves their development efforts emotionally dead, and devoid of 
the power to mobilize people for democratic change. As social movement scholars have 
argued, engaging in politics stirs up the emotions that are crucial for the growth of a social 
movement for change.  
 
5.4  CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS TO BOTTOM-UP PRESSURE 
 
Apart from regulations and norms, certain practices, which have become entrenched within 
society over time, also constrain the political capacities of development associations in 
NW Cameroon. In most ethnic groups across Cameroon, there is a highly institutionalized 
culture of respect and reverence of traditional chiefs and elites. In the NW region in 
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particular, chiefs are considered sacred custodians of the customs of the different tribes. 
For North-westerners, the authority of the chief over his subjects originates from the 
ancestors. Simply put, the authority of the chief is seen mystical in nature; hence must not 
be called to question. The government recognizes the chiefs as auxiliaries of the state 
administration, even though their authority is inconsistent with the liberal democracy 
constitution of the state. Like the colonial powers and the Ahidjo regime, the Biya regime 
exploits the traditional authority of chiefs to exercise control over citizens (Jua, 2002).  
 
The reverence of chiefs and elites which is common among village development 
associations (VDAs), makes it easy for these elites (who are often pro-government) to 
discourage oppositional voices within associations. The coordinator of a CSO explains 
how reverence of the chief weakens the Mankon village Cultural and Development 
Association (MACUDA):  
When the MACUDA executives conceive an idea, they run to the chief; and when the 
chief sees no benefit in it for him, he kills the initiative. MACUDA is ‘castrated’. Its 
members have sold their minds to an individual because he is chief.  
 
On the one hand, the Constitutions of village development associations uphold democratic 
values, since all executive members are selected through elections and major decisions are 
taken in a general assembly of members. On another hand, the reverence or authority 
accorded to chiefs and elites contradicts these democratic values. This controversy is 
evident, for example, in the Constitution of the Mbesoh Community Development 
Association which states that “the Mbesoh people give honour and respect to their quarter 
heads and to the Fon...who is the supreme ruler of the village.”  Traditional chiefs receive 
monthly stipends from the state. Chiefs and traditional elites loyal to the ruling party, 
therefore, tend to use their authority to turn VDAs into mere ‘hand-clappers’ for the 
government. The Ngoketunjia Development and Cultural Association (NDECA) is a good 
example. Shortly after the February 2008 anti-government protests in which over 100 
Cameroonians were killed, the elites of NDECA, in the name of the thirteen Chiefs of the 
division, sent a letter of congratulations and support to President Biya (Letter from 
NDECA to President Biya, 2008). 
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NGOs unlike village development associations are not susceptible to the influences of 
chiefs and elites. However, most NGOs operate as hierarchic professional organisations in 
which the founder or executive director has supreme powers over the employees. An NGO 
worker explains:  
NGOs are far from participatory. In most, if not all NGOs, the project coordinator 
knows nothing of how finances are managed in the organisation. The founder is the 
almighty. In fact NGOs are run like a family business or enterprise.  
 
In the NW Region, most NGOs are run as ‘the private property’ of the founding members 
who remain at the head of the association for life. An NGO interviewee calls this “a 
tendency for founding members to ‘hijack’ the organization.” In 2000, squabbles over 
donor funds between the founding members of the development association, Aid 
International Christian Women of Vision (AIChrisWOV) led to the dissolution of the 
organization.  Similarly, leadership conflicts have weakened the Union of North West 
Human Rights Organizations (UNOWHURO), a network of CSOs focusing on human 
rights. The traditional culture of the grass field people of Cameroon (North Westerners) 
which associates leadership with absolute power has permeated development associations, 
and even NGO networks, where team work and participation ought to prevail (SVN and 
DED, 2007). As an NGO worker explains, leadership in NW Cameroon is misconstrued as 
a one-way relationship: “leadership in our context is about giving orders that subordinates 
must take.”  
 
Furthermore, scarcity of resources has cultivated a culture of competition, rather than one 
of collaboration among CSOs. As Fig. 4.9 in the previous chapter illustrates, the ‘Resource 
capacity’ (R) score for associations in the NW Region is below average (4.5 on 10). Given 
this resource deficiency, associations tend to scramble over every funding opportunity as if 
it were a matter of “life and death” (Interview with an NGO worker, 2009). The scramble 
over the EU-funded Support Program for the Strengthening of Civil Society (PASOC) is a 
good example of this culture of competition among CSOs in the North West Region. The 
‘call for applications’ from organizations interested in coordinating the PASOC program in 
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the NW Region, triggered conflicts within the North West Association of Development 
Organizations (NWADO). As a network of development organizations, NWADO was best 
suited for coordinating the PASOC program. However, INADES-Formation, a member 
organisation of NWADO, actively contested for the bid and lobbied the program away 
from the network of which it was part. An NGO interviewee highlights that in the 
scramble over coordination of the PASOC program, “lives were threatened and there was 
a lot of backstabbing.” The culture of competition among CSOs is a factor that hinders 
networks like NWADO from working for the benefit of all its members.   
 
Porter (2003) observes that in Ghana, a strong culture of competition among local NGOs 
limits information sharing which is crucial for effective networking. This is also the case in 
the NW region of Cameroon where “some members of networks see power as retaining 
information and not sharing it” (SNV and DED, 2007: 35). Organizations that are 
members of formal networks tend to pursue their individual interests at the expense of the 
interests of the network.  
 
Given this culture of competition among CSOs, many development associations consider 
networking more harmful than beneficial. The coordinator of a CSO in the Bui Division of 
NW Cameroon explains: 
I have seen other organisations grow fat on the sweat and intellect of our 
organisation. Many organisations have approached us for partnership and used our 
projects to secure funds for themselves. This is why we have given up partnering with 
other associations. 
  
Such disenchantments with networking explain why formal networking between 
development associations in the NW Region tends to be more donor-driven than locally-
driven. Development associations perceive formation of a formal CSO network 
organization as merely the creation of an additional competitor against whom they would 
have to fight for scarce funds.  
 
Formal CSO networks also face difficulties in attracting high membership because many 
local associations find their membership fees and annual dues unaffordable. Table 5.1 
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shows the most prominent CSO networks in the NW region. The North West Association 
of Development Organization (NWADO) has 28 members and the membership fee is 
approximately €23 (15,000 FCFA), while the annual due is about €38 (25,000 FCFA). The 
Western Highlands Nature Conservation Network (WHINCONET) consists of 19 member 
organizations; and the registration fee and annual due for associations are €30 (20,000 
FCFA) and €60 (40,000 FCFA) respectively.  
 
Table 5.1: Most Prominent CSO Networks in the NW  
Region of Cameroon 
 
Name of Network Thematic Focus 
North West Association of Development 
Organisations (NWADO) None 
The Western Highlands Nature Conservation 
Network (WHINCONET) 
Environment and 
conservation 
Union of North West Human Rights 
Organisations (UNOWHURO) Human rights 
Cameroon Alliance of Voluntary Organisations 
for Development None 
Platform  of Actors for the Fight Against 
HIV/AIDS (PAFAC) Health 
 
Another entrenched practice among NGOs in the NW Cameroon is workshop 
organization: long deliberation meetings, training programs and capacity-building lectures. 
Among NGOs, it is standard practice to include capacity-building workshops as a 
component of donor-funded projects. Moreover, the practice of paying NGO workshop 
participants a stipend (per diem) is so widely acclaimed in the NGO circle that workshops 
that offer no per diem for participants draw very little attendance. In other words, among 
NGOs, interest in workshops has shifted from the knowledge and advocacy skills offered 
to the per diem. An NGO worker explains:  
at the end of a training program for NGOs that I attended, participants protested that 
the per diem was small. They blocked the doors and held the [European] workshop 
organiser hostage until he increased the per diem.  
 
Regrettably, advocacy skills that are built in NGO workshops are seldom put into action. 
NGOs in the NW Region are not proactive in fighting pertinent social ills like corruption 
and human rights abuse. As a result of their ‘silence’ on these issues, NGOs have lost 
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credibility and visibility within local communities. An NGO worker observes that 
development association networks “look inwards most of the time: NWADO, for example, 
has for the meantime focused its attention on building the capacities of its members.” The 
entrenched workshop culture – or more correctly, the ‘talk-shop’ and per diem culture – 
among NGOs has compromised both the spirit of volunteerism and the resolve to put 
words into practice. Workshops contribute in building solidarity among CSOs, and they 
also act as forums for networking. However, the contribution that development 
associations can make to democratization depends not on impressive rhetoric, but on their 
ability to put knowledge into action. Many NGO interviewees mention the absence of a 
role model NGO in the NW Region: an advocacy pioneer around whom other associations 
can rally.  
 
5.5  RETHINKING PUTNAM: INSTITUTIONS AND THE ASSOCIATIONS- 
DEMOCRACY NEXUS 
 
The above analysis of the influence of regulations, norms and cultural codes or entrenched 
practices on bottom-up pressure in NW Cameroon reveals that context matters – a lot. The 
institutional context in which associations exist affects the quality of social capital, as well 
as the relationship between social capital and political capital. Government and donor 
regulations, norms and entrenched practices in the Cameroonian context particularly 
constrain political capital in development associations.  
 
A rich stock of associations in a context with constraining regulations, norms and cultural 
institutions will not result in associational activities that advance shared goals and hence 
democracy as Putnam posits. Putnam erred in “lumping social capital together with other 
forms of human capital” such as political capital (Edwards and Foley, 1998: 135). Whether 
political capital develops alongside social capital depends on the regulations, norms and 
codes of practice that govern the activities of associations. In order for associations to 
influence governance systems, they must exercise political capital. Efforts aimed at 
promoting participatory democracy in developing countries, must therefore not only focus 
on encouraging the emergence of associations. Such efforts must also support associations 
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to overturn those rules, norms and values that limit their maneuvering space and their 
ability to exercise political capital. 
 
5.6  SUMMING UP 
 
This chapter has explained that institutional factors namely, regulations, norms and culture 
constrain bottom-up pressure in Cameroon, predominantly by acting as checks to political 
activity in associations. Although institutions affect civil society associations, these 
associations are not entirely at the ‘mercy’ of institution. Institutions are relatively stable, 
but they are not immune to change: civil society organisations can change institutions. As 
Walzer (2002: 43) notes, the relationship between civil society and the state, for example, 
is two-way: 
No significant move towards greater equality has ever been made without state 
action, but states do not act in egalitarian ways unless they are pressed to do so 
by mobilizations that can take place only in civil society…. 
 
This two-way relationship is seldom acknowledged in analysis: the relationship between 
institutions and civil society is often the subject of ‘chicken first-egg first’ debates. That is, 
while some researchers put emphasis on how institutions can enable or constrain 
associations, others focus on how the actions of associations can transform institutions. To 
avoid bias, analysis of how institutions in NW Cameroon constrain the pressure capacities 
of CSOs needs to be balanced with analysis of how these organizations attempt to change 
their institutional context. The latter is the subject of the next chapter. 
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6 
6. WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: HOW CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA CAN FOSTER GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
In international development, there is a strong interest in civil society organizations 
(CSOs) because these organizations have the potential to promote democratic governance 
and efficiency in service delivery. In the African context, however, institutions – namely 
norms, values and regulations – often constrain the extent to which local civic associations 
exercise this democracy promotion attribute. How can associations in Africa break 
institutional constraints and play a greater role in advancing democracy and equality in 
development? The answer to this question is of great interest to non-governmental 
organizations and international donors that clamour for a deepening of democracy in 
Africa. This chapter attempts to address the question, first by reviewing theoretical debates 
on the processes and requirement for effectuating institutional change; and second, by 
analyzing promising good governance promotion interventions observed among CSOs in 
the North West Region of Cameroon. I argue that CSOs in Africa are more likely to break 
institutional constraints and advance democracy when they actively replicate those 
interventions that have yielded results in their given contexts; and when they make their 
advocacy efforts consistent or continuous over a period of time, rather than intermittent or 
discontinuous.  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Associations can play a significant role in promoting democracy. However, a “vibrant 
associational life” (Putnam, 1993) or the existence of a high number of community 
associations, however, does not automatically translate into actions that advance the 
quality of democracy in a particular setting. As the previous chapter highlights, the 
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existing institutional context (norms, values and regulations) can have a strong tapering 
effect on the ability of civic associations to act as promoters of democratic values. 
Constraining institutional environments explain why there is a democracy hold-up in 
African countries like Cameroon, despite an abundance of development-oriented civic 
associations. Actors who share the mission of advancing democracy in Africa are 
interested in knowledge on how the institutional context can constrain civic association 
pressure for democratic governance. They are even more interested in understanding 
which windows of opportunity for change exist and how associations in Africa can exploit 
them in order to play a greater role in democratic change. As earlier mentioned, although 
institutions influence associations, civic associations in return can change the institutions 
in which they are embedded. Hollingsworth (2000: 600) aptly notes that: 
building of new institutions and redressing the decline of…important 
institutions of our societies are among the most important problems of our time.  
 
‘How to effect institutional change’ is a challenging issue for both practitioners and 
researchers worldwide, because existing institutions are characterized by stability or 
persistence.   
 
There are two underlying reasons for the stability of institutions. First, the rules, norms, 
and cultural values that structure meaning and action within a group of people or society 
often have long historical roots. Established organizational systems therefore tend to 
endure because, over time, the rules, values or norms which uphold them become taken for 
granted; and so go unquestioned (Scott, 2001). Secondly, North (1990a) argues that 
institutional change depends on power, and as long as powerful actors profit in a given 
context, they tend to hold institutions in place, even when the political system is 
inefficient. In different words, when a particular social order becomes established, it 
selectively constrains actions that challenge it, and enables those actions that reproduce or 
reinforce it. Institutions are thus described as being path-dependent in nature, where 
policies’ or practices work like centripetal forces to keep change around the status quo 
(Wilsford, 1994).  
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In the previous chapter, institutional analysis is used to explain how contextual factors 
constrain pressure for democracy among associations in the North West (NW) Region of 
Cameroon. While institutional analysis adequately uncovers the reasons behind the 
persistence of non-inclusive forms of governance, it does not provide a good basis for 
hypothesizing about change. This is the main shortcoming of the institutional approach. 
Despite this shortcoming, institutional analysis does provide some useful clues about the 
qualities that change-oriented endeavours should have. As Lindner (2003) points out, it is 
by scrutinizing the conditions and processes for institutional stability that we can begin to 
understand the possibilities and requirements for change.  
 
Keohane and Martin (1995) argue that we can gain insights on how to stimulate 
institutional change by identifying and looking closely at any positive changes that take 
place in a given context. Actions that produce small impacts can show windows of 
opportunity for change within the political system. By building on these windows of 
opportunity, civic associations advocating for reform can weaken those mechanisms that 
stall change. Societies with strong institutional barriers to democracy are, therefore, not 
condemned to remain as such. This chapter attempts to identify association practices and 
initiatives that in small ways contribute to building bottom-up pressure for democratization 
in Cameroon. But to adequately show how some association initiatives can be models for 
change efforts, it is important to first review the theoretical debate on processes of 
institution-building.   
 
6.2  HOW DO INSTITUTIONS CHANGE? 
 
A system of governance or social order changes, when given sets of complementary rules, 
norms and cultural perceptions that were subordinate within the group or society gain 
dominance. Old institutions and the new institutions that actors seek to establish are, 
therefore, always in a state of competition (Lanzara, 1998). For actors to succeed in 
bringing about change, they must question and challenge existing institutions to the extent 
that they discredit them and bring legitimacy to new institutions. Institutional change, 
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however, is not always the result of deliberate action. Change also results from 
unintentional processes which may be gradual or abrupt. Given that the focus of this study 
is pressure for democratization, it makes sense to concentrate on intentional actions of 
institution building. Even though in reality, change results from a mix of intentional and 
unintentional process, the major driving forces behind change are “the deliberate attempts 
of...actors to craft new rules” (Kingston and Caballero, 2009: 153).  
 
There are different schools of thought on how institutional change comes about. Stephen 
Krasner (1984) asserts that since institutions are characterised by considerable inertia, 
crises or conflicts are important factors that trigger institutional change. Such crises can be 
endogenous or exogenous, and may include social movements, depression, war, 
international pressure, and so forth.  Crises open up opportunities for change through a 
variety of process such as: through giving certain ideas more resonance within society; 
creating shifts in resources/power; and reducing the risks associated with transition. In this 
view, change is discontinuous or episodic. Borrowing terminology from Biology, Krasner 
(ibid: 242) argues that institutional change occurs through a process of “punctuated 
equilibrium.” According to him, institutional change occurs when crises disrupt the 
longstanding institutional order and replaces it with a new order, which itself becomes 
entrenched and stable over time.  
 
The second school of thought on institutional change criticizes the emphasis on disruptive 
events championed in episodic conceptualizations of institutional change. North (1993: 64) 
contends that “the process of change is overwhelmingly incremental” and path-dependent, 
rather than revolutionary in nature. According to this view, existing institutions set barriers 
to reform; hence change predominantly occurs through gradual adjustments of status quo 
norms, rules and values. Change results when actors who seek to increase their advantages 
within a given polity, learn from experience and invest in beneficial strategies that slowly 
erode the elements responsible for institutional stasis (North, 1990b). In this sense, success 
in transforming institutions depends on gaining bargaining power in ongoing interactions. 
The risks and costs associated with crises (or revolutionary change actions) are often so 
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high that most actors who seek change refrain from disruptive strategies. Incremental 
change which occurs through the diffusion and assimilation of new practices, norms or 
values in society (Clemens and Cook, 1999) is often ‘safer’. The rate of change of a 
system of governance would, therefore, depend on the rate of diffusion and adoption of 
such new institutions. Revolutionary institutional change and incremental institutional 
change are not necessary disconnected. Some researchers advance that revolutionary 
changes are likely the products of accumulated incremental institutional changes 
(Campbell, 2004).  
 
For any action or event to produce institutional change – whether revolutionary or 
incremental – it must break the reproduction cycle of existing institutions. The two 
perspectives on institutional change discussed above explain the sources of reform, 
namely, crises/conflict and gradual gains in bargaining power. However, they do not 
explicitly state the mechanisms through which actors or events break the cycles of stability 
of existing institutions. As Gorges (2001) notes, theories on institutional change tend to be 
vague on the causal processes that connect particular kinds of events or actions to the 
potential or desired change. The fuzziness of institutional change arguments limits their 
utility or applicability to particular situations, for example, in exploring how civil society 
associations can foster democracy. Given their inattention to mechanisms, Campbell 
(2004: v) states that these concepts of institutional change “resemble mysterious black 
boxes whose arguments need to be unpacked and examined.”  
 
Lanzara (1998) sheds some light on both the prerequisites for institutional change and the 
mechanisms through which they produce effect. He argues that four factors are 
indispensable for institution-building efforts to succeed in bringing about change. First, 
actors pushing for change need to acquire competencies and resources to serve their 
institution-building purposes. Without skills and resources, change efforts would be lame. 
Second, common interest must prevail over the self-interests of the parties who want to 
effect change, because pursuing individual interest is destructive to institution-building 
efforts.  A third requirement is the forging of a collective identity. Lanzara (ibid: 16) 
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argues that “institutions cannot be built if collective identities do not emerge.” As an 
increasing number of people adhere to the new or desired identity, old ways lose 
legitimacy. Fourth, promoters of reform need to win trust and confidence for the new 
institutions, so that people can adhere to them long enough for these new values, norms 
and rules to become consolidated.  
 
According to Lanzara (ibid), actors engaged in institution building can achieve the above 
requirements through three mechanisms. These are (i) creation of focal points, (ii) positive 
feedback processes, and (iii) bricolage (patchwork). A focal point is a centre of 
coordination, and it could be a leader or a committed group. The focal point provides 
orientation to other actors, and reduces controversies and self-interests by espousing a 
vision of change for collective good. Focal points thus serve as “an ‘anchor’ for 
establishing identities, meanings and mutual recognitions, a ground upon which trust and 
competencies can be built, and a focus for mobilizing increasingly large amounts of 
resources (Lanzara, 1998: 23).” 
 
Feedback processes on their part enable actors to learn from experiences, and to develop or 
devise new strategies that are suited for their given context. Apart from encouraging 
innovation, feedback processes promote the “adoption and diffusion of institutional 
solutions” (ibid: 20). The third mechanism, bricolage (patchwork) stands for the process of 
constructing large structures of change out of the small ones that are available. Since 
institutional building requires considerable resources, competencies and trust, constructing 
a large advocacy for reform from scratch is difficult in most settings. Change comes about 
more readily when actors use existing successful strategies and networks as “inspiration” 
for large institutional overhaul (Offe, 1996).    
 
Bearing in mind these mechanisms that enable institutional change, the task of action-
research is to identify which type of practices among African associations actually succeed 
in challenging the institutional barriers to bottom-up pressure discussed in the previous 
chapter. Analyzing how small initiatives carried out by civil society associations actually 
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contribute to institutional change is relevant for two reasons. First, it will help us 
understand how specific actions of associations are causally linked to specific changes in 
those norms, values and regulatory structures that constrain the deepening of democracy in 
Africa.  Second, it will show how associations in a typical African setting can build on 
local success stories to promote democracy. Recommendations for change that stem from 
local experiences would avoid the pitfalls of prescribing practices and expectations from 
Europe on local African associations.  Policy recommendation that are inspired by local 
experiences and which give due consideration to the Africa context are more likely to 
produce better results than recommendations based on experiences from other cultures.  
 
6.3  CSO INITIATIVES THAT PROMOTE CHANGE IN CAMEROON 
 
In spite of their shortcomings (discussed in the previous chapter), associations in NW 
Cameroon have scored some successes in building qualities that enhance their role as 
promoters of democracy and equal development. Some successes can be observed in 
efforts aimed at: 
a) Rebuilding the image of CSOs;  
b) Promoting networking;  
c) Increasing resource capacities;  
d) Enhancing community participation;  
e) Advocating for justice and accountability; and  
f) Facilitating information dissemination.  
The sections below describe these small efforts in detail, to show how they can be the 
springboard for greater institutional change. Borrowing Lanzara’s terminology, these small 
successful strategies could be – on an optimistic note – the building blocks of institutional 
bricolage for large scale reform in the system governance. 
 
6.3.1  Rebuilding the Image of Civil Society Organisations 
 
For development associations to make demands for greater accountability, transparency 
and participation in the management of the state, they need to uphold these qualities 
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themselves. In Cameroon, many development associations fail to demonstrate these values. 
NGOs in particular are known to be implicated in scamming, government corruption, tax 
fraud and embezzlement of donor funds. An NGO Coordinator claims that as many as 
forty percent of NGOs in the NW region of Cameroon are fraudulent (Personal Interview, 
2009). CSOs have lost credibility in the eyes of the government, donors and most of all, 
the local communities. However, there are a number of NGO initiatives that try to reform 
the image of CSOs within the society.  
 
As a case in point, the North West Association of Development Organizations (NWADO) 
in December 2008 proposed a Code of Ethics for civil society organizations. The code of 
Ethics was developed from the deliberations of a consortium of CSOs from the North West 
and West Regions of Cameroon. The Code of Ethics outlines standards which all signatory 
associations are to abide by. It champions values like the promotion of human rights, 
transparency, accountability, social justice, gender balance, peace, equality, stakeholder 
participation, to name a few. Moreover, it states that CSOs should not be self-serving, but 
should instead provide development stakeholders with full information on their activities 
and management of funds. After developing the Code of Ethics, NWADO laid out plans to 
organize discussion workshops on the code in all the ten regions of the country. The 
intended purpose of the workshops was to distribute the Code of Ethics document to 
associations throughout the national territory, and to gather feedback which would help in 
finalizing the self-regulatory tool. Through such a participatory process, NWADO hoped 
to encourage development associations throughout the country to adopt or support the 
code, and by so doing, participate in a movement for building the credibility of CSOs. As 
an interviewee notes, NWADO is succeeding in winning national support for the initiative 
because “the code is a bilingual document”, developed by representatives of civil society 
associations from both the French part and the English part of the country.  
 
The last phase of the Code of Ethics initiative involves the creation of a regulatory organ – 
an ethics committee composed of CSO representatives – which will pressure signatory 
associations to respect the values in the code. The Code of Ethics initiative also involves 
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the development of a quality assurance system: a set of criteria for classifying and issuing 
different kinds of certificates to associations based on the degree to which they abide by 
the good governance norms prescribed in the Code of Ethics. Regular publication of the 
names of associations that voluntarily appropriate the code is expected to help in 
discrediting dubious and fictitious associations in the eyes of communities and donors. The 
more the Code of Ethics gains support among CSOs, the more it can contribute in 
ostracizing government-created associations that pose as members of the civil society 
community. Though still in its infancy, the Code of Ethics initiative holds some promise 
for reforming the collective identity of development associations around the principles of 
good governance. 
 
Some development associations in NW Cameroon use sterner measures to rid the civil 
society of fraudulent associations. In 2008, the NW branch of Responsible Citizen 
(Dynamique Citoyenne), a network of development associations, filed a lawsuit against the 
director of the NGO, FAMM-Cameroon6. The law suit included complains from over 250 
people who had been scammed by FAMM-Cameroon. The organization FAMM-
Cameroon had swindled money from citizens by promising employment and access to 
subsidized healthcare (Cameroon Tribune, 2008). The case filed by the network of CSOs 
against FAMM-Cameroon sent out a strong signal that NGO malpractices would not go 
unpunished. Such measures, if replicated, can contribute in building a tradition of ‘whistle 
blowing’ among civil society organizations. The CSO communities in African countries 
stand a greater chance of gaining public trust – an important requirement for institutional 
change – if they put a system in place for investigating suspected cases of NGO fraud.  
 
Donors working in Cameroon are also playing a role in fighting corruption among 
development associations by demanding more elaborate accountability reports on 
implemented projects. To decide whether or not to support an association with resources, 
some donors request for a history of activities that the association has carried out. Other 
donors ask for references from credible partners working in the country, who can ascertain 
                                                 
6
 Fondation pour l'assistance maladie et maternité  
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the reputation of the association that is applying for funding. Progressively, donor 
organizations are adopting the practice of funding projects in phases, instead of disbursing 
funds to local CSOs in a single instalment. In other words, donors disburse funds to 
associations for execution of the second phase of a project only when they have received 
detailed reports which justify how funds were used in the first phase. NGO workers in NW 
Cameroon point out that on the one hand, the paperwork involved in detailed funding 
justifications to donors slows down their activities, especially given their problems of 
manpower shortage. However, they recognize that these more stringent follow-up or 
accountability measures on the part of donors help to curtail embezzlement of fund among 
CSOs; hence it helps to put fraudulent associations ‘out of business’. In the words of an 
interviewee, reinforcing such accountability measures will contribute to a great extent in 
“phasing out those associations that are not active” in the field. Getting rid of fraudulent 
associations can opens up opportunities for genuine development associations to spread 
good governance norms within the civil society. 
 
The diversion of donor funds into private pockets which has soiled the credibility of CSOs 
in Cameroon seldom takes place when development projects are implemented by groups of 
associations or networks. Projects implemented within networks invariably command 
greater involvement and participation of different associations. Network-managed projects 
therefore tend to be more transparent. In development projects run by networks of 
associations, the individual associations monitor each other. Donors can therefore 
contribute in promoting good governance within the civil society by directing more funds 
towards network-run projects rather than towards projects run by single associations.  
 
Interviews show that development associations can further build their credibility and gain 
popular support when they shift their focus to issues that have wide societal relevance. For 
example, in 2003 the Citizens Association for the Defence of Collective Interests (ACDIC) 
mobilized associations and poultry farmers in Cameroon for a campaign against 
importation of frozen chicken. The exportation of low-priced chicken from Europe to 
Cameroon had driven many local poultry farmers out of business and pushed them into 
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poverty. Additionally, given that the imported frozen chicken was maintained under sub-
standard refrigeration and hygienic conditions, it posed serious health risks to consumers 
throughout the country. In 2004, ACDIC activists organized workshops with government 
officials, and carried out public sensitization campaigns on what they dubbed “the chicken 
of death.” The frozen chicken campaign enjoyed support from poultry farmers, the local 
population, and the media, because the problems it sought to address concerned a large 
fraction of the population. In 2005, the campaign produced results: the government 
introduced a ban on the importation of frozen chicken (Fig. 6.1). Frozen chicken imports 
dropped from 24,000 tons to 2,100 tons in 2005. Following the stop of frozen chicken 
‘dumping’ on local markets, the demand for locally produced chicken increased and 
farmers began to reinvest in poultry farming.   
 
Fig. 6.1: Imports of Frozen Chicken to Cameroon (1996 to 2006) 
 
(Source: EED et al, 2007) 
 
The frozen chicken problem was a topical issue that affected the lives of many people. By 
confronting government with the issue, NGOs proved themselves as the mouthpiece of the 
voiceless. Instead of just restricting their efforts to addressing the consequences of poverty, 
the NGOs focused on one of the root causes, which was of concern to the wider society. 
This success story demonstrates that addressing problems that affect the lives of a large 
fraction of the population is important if local associations hope to gain local recognition 
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and support. A member of the North West Association of Development Organizations 
(NWADO) explains how the CSO networks can gain public support and negotiation power 
vis-à-vis the state:  
what will make NWADO known is the ability to stand up and defend something 
that affects everyone. When we do this, the government will call us for 
negotiation because they would know that we have the backing of the people; 
and that we represent power. 
 
The example of the frozen chicken campaign shows that development associations gain 
greater legitimacy for spearheading policy advocacy when they take up topical issues that 
go beyond narrow interest.  
 
To illustrate further, in 2007, NGOs in NW Cameroon for the first in history, carried out a 
project to promote transparency in the municipal elections. The association, Community 
Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD) which had received funding to run a 
project on election observation decided to execute the project in collaboration with other 
CSOs. COMINSUD placed the project on the platform of a national CSO network called 
Responsible Citizen (Dynamique Citoyenne). As part of the project, NGOs trained eighty-
nine people (animators) to work as election observers at different voting centers in the 
region. Prior to the election, the animators carried out sensitization campaigns to fight 
apathy and also urged District Officers to resolve problems that citizens faced in the 
registration process. An interviewee argues that NGO participation in monitoring and 
reporting on the election process reduced fraud and other irregularities which are common 
with elections in Cameroon. By advocating for an issue like electoral transparency which 
mattered to citizens throughout the country, COMINSUD and the other associations 
involved in the initiative gained public recognition and hence credibility. A COMINSUD 
worker states: 
we are known today in almost all regions of the country. We are invited to 
many activities in other regions because we are recognized as [true] advocates 
of democracy and human rights.  
 
Mercer (2002) and others have noted that typically, NGOs and grassroots associations  
have a close relationship with local communities and are more informed about the 
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problems which these communities face. To fight inequality, these associations often focus 
attention on problems at the local level. Although this ‘local level focus’ of civil society 
associations is often regarded as positive, it also has a disadvantage. The development 
problems that are experienced at the local level are often the result of poorly designed 
policies at the national level. Jasanoff (1997) argues that when associations focus on local 
level issues they are less likely to bring about radical policy change. As individual 
association work on small projects in their respective small corners, their campaigns end at 
the local level, and fail to gain visibility, which is crucial for building credibility. 
COMINSUD magnified and brought visibility to the election observation initiative 
described above because the issue it addressed was not a local but a national concern. The 
ability to gain visibility through a focus on national policy issues or issues of wide societal 
relevance depends on successful networking. 
 
6.3.2 Overriding Challenges to Networking 
 
According to interviewees, networking among development associations in Cameroon is at 
its best in the NW Region. Quantitative data (Fig. 4.9 in Chapter 4) shows that on a 0 to 10 
scale, the average score for ‘organization and networking’ (O) among CSOs in the NW 
Region is 6. This score is only slightly above average. This implies that as far as 
networking to mount pressure on government is concerned, civil society associations in 
Cameroon still have a lot of ground to cover. The networking experiences of associations 
in the NW region provide some clues as to how networking can be enhanced.  
 
One of the greatest challenges to successful networking is competition between 
organizations within a network. In the NW region of Cameroon there are many formal 
networks of CSOs and among these, the North West Association of Development 
Organizations (NWADO) is the most prominent. By learning from experience, the 
NWADO members have achieved some success in reducing destructive competition 
within the network. Conflict among member organizations was reduced first by employing 
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an independent coordinator to manage the activities of the network, and secondly, by 
renting a separate office for the network’s secretariat.  
 
Resource scarcity, a common feature among development associations in NW Cameroon 
poses a challenge to the survival of CSO networks. To survive in a situation of scarce 
resources, networks rely heavily on support from their member associations. Usually, one 
member organization provides space at its office for the network secretariat, and other 
member organizations volunteer their staff to run some of the activities of the network. For 
example, the CSO, Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD) 
hosted the NWADO secretariat for some time. This kind of support which is indispensable 
for the growth of young network has also been a major source of conflict that threatens the 
survival of the network.   
 
According to NGO interviewees, the association hosting the secretariat of a CSO network 
often tends to dictated in the management of the network, as such stirring up 
disenchantment among the members of the network. Conflicts have also arisen in networks 
because associations which host the secretariats of the network typically assimilate the 
activities of the network into their own activities, and end up draining resources from the 
network. Furthermore, the host associations charged with coordinating the activities of 
CSO networks are known to discriminate in the way information about financial resources 
is circulated. Such discrimination has been the root cause of factions within networks. 
Additionally, CSO networks in NW Cameroon often become dormant because member 
organizations commit very little manpower for running the activities of the network. Most 
networks, therefore, fail to act with continuity. For example, the Union of North West 
Human Rights Organizations (UNOWHURO) becomes active when it gains access to 
resources to execute a project. And after the project is completed, the network, as a result 
of lack of manpower, again becomes inactive. If civil society organizations are to succeed 
in bringing about institutional change through pressure, they need to ensure continuity in 
their activities. Also, for CSO networks to attract new members and grow in numbers and 
influence, they need to remain active.  
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The successes achieved by the North West Association of Development Organizations 
(NWADO) give some clues as to how development associations can override the network 
challenges discussed above. The NWADO members resolved conflict in management of 
the network by recruiting a full-time coordinator who was not affiliated to any of the 
member organizations. The paid coordinator showed commitment to the network. The 
resultant success in the management and implementation of the network’s projects 
attracted more CSOs to become members. In 2007 NWADO had 15 registered members, 
and by August 2009, the membership had almost doubled. As the coordinator was not 
affiliated with any of the member organizations of the network, he ensured that 
information was circulated to all members equally without preferential treatment. The 
recruitment of an independent coordinator, who does not belong to any of the member 
organizations therefore, significantly reduced conflicts of interest, and enhanced harmony 
within the network. Additionally, with support from international donors, the NWADO 
members rented an office for the NWADO secretariat. This freed the network from any 
obligations to a particular member, and gave the coordinator more autonomy to manage 
the network with impartiality.  
 
The recruitment of an independent coordinator clearly helped NWADO reduce the 
problem of conflict that plagues most CSO networks in NW Cameroon, but it also created 
a new problem. The members of the network shifted almost all management 
responsibilities to the coordinator. This made the network fragile, as activities were liable 
to stop or slow down in the absence of the coordinator (SNV and DED, 2007). To help 
address this manpower problem, the NWADO coordinator recruited two national 
volunteers. NWADO also established a partnership with the international organization 
Volunteer Services Oversees (VSO), which sent skilled volunteers to provide technical 
assistance to the network.  Eventually, the network secured financial support from VSO to 
provide financial compensation to the two national volunteers. 
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As is the case for other CSO networks in the NW Region of Cameroon, shortage of 
financial resources is a major constraint to the growth and vibrancy of NWADO. CSO 
networks face the dilemma of either instituting low membership fees to attract more 
members, or instituting high fees so that the network can have enough financial resources 
for its operation costs. On the one hand, networks would like to attract higher membership 
by decreasing their annual dues. The Western Highlands Conservation Network 
(WHICONET), for example decreased its annual dues from 50,000 to 40,000 FCFA – 
approximately from €76 to €61 (SNV and DED, 2007). But without resources, networks 
risk stagnation. When annual dues are substantial, networks can continue to pay their 
operational costs when they are low on resources from donor-funded projects. High annual 
dues, however, prevent small and low-resourced associations from joining CSO networks. 
NWADO, for example with its 28 members, can be described as a ‘high-class’ or 
‘bourgeois’ network because ninety percent of its members are well established 
organizations which receive considerable funding from foreign donors. Since NWADO 
has succeeded in gaining recognition as the focal point of CSOs in the North West region 
of Cameroon, being a member of the network is appealing to many smaller development 
associations in the region. However, very few of these smaller lower-income community 
associations are able and willing to pay the membership fees. An NGO worker points out 
that although the registration fee and annual dues act as a disincentive for smaller 
associations to join networks, these fees are important because paying them stimulates 
commitment to the CSO network.  
 
Even when associations pay registration fees and join networks, not all of them readily pay 
the annual dues which the network needs for its operation costs. For example, although 
most NWADO member organizations are quite well-off financially, by the month of April, 
only half of them had paid their annual dues in 2009.  Networking is not a purely altruistic 
endeavor, although it is often regarded as such. The readiness with which associations join 
network or show commitment to networks depends on the benefits they can draw from 
being members. These benefits can be material, such as greater accesses to donor funding. 
They can be symbolic, for instance, greater visibility and recognition in society. Benefits 
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can also be in the form of access to better information on sources of funding or on 
intervention strategies that work. Therefore, for a network to keep its members devoted, or 
attract other associations to join, it needs to demonstrate that it has these benefits to offer. 
The experience of NWADO provides some clues as to how networks can motivate 
members to pay their dues. Before submitting an application for a big donor-funded 
project, the NWADO coordinator in May 2009 informed the network’s members that only 
associations that had paid their annual dues would be allowed to participate in executing 
the project. Shortly after receiving this information, many member organizations rushed to 
pay or complete their annual dues.  
 
To attract development associations in NW Cameroon to become members of the network, 
NWADO launched a quarterly newsletter in 2009. The newsletter was a ‘marketing’ 
strategy. It contained information about the activities of the network, as well as the success 
stories or achievements of its member organizations. The newsletter was distributed for 
free to local associations and donors, as such, giving visibility to both the network and its 
members. Increasing membership is one of NWADO’s main objectives. So far, the 
members of CSO networks in NW Cameroon are mostly formal and professionalized 
associations like NGOs, even though the region is teeming with community-based 
organizations. As an interviewee notes, for a network like NWADO to be truly 
representative of the civil society, it “needs to include all types of civil society 
associations, such as village development associations (VDAs) and churches”, as well as 
community groups. 
 
Some village development organizations in NW Cameroon have organized themselves into 
networks. An example is the Ngoketunjia Development and Cultural Association 
(NDECA), a network of the 13 village development associations within the Ngoketunjia 
Division in NW Cameroon. Another example is the Wimbum Cultural and Development 
Association (WICUDA), a network of 32 village development associations of the Mbum 
ethnic group. The networks of village development association (VDAs) are tribal-based 
and often represent the interests of a specific group of people. Granovetter (1973) argues 
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that in networking, tight ties break society into cliques, while cross-cutting ties link 
different groups or classes of people. Social fragmentation – such ethnic-based networking 
can be destructive to democracy. VDA networks are, therefore, not a suitable model for 
democracy-friendly networking in the NW region of Cameroon because they lay emphasis 
on ethnic identities. The North West Association of Development Organizations 
(NWADO) is a more suitable model for broad-based networking, because it can include 
different groups that share the vision of promoting democracy and equality in the country. 
 
Given that the NWADO secretariat is based in Bamenda, the capital of the NW region, 
which is located in the Mezam Division, the activities of the network are often limited to 
the headquarter Division. For this reason NWADO can be described as centralized. Only 
occasionally does the network run capacity-building programs in the other six divisions of 
the region. The relative ‘absence’ of NWADO in, for example, the Bui Division has 
prompted associations in this division to form a divisional network of CSOs called the Bui 
Association of Development Organizations (BADO). On the one hand, the creation of a 
divisional network of CSOs is a laudable initiative. However, when all divisions create 
their own networks, problems of linking or networking the various divisional networks is 
bound to arise. In other words, there will be conflicts of interests and problems of 
coordination between NWADO and the divisional networks, which may want to be 
independent.  
 
An NGO worker therefore argues that a better model for successful networking is for 
NWADO to create sub-branches in the seven divisions (Bui, Boyo, Donga-Mantung, 
Mezam, Menchum, Ngoketunjia and Momo) of the NW region (Fig. 6.2). Based on its 
experience with networking, the NWADO secretariat can then build the capacities of the 
sub-branches, which would then act as the focal points of the network in the respective 
divisions.   
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Fig. 6.2: A Networking Model for the North West Association 
of Development Organizations (NWADO) 
 
 
 
This radial model of networking holds three main advantages. First, the model can expand 
the geographic reach of NWADO by connecting NWADO to emerging network initiatives 
in different divisions of the region. Second, with the roles and powers of the branches and 
central secretariat clearly elaborated, the model can forestall conflicts or competition 
between NWADO and emerging divisional networks. Third, such a radial system of 
networking is suitable for a more structured two-way flow of information between 
associations in the region, with the NWADO secretariat acting as the central coordination 
body.  
 
Associations working for the interest of the Mbororo (one of the most marginalized groups 
in Cameroon) employed this networking model to organize their interventions under one 
body. Before 1992, there were three associations in Cameroon that focused on fighting 
marginalization of the Mbororo, a cattle-rearing Islamic people. Two of these associations 
were based in the towns of Bamenda and Kumbo of the NW region and one was based in 
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Yaounde in the Centre Region. The literacy rate among the Mbororo at this time was less 
than 4%, (Interview with an NGO worker, 2009). Government officials and other people in 
positions of power took advantage of the Mbororo people’s low levels of education to 
victimize them in various ways. The three associations advocating for the rights of the 
Mbororo realized that independently, their voices were weak. In 1999, they came together 
under one identity and name: the Mbororo Social and Cultural and Development 
Organization (MBOSCUDA). Jointly, they drafted the vision, objectives, and constitution 
of the new umbrella structure. The three associations in the three different towns thus 
began to operate as branches of one association, that is: MBOSCUDA Bamenda Branch, 
MBOSCUDA Kumbo Branch and MBOSCUDA Yaounde Branch.  This networking 
enhanced information sharing, mutual support, and visibility of the associations. In short, 
networking gave more clout to the advocacy actions of the three associations.  
 
Although the radial model of networking has merits, putting it into practice in the case of 
NWADO, would require considerable amount of resources, because self-interest 
characterizes the interaction between CSOs in NW Cameroon. Donors can encourage the 
emergence of such a broad-based networking model by giving priority to development 
project run by networks over those executed by single associations. Associations, 
especially NGOs follow resources: their priorities shift in accordance with donor priorities 
(Howell, 2000). By tilting their funding towards networks, donors would give associations 
a powerful incentive to work in collaboration. Furthermore, a long-lasting solution to the 
problem of competition which hampers effective networking lies in laying down guiding 
principles on how the networks should function. As an NGO worker points out, clear 
guiding principles would ensure that “resources meant for networks go to networks and 
resources meant for member organizations go to member organizations”. Such principles 
would avoid, scrambles between a network and its member organizations over donor 
funded projects; as was the cases in 2008 between NWADO and one of its member 
organization over the EU-funded Support Programme for the Strengthening of Civil 
Society (PASOC). 
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6.3.3 Increasing Resource Capacity 
 
Resources are the lifeblood of civil society associations. As several NGO informants point 
out, the level of resources (R) affects the extent to which associations can develop the 
other bottom-pressure attributes of the POWER framework. An interviewee notes:  
If you have the resources, you can work for policy change; you can organize 
yourself well and work within a network; you can integrate well with your 
target group; and you can establish links which would not put you in danger of 
being co-opted by this or that political party. 
 
The low level of ‘politicization activities’ (P) observed among associations in NW 
Cameroon is a reflection of their inadequate access to resources. Many CSOs in the case 
study are described as “ghost associations” because they exist in name and do not pursue 
their visions and objectives in practice due to inadequate resources. Shortage of resources 
has forced many associations to divert from addressing local problems which they find 
pertinent. In the words of an NGO worker, resource deficiency “has given room for the 
funders to tie a rope around the necks of associations; CSOs are forced to dance 
according to the dictates of the donor, instead of facing the realities in the field.” For 
associations to succeed in bringing about institutional change, increasing their resource 
capacity is vital. 
 
Associations in NW Cameroon use a number of strategies to build their resource capacity. 
Some associations operate businesses to raise funds which can sustain their activities when 
there are no resources from donors. NWADO, for example, runs a photocopying and 
printing service. The organization, Navti Foundation generates income through its 
community clinic, tailoring workshop, and computer training centre. According to an 
interviewee, income from these three services would have been sufficient to sustain the 
organization, if there wasn’t gross mismanagement on the part of the association’s leaders. 
The Navti Foundation case indicates that associations can reduce or break out of their 
dependence on donors by investing in income-generating activities, especially as non-
profit associations are not required by law to pay taxes. The association, Piyin Sustainable 
Farming System (PISUFAS) has focused its development activities on supporting the 
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income-generating activities of farmer groups in rural areas. According to the association’s 
coordinator, the key to real empowerment is economic self-sufficiency. Economic self-
sufficiency, he argues, frees people and makes it possible for them to be critical – “to think 
with their heads, rather than with their stomachs.” To put it differently, economic 
independence makes people and their associations less susceptible to corruption and to 
placation by government politicians who do not truly have their interests at heart. 
 
Some development associations try to address the resource shortage problem by 
diversifying their sources of funding. The association, Community Initiative for 
Sustainable Development (COMINSUD), for example broadened its objectives from just 
waste management in 1996 to promoting environmental conservation, gender equality, 
human rights, democracy, and healthcare. Some interviewees criticize this CSO tendency 
of pursuing multiple goals as “NGO prostitution” or “biting off more than can be chewed.” 
Edwards (1999) argues that associations which pursue too many goals at the same time are 
less likely to achieve them because of a loss of focus. These criticisms certainly have some 
credit. However, they do not take into account that development is multifaceted; for 
example, problems of female marginalization often have import on issues of 
environmental management. Most importantly, the criticisms overlook the fact that 
diversification of objectives is a strategy which associations use to mobilize resources 
from a variety of sources. Having multiple sources of funding helps to ensure 
sustainability of NGO activities, and it also helps to guarantee some degree of 
independence from the different donors. A member of the development association, 
COMINSUD explains: 
We realized we can have more resources in the organization by opening up 
our areas of intervention. Funding for one sector helps to solve small problems 
in other sectors. When we put together the funding for the different sectors, it 
is quite substantial. 
 
COMINSUD has applied the same strategy of diversification in the training of its staff. 
Instead of building the capacities of a worker in just one sector, such as natural resources 
management or democracy advocacy, the association tries to develop a multi-skilled work 
force by rotating workers across sectors. This helps to prevent project activities from 
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stalling when a worker leaves the organization. For example, when the team working on 
governance project runs low on staff, workers from other project areas offer support. A 
COMINSUD interviewee notes: “we have a coordinator who is very polyvalent; it is 
possible for him to backstop each project team within the organization.” 
 
Associations in NW Cameroon also try to increase or guarantee continuous access to donor 
resources by establishing long-term collaboration or agreements with funders. The 
advantage of long-term collaboration over project-based cooperation is that it gives 
associations in developing countries room to ‘sell’ their visions and objectives to donors. 
In project-based cooperation, the donor sends out a call for project proposals within a 
particular sector (for example, environmental conservation) that it deems necessary for a 
particular developing country. Associations then try to fit their development interests 
within the requirements of the call for proposal. When the problems which the call for 
proposals mentions are not the main problems which local communities face, development 
associations which need donor funding tend to appropriate the donor-identified problems. 
In this way, project-based cooperation maintains a patron-client relationship between 
associations and their donors.  
 
Long-term funding cooperation with donors makes a shift from project funding to program 
funding. In program-based funding, donor funds are not tightly earmarked, and this gives 
local associations more flexibility to address the problems they deem more pertinent in 
their context. Since in long-term funding collaborations (program-based cooperation), 
donors commit resources to local associations over a given period of time, the 
sustainability and hence success of the interventions of these associations is more assured. 
An NGO worker states: “long-term collaboration with donors, enables associations to 
plan, which makes them more focused on achieving the outputs that they desire.” 
 
Donors further help CSOs gain greater access to resources when, they avoid the practice of 
channelling financial resources to associations through the government. In Cameroon, 
donor funding meant for civil society projects seldom reaches target groups entirely, when 
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it passes through the government. Despite the government’s anticorruption efforts, 
corruption within the state bureaucracy remains high. Many CSO interviewees mentioned 
projects which had come to a standstill because the government failed to disburse the 
funds meant for their continuation. The coordination of the association, Positive Vision for 
Development gives an example:  
The Malaria Project which we had in Mbengwi abruptly came to an end. We 
signed a contract with the Ministry of Health, carried out the first phase of the 
project and submitted the report. We have been waiting for over six months 
now and some of our patients have died. 
 
Interviewees argue that associations would gain greater access to resources if donors avoid 
the ‘middleman syndrome’; that is, using the state as a channel for sending resources to 
CSOs. Direct collaboration between associations and donors is important because the 
philosophy of ‘government empowerment of civil society’ is self-defeating or unrealistic 
in practice in semi-autocratic regimes like Cameroon. 
 
Micro-credit initiatives have also been quite significant in helping small associations break 
out of economic dependency. An example is the Empowerment Credit (EC) scheme of a 
non-governmental organization called Grounded and Holistic Approach to People’s 
Empowerment (GHAPE). The empowerment credit scheme entails using funds from 
donors to provide small associations of underprivileged people with loans, accompanied 
by advice on how to invest in small and medium size enterprises. The main advantage of 
the scheme lies in the extremely low interest rate of the loans. When borrowers in one 
association repay the loan, the money is then redeployed to people in other community or 
common initiative groups. The interest, which is usually 10% or less is used to cover the 
running cost of the scheme. Microfinance initiatives of this type have produced tangible 
results in the form of transforming underprivileged groups from ‘beggars’ to 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, such schemes are a good strategy for strengthening CSOs 
economically, especially those associations in rural areas. The female empowerment 
program of the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) 
has a micro-finance component. According to MBOSCUDA, the excessive dependence of 
Mbororo women on their men is the root cause of social and political marginalization of 
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the Mbororo woman. As a member of the organization notes, the microfinance scheme of 
MBOSCUDA which started in 2003 has so far “benefited and changed the lives of about 
24 women groups” in the NW region of Cameroon. Initiatives which enable associations to 
gain increased access to financial resources are crucial for bottom-up pressure because 
having a voice in community decision-making is closely tied to economic independence 
and empowerment. 
 
6.3.4 Enhancing Participation and Community Involvement 
 
Associations can achieve greater success in building and consolidating democratic values 
in society, not through mere rhetoric, but through action-centered learning programs of 
community participation. As Pateman (1970: 31) asserts, “it is by participating at the local 
level that the individual ‘learns democracy’.” In other words, regular experience with 
participatory forms of governance helps people develop critical mindsets, and the habit of 
advocating for their rights. The Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association 
(MBOSCUDA) has achieved praiseworthy success in promoting participation and critical 
consciousness within local communities in NW Cameroon using the REFLECT7 approach.  
 
REFLECT is an approach for enhancing participation that was developed from the 
pedagogy by practice theories of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire. According to Freire 
(1970), liberation from oppression requires active participation of the oppressed in 
reflections on the causes of their oppression. Reflective participation he argues gives the 
oppressed self-confidence to ask ‘why’ questions about their situation (their reality), which 
oppressive institutional structures have forced them to accept or to refrain from 
questioning. Reflection, therefore, inspires the oppressed to take action or engage in 
struggles to overturn social, cultural, economic or political structures that are responsible 
for their subjugation. Freire further argues that any libertarian effort in which the 
oppressed themselves are not actively involved is not itself free of oppressive character. 
For him, “libertarian action must recognize...dependence as a weak point and must attempt 
                                                 
7
 Re-generated Freirean Literacy through Empowering Community Techniques 
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through reflection and action to transform it into independence” (ibid: 66). To put it 
differently, only political action which is pedagogical in nature, in the sense of being 
“action with the oppressed” is truly liberating (ibid: 66).  
 
MBOSCUDA adopted the REFLECT approach in its adult literacy program in 1999 
thanks to support from the international development organization, Village Aid. In 
Mbororo communities in the NW region, the association created over 30 adult literacy 
groups or ‘reflect circles’ which together drew about 600 participants. The ‘reflect learning 
circles’ are forums in which community members gather to discuss the problems they face: 
the causes, consequences, potential solutions, and the challenges of implementing these 
solutions. In accordance with Freirean philosophy, ‘reflect learning circles’ are not run by 
teachers who instruct, but rather by facilitators who only guide the topics of discussion 
generated by the participants themselves. The REFLECT approach, therefore, gives room 
for local people to identify their development priorities, and to spearhead or take 
ownership of change efforts.   
 
The REFLECT approach has contributed significantly in building critical consciousness 
among the Mbororo people. The Mbororo today, increasingly see themselves as citizens 
with rights, and increasingly challenge cultural and political systems of hierarchy that have 
for long been used with impunity to marginalize them. Furthermore, the majority of 
participants in the ‘reflect circles’ are women. The reflect forums have been instrumental 
in breaking strong gender taboos by giving women the opportunity and space to contribute 
their voice in community issues. MBOSCUDA’s success with REFLECT makes the 
approach stand out as a strategy which associations in developing countries can adopt,  for 
building democratic values and norms from the bottom-up through praxis. Given its 
participatory nature, the REFLECT approach can help non-grassroots NGOs to gain 
greater community embeddedness. 
 
Creating microcosms of participatory democracy at the local can gradually erode those 
institutions that support corruption and clientelism. To cite an example, an NGO called 
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Integrated Development Foundation (IDF) has contributed in fighting corruption and 
mismanagement within the Bamenda Council of NW Cameroon by encouraging the 
inhabitants of two quarters to form development committees. First, the NGO mobilized the 
inhabitants of each quarter to organize themselves within a formal quarter development 
association. With coaching from the NGO, the people themselves then drafted a 
constitution and an electoral code for their respective development associations. To 
guarantee the independence of the quarter associations, the constitutions stated that only 
quarter inhabitants who were not part of the state administration were eligible to hold 
executive posts within the quarter associations. Subsequently, using secret ballots and a 
transparent ballot box, each quarter association elected its committee members and trained 
them to collaborate with the city council. The development committee members were 
charged with communicating the people’s development priorities to the council and with 
monitoring the execution of development budgets earmarked for the quarters.  
 
This initiative which is a pilot case of the ‘participatory decentralized development 
approach’ promoted by the World Bank has yielded tangible results. In one of the quarters, 
the development committee influenced the council to invest in building footpaths rather 
than roads, since a majority of the houses in the quarter were only accessible by footpaths. 
In another case, the development committee wrote a complaint to the council regarding a 
new road which was two meters narrower than stipulated in the construction contract. 
Following the complaint, the council instructed the contractor to respect the terms of the 
contract. The quarter committees have enabled quarter inhabitants to effectively follow-up 
on how the council uses the funds meant for development of their district. As an 
interviewee notes, if the participatory initiative is replicated so that there are “a series of 
quarters with development committees, the council will know it is dealing with a strong 
civil society and things would change.” Also, the creation of quarter committees which can 
provide information about people’s development priorities can help NGOs design their 
projects according to local priorities. In NW Cameroon, there is very little networking 
between professionalized associations like NGOs and village development associations 
(VDAs) which are more grassroots in nature. Information from quarter committees about 
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people’s development priorities will also help NGOs avoid the costly process of carrying 
out broad baseline surveys to determine community priorities.  
 
6.3.5 Advocating for Justice and Accountability 
 
In advanced democracies, civil society advocacy strategies, such as protest marches and 
rallies can be quite effective in changing government policy. But in semi-authoritarian or 
pseudo-democratic African countries, the government typically responds to demonstrations 
with repression. When confronted with civil unrest, the Biya regime in Cameroon has used 
terror – arbitrary arrests, torture, intimidation, killings, and detention without trial – to 
subdue discontent. Examples abound, but the most outstanding case is the repression of 
protests against high costs of living and elimination of presidential term limits from the 
Constitution in February 2008. The government repression left at least 139 civilians dead 
within 5 days of demonstrations (The National Observatory of National Human Rights, 
2009). Given the repressive nature of the government, associations that aim to promote 
democracy and equal development have turned to advocacy strategies that do not expose 
citizens to police or military brutalization.  
 
To fight forms of marginalization, tyranny and injustice, while avoiding the risks of 
repression, many associations in Cameroon have turned to the use of the legal system. In 
other words, development associations have shifted the battleground for good governance 
from street protests to courts cases. The access to justice programme of the Mbororo 
Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) is a good case of how 
associations have used the legal system to promote the respect of human rights. 
MBOSCUDA began its access to justice programme in 2001, as a response to the 
prevalent problem of harassment and human rights abuse which the Mbororo people faced. 
As a result to their low education, the Mbororo were defenceless against some government 
officials and barons, who misused administrative power to molest or exploit them. Within 
the access to justice programme, MBOSCUDA fights unlawful practices in three ways. 
First, the association assists rural Mbororo people to obtain documents like birth 
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certificates or national identity cards, which give them legal rights as citizens of 
Cameroon. According to a MBOSCUDA interviewee, “the association has helped about 
5000 people within the NW region to acquire citizenship documents.” Second, the 
association organizes human rights sensitization campaigns in Mbororo communities, and 
encourages people to report cases of harassment or human rights abuse. Third, 
MBOSCUDA has trained a team of paralegal officers who gather evidence against 
perpetrators of human rights abuse, and also provide pro bono legal representation to 
victimized Mbororo people.  
 
MBOSCUDA has a database where it records all the cases of abuse or exploitation that it 
has handled. In the North West Region alone, the association has handled over 600 cases 
on behalf of Mbororo people (Interview with a Member of MBOSCUDA, 2009). In one of 
these cases, the association intervened to stop police officers from exploiting the family of 
a murder victim in the town of Mbengwi in NW Cameroon. The police had requested that 
the Mbororo family pay 200,000 FCFA (approximately €305) before an investigation into 
the murder case could be opened, even though in Cameroonian law, no fee is required for 
the police to open an investigation into a crime. By the time MBOSCUDA learned of the 
case, the family had already paid one-quarter of the requested amount. By threatening the 
police officers with a human rights violation lawsuit, MBOSCUDA forced the police to 
repay the money and to pledge that an investigation will be opened as required by law 
(Interview with a Member of MBOSCUDA, 2009). This case and other successful cases 
show that to some degree, associations can promote democratic practice within a semi-
authoritarian context by exploiting existing legal opportunities to advocate for the respect 
of human rights. 
 
Other cases, however, demonstrate that there are limits to the extent to which associations 
can advance democracy through the access to justice strategy. An example is a 
victimization law suit which MBOSCUDA filed in 2008 against local government 
administrators in Nkambe in the NW region of Cameroon. The Nkambe government 
officials had confiscated fifty cows as custom duty penalty from a Mbororo nomad, as he 
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moved his cattle from the Centre Region to the NW Region of the country. Shortly after 
the seizure, the government officials auctioned the animals. Given that the cattle were 
neither being exported nor imported, the seizure of the animals as custom duty was 
unlawful. MBOSCUDA filed a lawsuit at the Nkambe High Court against the local 
government official and presented proof that the cattle were neither imported nor being 
exported. The Nkambe High Court, however, dismissed the case on grounds that the cattle 
owner had looked suspicious and that at the time of the seizure he appeared to have 
intentions of taking the cattle to Nigeria. Justice was denied because some magistrates at 
the Nkambe High Court were implicated in the victimization. A MBOSCUDA interviewee 
explains:  
one of the magistrates based in Nkambe had bought some of the cattle during 
the auction. So, the presiding judge dismissed the case to protect his colleague. 
 
After the unfavourable ruling, MBOSCUDA kept up the legal fight by filing an appeal. 
Over one year afterwards, the court had still not called up a hearing for the appeal case. 
The case thus illustrates that due to corruption within the judicial system, the access to 
justice programme as a CSO strategy for reform is not successful against very powerful 
individuals.  
 
The Mbororo in the NW Region of Cameroon, have suffered the most heinous human 
rights abuses at the hands of a powerful tycoon and rancher, Alhadji Baba Danpullo, with 
whom they have land conflicts. Some of Alhadji Baba’s acts of victimization include 
unlawful eviction of the Mbororo from their land, confiscation of their cattle, 
imprisonment of rivals without charge, and torture (Hickey, 2002; Fon and Ndamba, 
2008). Given Alhadji Baba’s reputation of oppression, an interviewee describes him as 
“the terror of the Mbororo people.” MBOSCUDA has filed numerous law suits against the 
multimillionaire, but all these attempts to secure justice for the victimized Mbororo have 
not produced positive results. Given his position as a prominent member of the ruling 
party, as well as, his strong personal ties with the President, Alhadji Baba has proven to be 
above the law. Following pressure from MBOSCUDA, the central government has on 
many occasions dispatched special commissions to the NW region to investigate human 
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rights complaints made against Alhadji Baba. These investigations, however, have been 
merely cosmetic, and none of them has ever culminated in government penalties or 
sanctions against the tycoon. Additionally, although MBOSCUDA and its clients have in 
some cases emerged triumphant in court over Alhadji Baba, none of such judgments made 
against the tycoon have been implemented. As an interviewee explains, “no police officer, 
local government administrator or bailiff can execute these court judgments because 
Alhadji Baba can use his political influence to get anyone dismissed from public office.”  
 
These limitations notwithstanding, the access to justice strategy plays an important role in 
civil society organization struggles for democracy because it challenges established power 
structures. Before MBOSCUDA began its access to justice programme, no one dared to 
defy or speak out against Alhadji Baba’s victimization. Nowadays, the tycoon’s authority 
is somewhat challenged when the central government sends special commissions to 
investigate human rights complaints made against him. Although court judgments against 
the multimillionaire are never implemented, the fact that some judges nowadays venture to 
rule against him in court is ground-breaking. This recent development is emblematic of his 
diminishing power. Therefore, through its paralegal scheme, MBOSCUDA has succeeded 
in dispelling the ‘superman’ myth associated with the name Alhadji Baba Dampullo in 
NW Cameroon (Fon and Ndamba, 2008).  
 
In NW Cameroon, the most outstanding example of how the access to justice strategy 
challenges tyranny is the conviction of the chief of Balikumbat village, a prominent 
member of the ruling party, for the murder of an opposition party militant. On the 20th of 
August 2004, Fon Doh Gwanyin III of Balikumbat and some of his followers assaulted 
and killed John Kohtem, the chairman of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) of the 
Balikumbat district. John Kohtem had, prior to the attack, publicly criticized the revered 
chief for intimidating opposition party supporters, and falsification of the voters’ register 
for the imminent Presidential Elections. Given his status as a member of parliament for the 
ruling CPDM party, Fon Doh Gwanyin was under immunity and not liable to stand trial 
for the politically-motivated murder. Under pressure from the SDF, civil society 
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organizations and the media, the government in February 2005 lifted Fon Doh’s 
parliamentary immunity. In 2006, the High Court of Ngoketunjia Division found the chief 
and his seven accomplices guilty of manslaughter. The once powerful and untouchable 
Fon Doh was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. This unprecedented conviction of a 
North West Region chief and elite of the ruling party was a historic achievement for civil 
society pressure groups. The victory, however, turned out to be short-lived. 
 
After serving only about six months of his sentence, Fon Doh who had filed an appeal 
against the court judgment was released on bail for reasons of ill-health. However, upon 
his release, the chief appeared in public showing no signs of illness.  By August 2009, two 
years after his release, the Court of Appeal had not called up a hearing on the appeal case, 
and unofficially Fon Doh remained a free man. On the one hand, the Fon Doh case reveals 
the double standard of the judiciary in Cameroon, which allows protégés of the regime in 
power to get away with human rights violations. On another hand, the case illustrates that 
the access to justice strategy of associations has potentials for advancing democracy by 
promoting the rule of law.  Although Fon Doh escaped justice on account of the legal ruse 
in the Court of Appeal, the initial conviction has significantly eroded the chief’s power in 
the NW region. Although not in jail, Fon Doh is considered a de facto convict, and this 
status bars him from competing for political office. When the access to justice strategy 
fails to bring sanctions on perpetrators of human rights abuse like Alhadji Danpullo and 
Fon Doh, it at least exposes the unfairness of the Cameroon judiciary.    
 
The judiciary system, despite its imperfections, still offers a channel through which 
marginalized people can voice their dissatisfaction and make demands on the government 
without fear of police brutality. For example, using convincing argumentation, traders in 
Bamenda, the capital of the NW region of Cameroon, persuaded the government to check 
the discretionary powers of tax controllers who perpetually exploited them. Prior to the 
government intervention, corruption among tax controllers was alarming, and tax controls 
were done in a discriminatory way. As a standard practice, tax controllers looked the other 
way, and allowed tax defaulters to continue operating their businesses as long as these 
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traders regularly gave bribes. Meanwhile, the tax controllers intimidated traders who had 
fulfilled their tax payment obligations, and used various strategies to impose unjustified 
fines on them. In this way, the tax collectors encouraged tax evasion and corruption among 
traders rather than respect of the law. As a trader in Bamenda points out, “no effective 
control was being carried out; traders worked very hard, but they could not enjoy the 
revenues from their businesses, because tax controllers drained all the profits.” To check 
this abuse of power and to promote accountability in tax controls, an association of traders, 
the Bamenda Trade and Economic Operators (BTEO) hired a team of lawyers to present 
the traders’ case to the government.   
 
In its advocacy for reform in tax controls, BTEO focused on proving to the government 
that many young businesses were dying because of the exploitative and corrupt nature of 
tax controls. The association argued that transparency in tax controls could only be assured 
if tax officials were required by law to obtain court orders before proceeding to seal the 
shops of traders on account of tax evasion. Such a procedure, they argued, would help 
protect traders and young businesses from the kind of intimidation and blackmail that 
characterized tax controls. BTEO also highlighted that instituting such a procedure also 
held benefits for the state. The association argued that when fines are legally registered, it 
will be difficult for these tax revenues to get diverted from the public treasury into the 
private accounts of tax controllers. With such logical and strong argumentation, BTEO 
lobbied the Governor of the NW region to override the closure orders which tax control 
officials had imposed on many businesses in the major markets of the Region’s capital 
city, Bamenda. A member of the traders’ association notes:  
we don’t engage in foolish things like demonstrations because when protests 
go out of hand, the government holds the leaders responsible. We are tactful – 
we explain our case and prove our point.  
 
By confronting government with the strong argument that corruption in tax controls stifled 
business and economic growth, BTEO succeeded in forcing local government officials in 
Bamenda to revise tax control practices. Now, before beginning tax controls, tax officials 
are required to consult with the Market Master, a representative of the traders. The 
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representative of the traders and the tax controllers agree on the modalities of the tax 
controls before the controls begin. In case tax controllers insist on control criteria that are 
discriminatory and unfair to traders, the Market Master would shut down the entire market, 
thereby preventing the control. In this way, the traders participate in laying down the rules 
that are used to govern them.  
 
Since strong legal argumentation does not always bring the government to address 
problems of corruption or poor accountability in the public sector, some associations in 
NW Cameroon use other strategies. Associations have succeeded in promoting good 
governance by attacking the public image of the government and causing ‘embarrassment’ 
to corrupt state departments. In 2007, the association, Responsible Citizen (Dynamique 
Citoyenne) conducted a survey to identify the ten most corrupt public institutions in the 
NW Region. Responsible Citizen borrowed this idea from the International NGO, 
Transparency International, whose corruption perception index rated Cameroon as the 
world’s most corrupt country in 1998, and caused great embarrassment to the Biya regime. 
According to Responsible Citizen’s corruption survey, the taxation sector was rated as the 
most corrupt public sector in the NW Region. The judiciary was second, while the police, 
the divisional government administration, and the public hospitals ranked third, fourth and 
fifth respectively.  
 
The release of the corruption ranking and its subsequent dissemination through the private 
media embarrassed the managers of those public sectors which had high corruption ratings. 
Shortly after Responsible Citizen made the survey result public, the head of taxation in the 
NW Region organized an ‘emergency’ staff meeting to discuss measures of fighting 
corruption in the sector. Similarly, the Director of the General Hospital in Bamenda held a 
crisis meeting with doctors and nurses and took corrective action to redeem the reputation 
of the institution. As a civil society organization worker notes, positive changes occurred 
in the Bamenda General Hospital following the release of the corruption rating (Interview, 
April 2009).  
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The case demonstrates that in repressive regimes, whistle-blowing and shaming are 
laudable strategies which civil society organizations can use to put pressure on the 
government. Such initiatives could have a significant impact on government if they are 
replicated in other regions of the country. Even though publication of the corruption 
perception index in 2007 produced positive results, Responsible Citizen failed to continue 
the initiative the following year, or to extend it to other regions of the country. This failure 
to bank on advocacy initiatives that yield results – a common feature among CSOs in the 
North West Cameroon – is one of the main reasons for the persistence of poor governance.  
 
For democracy to grow, advocacy strategies that produce positive transformations in 
government performance need to be sustained over a period of time to allow new practices 
to become institutionalized. Kimberley (1979: 447) defines institutionalization as “the 
process whereby new norms, values, and structures become incorporated within the 
framework of existing patterns of norms, values, and structures”. Institutionalization as 
such is a variable (Zucker, 1977); it denotes the degree of implantation of new values, 
norms and practices, and not simply their presence or absence in a given society. New 
government practices of good governance would therefore be considered highly 
institutionalized when they have become routinized, such that they operate in the absence 
of the civil society pressures that initiated them.   
 
The degree to which a new governance practice becomes institutionalized depends on 
time. As Lawrence et al (2001) note, institutionalization requires (i) time for an innovation 
to emerge, (ii) time for it to diffuse through the given society; (iii) time for it to gain 
legitimacy and (iv) time for it to stabilize. By implication, the longer a norm, value or 
practice is promoted or observed in a given setting, the more established or 
institutionalized it becomes. This implies that short-term or sporadic CSO advocacy 
initiatives are unlikely to produce long-lasting change in governance. One-off advocacy 
programmes for good governance do not allow sufficient time for the new governance 
practices that they initiate to diffuse, gain legitimacy and stability. As such, once the 
advocacy initiative ceases, the governance practices or actions that it inspired die down 
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(Fig. 6.3, Scenario 1). For example, in 2007, publication of the corruption perception index 
for public sectors in NW Cameroon forced the chiefs of the police and taxation 
departments to take actions aimed at fighting corruption. By the following year, this anti-
corruption drive had died down because the association, Responsible Citizen failed to 
continue the advocacy strategy. As Scenario 1 in Fig. 6.3 illustrates, when CSO pressure is 
inconsistent, a futile cycle characterized by progress in governance followed by relapse 
ensues. This scenario is a contributing factor to the democracy hold-up in Cameroon.  
 
Fig. 6.3: The relationship between Bottom-up Pressure, Time and 
Institutionalization of Good Governance Practices 
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Achieving success in advancing democracy, therefore, does not only require that 
associations intensify advocacy or the extent to which they carry out ‘politicization 
activities’ (P). To allow time for improvements in governance practice to take root, 
associations also need to be consistent in their advocacy as Scenario 2 of Fig. 6.3 
illustrates.  
 
There are two main reasons why CSO advocacy initiatives in NW Cameroon are seldom 
sustainable.  First, donor evaluation of project effectiveness often focuses on short-term 
gains. For this reason, many funders run into the pitfall of withdrawing resources 
prematurely from advocacy projects that show signs of positive impact. Second, for NGOs 
and donors, repeating an intervention previously implemented in a community by another 
association is erroneously equated with waste of scarce resources. As a consequence, 
NGOs tend to skip from one advocacy project to another; instead of pursuing one claim or 
petition to a productive end, before embarking on another. Additionally, any NGO which 
repeats a particular project in a community where another organization had implemented a 
similar initiative is quickly accused of “stealing ideas” or of encroaching on the other’s 
target group. Avoiding duplication has become a dominant discourse among international 
development organizations that fund local associations in Africa. But as Scenario 2 in Fig. 
6.3 illustrates, consistency in advocacy helps to consolidate or institutionalize newly 
introduced inclusive forms of governance, thus preventing the resurgence of pre-existing 
top-down modes of coordination. In this sense, in the quest for more democratic 
governance, duplication or repetition of CSO advocacy interventions actually ensures a 
more efficient use of resources.  
 
In different words, quick fix advocacy initiatives end up not fixing much. As highlighted 
earlier, institutions – norms, values, cultures – are stable. Consequently, actors often 
“require multiple exposures to programmatic interventions” (Goodman et al, 1993) before 
they can change behavior or practice. With the realization that consistent advocacy is 
essential for long-lasting governance transformations to emerge, NGOs nowadays strive to 
establish partnerships with donors who can support advocacy projects over a long period 
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of time. By forging long-term partnerships with donors, developing country associations 
gain greater resource security; hence the possibility of sustaining their advocacy actions. 
As an NGO worker notes, long-term collaboration with donors allows associations to 
“plan and focus on getting the outputs that they want.” The rate at which successful 
advocacy strategies diffuse and become appropriated among associations depends on the 
extent to which associations share experiences with each other. An increase in 
communication or information dissemination among associations, therefore, has positive 
implications for the advocacy (political capital) attribute that will enable associations with 
high social capital to contribute to democratic advancement.   
 
6.3.6 Facilitating Information Dissemination 
 
The documentation of activities and intervention strategies is a common practice among 
associations like NGOs in Cameroon, because donors require accountability reports that 
show how funds were used. Such NGO report, which also analyze the impacts of specific 
intervention strategies are seldom circulated to other local associations. In other words, 
while information flow between local NGOs and their international donors is high, 
communication among local associations is low. NGOs in NW Cameroon value 
international linkages, because without these linkages, they would lack the resources 
which are essential for them to put their advocacy plans into action. Local linkages, though 
neglected, have significant value for bottom-up pressure for democracy.  
 
Local linkages and communication helps associations to learn from each other. With 
mutual learning, associations can replicate strategies that have shown results, and avoid 
investing time and resources in advocacy strategies that do not work.  Sharing information 
– especially information on achievements – can also contribute in building motivation and 
reducing apathy among associations. In NW Cameroon, members of CSOs to some extent, 
share information and experiences occasionally in capacity-building workshops. This face-
to-face mode of communication, however, is not sufficient for extensive information 
sharing. The developing media sector in Cameroon offers a channel through which 
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associations can disseminate information, raise awareness on human rights and encourage 
public scrutiny of the government.  
 
The press freedom law, which was passed in Cameroon in 1990 opened way for the 
creation of private radio stations and newspapers. Some associations in NW Cameroon are 
actively using private (audiovisual and print) media to make their voices heard. An 
example is the association, Community Resource Center for the Disabled and 
Disadvantaged (CRCDD), which has gained visibility through a weekly radio show that 
covers the issue of discrimination against disabled people. In the radio programme, 
CRCDD speaks out against government neglect of the disabled, and also inspires the 
handicapped with self-confidence through its slogan, “disability is not inability.” People 
with disabilities were often sidelined during polio vaccination campaigns in the NW 
region. The coordinator of the association notes: “we were not given the chance to go and 
say to the world: here we are, victims of polio; we encourage you to vaccinate your 
children.” However, thanks to CRCDD’s regular advocacy for inclusion over the radio, the 
Delegate of Health for the NW Region invited people with disabilities to participate in the 
2009 Campaign for Immunization against Polio. The coordinator of the association 
explains: 
since we don’t have a program for the disabled on national radio and we want 
our voice to be heard, it is only through the private media that we can get 
information across.  
 
The private newspapers, radio and television, therefore, help associations break the 
domination which the government has over the dissemination of information to the public.  
 
The availability of private-owned newspapers and radios as means of information 
dissemination for associations does not mean affordability. As CSO worker points out, 
advocating through “the media [in Cameroon] is quite expensive”. Survey results in Fig. 
4.7 of  Chapter 4 show that fifty-nine percent of associations in the NW region score 
below-average in ‘Resource capacity’ (R). This resource deficiency has implications on 
the degree to which civic associations can take advantage of the media for information 
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sharing and advocacy. Although the private media are available, the majority of grassroots 
associations which operate on low annual budgets cannot use them regularly for 
information-sharing or advocacy. Some CSOs have demonstrated that the way out of this 
information dissemination challenge is for associations to publish their own newsletters 
periodically, instead of relying solely on the private media. For example, in June 2009, the 
North West Association of Development Organizations (NWADO) launched a quarterly 
newsletter, “The NWADO Brief”, with financial support from the international 
organization, Volunteer Services Oversees (VSO). The newsletter which carried 
development success stories of NWADO member organizations was distributed at no cost 
to national and international civil society organizations based in the NW Region. The 
newsletter served two main goals. First, it enabled the NWADO member organizations to 
‘market’ intervention strategies that had produced results, as such contributing in 
strengthening the civil society. Second, it helped the network of associations to gain more 
recognition and legitimacy in the region and as a consequence, attract new members.  
 
Another association, the BOTFON Human Rights Watch Group also used a periodic 
newsletter, as a means of sensitizing citizens on human rights. The newsletter, “BOTFON 
Human Rights Watch” acted as an instrument of advocacy and pressure for 
democratization, since it exposed government human rights violations, as well as cultural 
practices that abused women’s rights. To recover the costs of production of the newsletter 
and to raise funds, the human rights association sold the newsletter at a modest cost of 
between 500 and 1000 FCFA (€1 and €2).  However, given decreasing financial resources 
and difficulties in obtaining donor support, the human rights association could not sustain 
the publication of the newsletter.  
 
These two examples, “The NWADO Brief” and the “BOTFON Human Rights Watch” 
demonstrate how publication of newsletters can help associations disseminate information 
when they cannot afford standard media. The two cases also show that donors can help 
local associations to link or network locally, if funds for media and communication are 
included within the development aid packages given out to these associations. Most 
181 
 
association advocacy programmes in Cameroon are localized. Greater information sharing, 
through the media, could increase the likelihood that associations in one part of the country 
would learn about and appropriate successful advocacy strategies developed by 
associations in other regions of the country. In other words, through greater information-
sharing and mutual learning, a movement for democratic change could grow from current 
disconnected CSO advocacy campaigns. 
 
Like most African countries, Cameroon is undergoing a gradual cyber technology 
revolution. However, at this time, only a small fraction of the Cameroonian population has 
regular access to computers and the internet. This implies that the internet as a means of 
information-sharing is not a feasible option for most associations, particularly those in the 
rural areas. Despite the press freedom law in Cameroon, private media still operate in an 
atmosphere of government intimidation or harassment, which forces them into self-
censorship. In contrast to traditional media, the internet is more difficult to censor 
(Sussman, 2000).  Since information flow is the lifeblood of democracy, increase in access 
to the internet holds promise for the democratization prospect in African countries (De 
Beer, 2001).  
 
6.4  SUMMING-UP 
 
Institutions are stable and resistant to change, but in every context, change is possible even 
if difficult and slow. Starting from the premise that actors can play an active role in 
crafting new institutions, this chapter has reviewed literature on the mechanisms that 
permit institutional change. Literature holds that actors can readily build new institutions 
by creating focal points for coordination and building a new identity; by sharing 
information and learning from experiences; and by banking on existing successes. In view 
of these mechanisms, this chapter argues that as far as the quest for democracy and 
equality in development is concerned, associations in NW Cameroon have scored some 
successes in efforts aimed at: (a) rebuilding the image of CSOs; (b) promoting networking; 
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(c) increasing resource capacities; (d) enhancing community participation; (e) advocating 
for justice and accountability; and (f) facilitating information dissemination.  
 
Successful strategies for building the image of CSOs include measure like:  
- developing a code of ethics for development associations, 
- promoting whistle-blowing on fraudulent organizations,  
- focusing interventions on topical issue that are relevant for the wider society.  
Sound ways of promoting networking and avoiding conflicts within networks include:  
- recruiting an independent coordinator to manage the CSO network, 
- publishing a newsletter to show other CSOs the benefits of being in a network, 
- encouraging donors to direct more funding towards network-run projects instead of 
projects implement by single CSOs, 
- keeping network memberships fees moderate to attract a wide spectrum of CSOs, 
- creating branches of prominent CSO networks in different regions to avoid 
competition and conflict among multiple networks. 
 
Some identified successful practices for increasing the resource capacity of CSOs include: 
- engaging in income-generating activities and microfinance projects, 
- diversifying intervention areas to attract funding from different sources, 
- encouraging donors to avoid using corrupt governments as ‘middlemen’ for 
transmission of fund to local associations, 
- building the financial management capacities of local associations, 
- advocating for donors to shift from project-based funding to long-term financial 
cooperation (program-based funding). 
Laudable initiatives for enhancing community participation in Africa include: 
- establishing REFLECT circles within local communities, 
- assisting local communities to set-up a common community organization and to 
elect development committees which can represent their interests. 
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In semi-autocratic states, less risky strategies for advocating for justice and accountability 
include: 
- using the legal channels or courts (right-based approaches), 
- embarrassing the state by exposing malpractices, 
- bringing international pressure on the state by circulating complaints and petitions 
to foreign embassies. 
Last but not least, some practices that have worked in facilitating information 
dissemination include: 
- taking advantage of private media to challenge state monopoly over information 
dissemination, 
- publishing newsletters to avoid costs associated with using the private press, 
- encouraging donors to include funds for media and communication in their 
development aid package to NGOs. 
This chapter argues that, using the above measures, associations are more likely to break 
institutional constraints to democracy when their actions are consistent or continuous over 
a period of time, as opposed to when they are sporadic or discontinuous.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  THE SUBJECT OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
After more than half a century of so-called development practice, poverty and high levels 
of inequalities obstinately persist in sub-Saharan Africa.  Generally-speaking, the 
governments of sub-Saharan African states have failed to make basic social services 
accessible to the majority. Government failure is not only glaring in the inability to bring 
economic growth to the masses, but also in institutionalized corruption and 
mismanagement that flourishes in state institutions. As The Economist (1990) aptly put it 
two decades ago, “bad government is the biggest single reason for poverty in the Third 
World.” Given the failures of sub-Saharan African states to bring socio-economic 
development to the majority of citizens, the issue of governance has gained prominence in 
international development discourse. Among researchers and practitioners alike, there is a 
popular call for decentralization and participatory governance as the way forward for 
effective development in Africa. ‘How to promote good governance?’ remains the 
question of the day among development actors at the global, national and local level.  
 
In his influential book, Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam (1993) advances an 
answer to this complex question, using empirical data from regions in the North and South 
of Italy. He showed that the regions in the North with numerous and active civic 
associations had open, transparent, accountable, inclusive and well performing 
governments. On the other hand, the regions in the South with low associational activity 
were characterized by corruption, clientelism, hierarchical and poor performing 
governments. Putnam explained that associations build social capital – networks and 
norms of reciprocity and trust – which predisposes citizens to cooperation and pursue 
shared goals. He argued that in the regions of the North, the rich associational life and 
hence high social capital accounted for the more democratic, more accountable and well 
performing governments. Meanwhile, the low density of associations and the resultant low 
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levels of social capital in the Southern regions explained why the governments were 
hierarchical, corrupt and ineffective. Inspired by Tocqueville, Putnam argues that there is a 
positive relationship between associations and democratization. Social capital, he writes, 
“is the key to making democracy work” (ibid, 185).  
 
The influence of the associations-democracy theory on international development policy 
and practice has been tremendous. International development organizations encourage the 
creation of civic associations in developing countries with the expectation that a vibrant 
associational life in these countries will promote democratic governance. According to 
mainstream development discourse, deeper or more inclusive forms of democracy, such as 
participatory governance, are crucial for development efforts to succeed. In comparison 
with traditional representative systems, participatory governance, it is argued, ensures 
greater equality, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability in service 
delivery, and thereby limits government corruption.  
 
In view of promoting good governance for development, Western donors since the late 80s 
began to direct an increasing amount of funds to associations in developing countries. This 
increased availability of donor support triggered a rapid rise in the number of associations 
in sub-Saharan African countries. The fall of authoritarian regimes and the introduction of 
multiparty politics and civil liberties in sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s also 
favored the emergence of associations. Despite this rapid increase in civil society 
organizations, democracy in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa has not advanced 
readily as anticipated. In Cameroon, for example, where there has been an association 
boom since the 1990s, the democratization process has stalled. Even though multiparty 
politics was introduced in Cameroon in 1990, regime change has not taken place; human 
rights abuses are common, bureaucratic corruption is high, and decentralizations schemes 
are cosmetic and do not allow for citizen participation. Cameroon in effect has remained a 
pseudo-democracy. When one considers the Putnam associations-democracy theory, the 
the persistence of undemocratic forms of government in sub-Saharan African countries 
despite the existence of numerous associations is puzzling. 
187 
 
 
In view of the disappointing performance of civil society in African countries, a critical 
school of researchers contend that faith in the associations-democracy relationship runs 
ahead scientific evidence. First, critics point out that to understand the actual role which 
civil society organizations in African countries can play in advancing democracy, research 
must pay attention to how the institutional context influences these associations. Second, 
they argue that while Putnam posits a relationship between social capital and good 
governance, he does not clearly show how social capital brings about positive changes in 
governance. In other words, in the associations-democracy theory, the relationship 
between the social capital and the political capital of associations needs to be clarified. 
Third, critics note that scholarly discussions on civil society and democracy in developing 
countries have been overwhelmingly normative. Research that makes a shift from 
normative discussions to empirical analysis of the actual democracy promotion potential of 
specific civil society actors will be more meaningful and is therefore much desired. 
 
Taking the association-rich North West Region of Cameroon as a case, this study 
contributes in filling the above research gaps. The study sets out to achieve six objectives. 
Firstly, develop a conceptual framework that can be used for analyzing and measuring 
pressure for democracy in associations. Secondly, apply the conceptual tool in assessing 
quantitatively, the democracy pressure capacities of associations in the North West Region 
of Cameroon. Thirdly, analyze whether or not social capital among associations in the case 
study correlates with political capital. Fourthly, assess whether the influence of the 
institutional context (regulations, norms and cultural codes of conduct) on development 
associations is strong or weak. Fifthly, describe the mechanism through which the 
institutional context constrains the capacity of associations to pressure for democracy. 
Lastly, highlight some laudable measures which associations in sub-Saharan Africa can 
use to challenge the institutional factors that limit their potentials to press for democracy.  
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7.2  THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
7.2.1  Methodological Contributions 
 
A great deal of research has been done on the attributes that are important for civil society 
organizations to pressure for reform or good governance. Different studies espouse diverse 
bottom-up pressure attributes. No study, however, has yet proposed a comprehensive 
framework of the set of attributes necessary for effective bottom-up pressure; a framework 
which can be applied as a tool for analyzing association pressure for democracy in 
different contexts. 
 
From a broad survey of literature on the factors for effective civil society advocacy, this 
study proposes the POWER framework as a conceptual tool for bottom-up pressure 
analysis. The POWER framework represents the argument that development associations 
would effectively mount pressure for democratic governance when they engage in 
• Policy advocacy activities, 
• Organize and form networks,  
• Work in collaboration with local communities, 
• Establish links with opposition political parties, and 
• Rally resources for their activities. 
 
Although the five attributes of bottom-up pressure (POWER) are in reality qualitative in 
nature, they can also be assessed quantitatively with the help of a carefully structured 
questionnaire. When applied quantitatively in a given locality – as is the case in this study 
– the POWER framework reveals the deficiencies in bottom-up pressure capacity in that 
locality. This diagnosis can enlighten associations and proponents of democracy about 
which attributes of pressure they need to strengthen in the given locality.  
 
The POWER framework enables a more structured qualitative analysis of bottom-up 
pressure in a single case study, and a structured qualitative comparison across two or three 
cases. When used quantitatively, the framework also shows the relationship or correlations 
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between the different attributes of pressure in a particular context. Although a large 
amount of qualitative research has been done on civil society associations and pressure for 
democracy in Africa, quantitative comparison across provinces within a country or across 
different countries is rare. The POWER framework and its accompanying questionnaire – 
presented in this study – is a methodological contribution that now makes large scale 
quantitative studies a possibility. The conceptual framework is definitely not free of 
weaknesses, but as its use in this study demonstrates, it holds methodological promise for 
bottom-up pressure assessment. The framework is the first attempt of to crystallize 
arguments on the attributes for effective civil society advocacy; and further research works 
can build on this first step.  
  
7.2.3  Theoretical Contributions 
 
The study contributes in addressing two important research gaps in the associations-
democracy theory, namely: the influence of the institutional context on bottom-up pressure 
and the relationship between social capital and political capital.  
 
First, using correspondence analysis in conjunction with the theory of institutional 
isomorphism, the research shows that the influence of the institutional context on 
associations in the North West Region of Cameroon is strong. The institutional context – 
comprising regulations, norms and cultural codes of conduct – constrain association 
pressure for democracy by limiting political capital. Quantitative analysis reveals that 
although social capital is high among associations in the case study, political capital and 
resource capacities of these civil society organizations is low. This low political capital 
and resources capacity of associations in the case study explains why the association boom 
in Cameroon has not produced significant improvements in governance as expected.  
 
As Putnam argues, high social capital in the form of cooperation and networking that 
develops from a vibrant associational life is an important contributing factor to 
democratization. However, the existence of high levels of social capital is not sufficient for 
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associations to have a positive effect on state administration. This is so because 
cooperation and networking is not always political in nature. By arguing that social capital 
“is the key to making democracy work”, Putnam (1993: 185) subsumed political capital as 
an attribute that invariably accompanies high social capital. This study demonstrates that 
this assumption is incorrect.  
 
Quantitative assessment and correspondence analysis of bottom-up pressure attributes 
among associations in the North West Region of Cameroon reveal that social capital and 
political capital are not correlated or conjoint. The study argues that the constraining 
effects, which government and donor regulations, societal norms, and cultural codes of 
conduct have on the political capacities of associations, are responsible for this social 
capital-political capital disassociation.  
 
7.3.2  Recommendations for African Associations and International Donors 
 
In addition to the methodological and theoretical contributions, this research holds some 
practical recommendations for development associations and international development 
organizations that strive for deeper forms of democracy in Africa. If development 
associations in countries like Cameroon hope to have a stronger impact on democratization 
processes, energies must be directed towards building their political capital and resource 
capacities.  
 
Apart from contributing in service delivery, development associations in such pseudo-
democratic African countries like Cameroon need to first confront head-on those 
regulatory, normative and cultural institutions that limit their maneuvering space. For 
instance, associations in Cameroon need to focus on getting rid of the state regulations that 
proscribe the formation and registration of associations that have political objectives. They 
also need to strive towards elimination of the state decree that grants the government the 
right to ban protests. These regulations limit the very liberties which the freedom of 
association law claims to grant. Without first striving to improve the legal environment 
191 
 
that governs their own activities, the influence of associations on other structure of 
governance will remain limited.  
 
The view that ‘development work’ is a non-political enterprise, and the view that politics is 
the prerogative of politicians and not of associations are widely accepted among 
associations in Cameroon. These two norms act as a major setback to the development of 
political capital among associations. Such norms are not peculiar to associations in 
Cameroon, but are common in development practice in other African countries. Ferguson, 
for example, refers to development work in Lesotho as an “anti-politics machine” that 
subdues local communities and strengthens the powers of government. Drawing on case 
study evidence, this research argues that the reflective participation approach to 
development is a praiseworthy measure which associations can use in countering the above 
norms. In reflective participation forums, citizens develop the habit of asking questions 
about the underlying causes of their problems, and they also reflect on how these root 
cause can be tackled. Adopting a reflective participation approach to development can thus 
empower associations to identify and strive towards overturning those underlying political, 
social, and cultural structures that promulgate inequality and poverty in local communities. 
 
In addition to the regulatory and normative institutions that constrain their political capital, 
associations in NW Cameroon operate in a cultural environment that encourages the 
reverence of power holders, namely political elites and chiefs. By practicing participation 
in local level development projects, associations can gradually build within society the 
disposition to hold power to account. In the Cameroonian context where the government 
shows little tolerance for accountability demands made in the form of protests, associations 
have turned to the legal system as their battleground against abuses of power. Although 
these development associations have scored many successes through this ‘access to justice 
approach’, they have not always succeeded in getting the legal system to sanction abuses 
of power.  However, even in failure, the access to justice approach holds advocacy value 
because it exposes the unfairness of the judicial system. Qualitative data also indicates that 
by attacking the image of the government through the shaming of corrupt and poor 
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performing sectors, associations in sub-Saharan Africa can influence the government to 
consider reform.  
 
Carrying out advocacy does not suffice for changes in governance to emerge: the manner 
in which advocacy is carried out also matters. Institutions – regulations, norms, and 
cultural practices – that uphold systems of governance within a given region are stable and 
resistant to change. One-off or intermittent advocacy interventions on the part of 
associations are unlikely to result in durable institutional change. To succeed in effecting 
institutional change and producing long-lasting improvements in the system of 
governance, associations in African countries need to exercise consistency in their 
advocacy interventions. When the interventions of development associations are 
intermittent, institutions relapse to their original state whenever those interventions that 
push for change are interrupted. Consistency in association interventions gives time for 
new governance norms, value and practices to become institutionalized, thereby yielding 
durable changes in governance. Among international donors working in the NW region of 
Cameroon, the practice of avoiding duplication of funded association activities is popular. 
For donors, duplication – funding an association to carry out an advocacy program that is 
already being implemented in the same locality by another association – is seen as a waste 
of resources. This ‘avoid duplication policy’ is a serious barrier to consistency in 
association advocacy activity. 
 
The likelihood that the advocacy actions of development associations will trigger positive 
changes in governance also depends on the strength of the association networks that 
coordinate such interventions. Networking among development associations in NW 
Cameroon is fraught with conflicts due to stiff competition between network members 
over donor resources. Associations can reduce such strife if network members lay down 
clear rules that stipulate the kind of donor resources which associations can compete for 
individually, and which kind of resources they must apply for as a network. Donors can 
also encourage networking among development associations if in their funding allocations, 
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they give preference to network-run projects rather than projects run by single 
associations.   
 
International donors have made substantial efforts to strengthen networking among CSOs 
in the North West Region of Cameroon. Donors, however, must recognize that contrary to 
the discourse about social capital’s wonderful democratizing powers, social capital in 
reality is weak in the absence of political capital and financial resources. Qualitative and 
quantitative evidence from the North West Region of Cameroon makes this abundantly 
clear. International development organizations would contribute in building this much 
needed political capital if they refrain from earmarking development funds primarily for 
service delivery activities, and encourage local associations to include advocacy 
components in their development programs. Also, international donors would better 
contribute to political capital in local African associations if they channel funding directly 
to these associations rather than through the government. Given the high levels of 
bureaucratic corruption in pseudo-democratic countries like Cameroon, donor funds 
channelled through the state easily becomes a co-optation tool in the service of the 
government; a tool used for neutralizing vocal associations.  
 
In summary, this study is particularly relevant for international development organizations 
because it gives evidence-based voice to the institutionalist argument that ‘contexts differ 
and contexts matter’.  International donors have not been wrong to embrace the idea that 
supporting the formation of associations in African countries can result in positive 
externalities for democracy and development. However, if due consideration is not given 
to the ways in which regulations, norms, and the cultural setting in African countries affect 
associations, and steps are not taken to challenge these institutions, civil society 
organizations would not deliver expected results. The knowledge on how the institutional 
context constrains political capital among associations should make international donors 
rethink many of their policies. It should make them rethink the kind of associations to 
which they give funding preference; rethink the kind of activities they encourage 
associations to focus on; and rethink the ways in which they channel funds to associations. 
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Only when international donors recognize that building social capital does not suffice in 
the advancement of democracy, can they also take stronger action to promote two other 
assets, namely political capital and resource capacity among associations.   
 
The above practical recommendations for development associations and donors are drawn 
from the experience of associations in the Cameroonian context. Worthy of note, the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa shared a common socio-political background until the mid 
90s. Also, development associations in these countries have emerged and evolved in the 
same international development paradigm. As shown in Chapter 5, through reference to 
research works elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, development associations in many 
countries on the sub-continent experience some of the institutional constraints identified in 
this case study. The practical recommendations of this research are, therefore, applicable to 
those sub-Saharan African countries in which institutions similar to those in Cameroon 
shape the reality of development associations.  
 
7.4  LIMITATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study has addressed all the research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter, 
and it has tested the five sets of hypothesis which it set out to examine. However, the 
research has a number of limitations which further research can tackle.  
 
First, the research proposes a conceptual tool (the POWER framework) to guide qualitative 
analysis and quantitative assessment of association pressure for democracy. The five 
attributes of bottom-up pressure in this conceptual framework are accorded equal 
importance in the case study. More research is required to verify this assumption. 
Although it is clear that all five attributes of POWER are important for bottom-up pressure 
in different ways, some of the parameters might, in reality, have greater significance than 
others. The relative significance of the five attributes might be an empirical issue rather 
than a theoretical issue. Whatever the case, research on how the five bottom-up pressure 
attributes rank in importance relative to each other in the Cameroonian context, will go a 
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long way to enlighten associations and development practitioners about, where in POWER 
lies the greatest power.  
 
Second, this research suffers from the main limitation of the single case study research 
design, namely, the inability to offer comparison. The findings of the research raise many 
questions which can only be answered by a multiple case study or a survey research. For 
example, would associations in other parts of Cameroon, or regions in other sub-Saharan 
African countries show similar bottom-up pressure capacities as the North West region of 
Cameroon? Is the disassociation between social capital and political capital (which this 
study reveals) a common feature among associations in sub-Saharan Africa? Or will 
associations in a country like Ghana – which is considered the shiny example of 
democracy in Africa – show a correlation between these attributes? The need for a 
comparative study or a multiple case study research that makes use of the POWER 
framework to analyze bottom-up pressure in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be 
overemphasized.  
 
Third, this study assesses bottom-up pressure quantitatively and uses process tracing to 
show how specific association practices impinge on governance practices or institutions. 
However, no inference is made about the link between the level of pressure and the mode 
of governance or the performance of government. The study rests on the common 
assumption that a high level of bottom-up pressure will stimulate positive changes in 
governance. While this assumption is logical, it needs to be verified; because governments 
do not always respond to civic pressure. Verifying this assumption will require a multiple 
case study design and hence a considerable amount of resources and time.  
 
Fourth, this study presents an assessment of association pressure for democracy in the 
North West Region of Cameroon, but it gives no clue whether and how this pressure has 
changed over time. Further research could adopt a longitudinal research design that 
assesses the bottom-up pressure capacities of associations over a particular time interval; 
for example, every two, three, four or five years. Such a study that takes a longitudinal 
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approach could help identify how particular factors or events influence the evolution of the 
bottom-up pressure capacities of associations in a given region or locality. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Warren (2004: 46) rightly points out that “there is a very large 
amount of thinking and research to be done if we are really to take seriously the 
democracy-civil society [or association] connection.” This study has contributed in filling 
this research gap by proposing a conceptual tool for quantitative analysis of bottom-up 
pressure; by providing a qualitative analysis of how the institutional context in an African 
country influences the associations-democracy relationship; and by demonstrating within a 
single case study that social capital and political capital in associations are not necessarily 
coupled. But perhaps the greatest input of the study is that, through its findings, it also 
points researchers towards the additional work that needs to be accomplished for us to 
fully understand the associations-democracy connection.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
APPENDIX 1:  LIST OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS 
 
Associations 
African Institute for Economic and Social Development (INADES Formation) 
Aghem cultural and Development Association 
Angel of Mercy 
Angong Cultural and Development Association (ADCA) 
Association for Youth Justice and Development (AYJD) 
Awing Cultural and Development Association (ACUDA) 
Babungo Cultural and Development Association 
Bafut Manjong Cultural and Development Association 
Bali Nyonga Development and cultural Association (BANDECA) 
Baligaam Elite Cultural and Development Association 
Balikumbat Cultural and Development Association 
Bambili Cultural and Development Association 
Bambui Cultural and Development Association 
Bamendakwe Development and Cultural Association 
Baminjen Cultural and Development Association 
Bamunkumbit Cultural and Development Association 
Befang Cultural and Development Association 
Belo Cultural and Development Association 
Beri Kindness for Individual and Development Services (BERIKIDS) 
Binkar Development  and Cultural Association (BINDECA) 
Botfon Human Rights Watch (BOHURW) 
Buwe Cultural and Development Association 
Cameroon Bar Association 
Cameroon Commonwealth Nurses Association 
Cameroon Ecovillage NGO (CECOVIL) 
Cameroon Teachers Trade Union (CATTU) 
Centre for Human Rights and Peace Advocacy (CHRAPA) 
Centre for Rehabilitation and Abolition of Trauma (CRAT) 
Christian Children Care International (CHALICE) 
Civil Law Society 
Community Development and Epilepsy Foundation (CODEF) 
Community Education and Development Service (CEDS) 
Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD) 
Community Resource Centre for the Disabled and the Disadvantaged (CRCDD) 
Community Unity Trust 
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Donga-Mantum Community Radio (DMCR) 
Esu Cultural and Development Association (ECUDA) 
Fight Against Poverty Association (FAPA) 
Green Care 
Guneku Cultural and Development Association 
Hope For Widows and Orphans Ministries (HWOM) 
Human Rights Resource Management Clinic and Education Centre (HURMACE) 
Integrated Youth Volunteer Foundation (IYVF) 
Interfaith Vision Cameroon (IVFcam) 
International Assistance for Community Development (INACOD) 
Kejum Keku Cultural and Development Association 
Knowledge for Children NGO 
Kumbo Development and Orientation Centre (KUDOC) 
Light Africa Cameroon 
Mankwi Cultural and Development Association (MACUDA) 
Mbatu Cultural and Development Association  
Mbem Cultural and Development Association 
Mbengwi Cultural and Development Association (MBECUDA) 
Mbororo Social Cultural and Development Association (MBOSCUDA) 
Mbuh Cultural and Development Association 
Mmen Cultural and Development Association  
Modelle Development Association (MODA) 
Mundum Cultural and Development Association 
Muslim Students Association Bamenda (MUSAB) 
National Organisation of Human Rights (NOHR) 
Navti Foundation 
Nda Lela 
Ngie Cultural and Development Association (NCADA) 
Ngoketunjia AIDS Fighters (NAFI) 
Ngwo Cultural and Development Association (NCUDA) 
Nka-ni-kwi-ni Mankon 
Nkumu Fed Fed 
North West Association of Development Organisations (NWADO) 
North West Farmers Organisation (NOWEFOR) 
North West Women Empowerment Forum (NOWEF) 
Nseh cultural and Development Association  
Nso Development Association (NSODA) 
Oku cultural and Development Association  
Oshei Cultural and Development Association (OCUDA) 
Pinyin cultural and Development Association  
Piyin Sustainable Farming System (PISUFAS) 
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Positive Vision Cameroon  for Community Development 
Pure and Undefiled Hope Ministries (PUHM) 
Rural Infrastructure Development Group (RIDGRO) 
Santos Development Organisation (SADO) 
Save the Young NGO (SAYO) 
Self Reliance Promoters (SEREP) 
Sharon Farmers Group 
Shisong Development Association 
Society for Initiatives in Rural Development and Environmental Protection (SIRDEP) 
Socio-cultural Association for Livestock Breeding and Development (SODELCO) 
Star Crusaders Against AIDS 
Strategic Action to Alleviate Suffering (STRATAS) 
Strategic Humanitarian Services in Cameroon (SHUMAS) 
Sustainable Balanced Development Foundation (SIBADEF) 
Tabenken Cultural and Development Association 
The Development and Human Rights Monitor (DEHERI) 
Torch Bearer Foundation 
Weh Cultural and Development Association 
Welfare Foundation for the Underprivileged and Vulnerable (WELFUV) 
Wombong Area Development Union (WADU) 
Women Empowerment Institute Cameroon (WEICAM) 
Women in Action Against Gender-based Violence (WACameroon) 
Women’s Initiative for Health Education and Economic Development - Cameroon 
(WINHEEDCAM) 
Youth Outreach Program (YOP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
